From Lazarus''No Pineapple''

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The U.S. Government refers to malicious cyber activity by the North Korean government as HIDDEN COBRA.[1][5]

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Lazarus Group keylogger KiloAlfa obtains user tokens from interactive sessions to execute itself with API call CreateProcessAsUserA under that user's context.[3][8]

Lazarus Group has queried an active directory server to obtain the list of accounts, including administrator accounts.[9]

Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyDelta-Two contains a function that attempts to rename the administrator’s account.[3][10]

Lazarus Group has acquired domains related to their campaigns to act as distribution points and C2 channels.[11][9][12]

Lazarus Group has acquired servers to host their malicious tools.[9]

Lazarus Group has hosted malicious downloads on Github and Dropbox.[11][13]

Lazarus Group executed Responder using the command [Responder file path] -i [IP address] -rPv on a compromised host to harvest credentials and move laterally.[14]

Lazarus Group has conducted C2 over HTTP and HTTPS.[15][16][17][18][19][20][21]

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server the title of the window for each running process. The KilaAlfa keylogger also reports the title of the window in the foreground.[3][22][8]

Lazarus Group has compressed exfiltrated data with RAR and used RomeoDelta malware to archive specified directories in .zip format, encrypt the .zip file, and upload it to C2. [22][23][15][9]

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is compressed with Zlib, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[23][15]

A Lazarus Group malware sample encrypts data using a simple byte based XOR operation prior to exfiltration.[3][22][23][15]

Lazarus Group has maintained persistence by loading malicious code into a startup folder or by adding a Registry Run key.[3][23][15][18][19]

Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.[15][13]

Lazarus Group has performed brute force attacks against administrator accounts.[9]

Lazarus Group malware attempts to connect to Windows shares for lateral movement by using a generated list of usernames, which center around permutations of the username Administrator, and weak passwords.[3][23]

Lazarus Group has used PowerShell to execute commands and malicious code.[9][12]

Lazarus Group malware uses cmd.exe to execute commands on a compromised host.[3][10][15][24][20] A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group uses a batch file mechanism to delete its binaries from the system.[25]

Lazarus Group has used VBA and embedded macros in Word documents to execute malicious code.[18][13][19][20]

Lazarus Group has compromised legitimate domains, including those hosted in the US and Italy, for C2.[26]

Lazarus Group has compromised servers to stage malicious tools.[14][13][9][18]

Several Lazarus Group malware families install themselves as new services.[3][10]

Lazarus Group has used a custom secure delete function to overwrite file contents with data from heap memory.[3]

A Lazarus Group malware sample encodes data with base64.[15]

Lazarus Group has collected data and files from compromised networks.[3][22][23][14][13][18]

Lazarus Group malware also uses a unique form of communication encryption known as FakeTLS that mimics TLS but uses a different encryption method, potentially evading SSL traffic inspection/decryption.[3][10][15][25]

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia saves information gathered about the victim to a file that is saved in the %TEMP% directory, then compressed, encrypted, and uploaded to a C2 server.[3][22]

Lazarus Group replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a Disk Structure Wipe.[10]

Lazarus Group has used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs and shellcode into memory at runtime.[19][20]

Lazarus Group has developed custom malware for use in their operations.[11][9][12][13]

Lazarus Group has used malware like WhiskeyAlfa to overwrite the first 64MB of every drive with a mix of static and random buffers. A similar process is then used to wipe content in logical drives and, finally, attempt to wipe every byte of every sector on every drive. WhiskeyBravo can be used to overwrite the first 4.9MB of physical drives. WhiskeyDelta can overwrite the first 132MB or 1.5MB of each drive with random data from heap memory.[10]

Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT overwrites and deletes the Master Boot Record (MBR) on the victim's machine and has possessed MBR wiper malware since at least 2009.[24][3]

Lazarus Group delivered RATANKBA and other malicious code to victims via a compromised legitimate website.[27][12]

Several Lazarus Group malware families encrypt C2 traffic using custom code that uses XOR with an ADD operation and XOR with a SUB operation. Another Lazarus Group malware sample XORs C2 traffic. Other Lazarus Group malware uses Caracachs encryption to encrypt C2 payloads. Lazarus Group has also used AES to encrypt C2 traffic.[3][10][15][25][18]

Lazarus Group has created new LinkedIn and Twitter accounts to conduct social engineering against potential victims.[13][9][12]

Lazarus Group has created new email accounts for spearphishing operations.[9][14]

Lazarus Group malware SierraBravo-Two generates an email message via SMTP containing information about newly infected victims.[3][23]

Lazarus Group has exfiltrated data and files over a C2 channel through its various tools and malware.[3][22][15][26]

Lazarus Group has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox using a customized version of dbxcli.[9][13]

Lazarus Group has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2018-4878 for execution.[28]

Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa sends data to one of the hard-coded C2 servers chosen at random, and if the transmission fails, chooses a new C2 server to attempt the transmission again.[3][23]

Several Lazarus Group has conducted word searches on compromised machines to identify specific documents of interest. Lazarus Group malware can use a common function to identify target files by their extension, and some also enumerate files and directories, including a Destover-like variant that lists files and gathers information for all drives.[3][25][13][19][20]

Lazarus Group collected email addresses belonging to various departments of a targeted organization which were used in follow-on phishing campaigns.[14]

Lazarus Group has studied publicly available information about a targeted organization to tailor spearphishing efforts against specific departments and/or individuals.[9][13][14]

Lazarus Group has targeted specific individuals within an organization with tailored job vacancy announcements.[9][13]

Lazarus Group has used a VBA Macro to set its file attributes to System and Hidden and has named files with a dot prefix to hide them from the Finder application.[15][16][17][19]

Lazarus Group has replaced win_fw.dll, an internal component that is executed during IDA Pro installation, with a malicious DLL to download and execute a payload.[21]

Lazarus Group has abused the KernelCallbackTable to hijack process control flow and execute shellcode.[19][20]

Lazarus Group malware TangoDelta attempts to terminate various processes associated with McAfee. Additionally, Lazarus Group malware SHARPKNOT disables the Microsoft Windows System Event Notification and Alerter services.[3][22][8][24].

Various Lazarus Group malware modifies the Windows firewall to allow incoming connections or disable it entirely using netsh. [3][22][8]

Lazarus Group has restored malicious KernelCallbackTable code to its original state after the process execution flow has been hijacked.[19]

Lazarus Group has routinely deleted log files on a compromised router, including automatic log deletion through the use of the logrotate utility.[14]

Lazarus Group malware has deleted files in various ways, including "suicide scripts" to delete malware binaries from the victim. Lazarus Group also uses secure file deletion to delete files from the victim.[3][25]

Several Lazarus Group malware families use timestomping, including modifying the last write timestamp of a specified Registry key to a random date, as well as copying the timestamp for legitimate .exe files (such as calc.exe or mspaint.exe) to its dropped files.[3][10][22][25]

Lazarus Group persistence mechanisms have used forfiles.exe to execute .htm files.[20]

Lazarus Group has downloaded files, malware, and tools from its C2 onto a compromised host.[3][10][22][16][17][13][14][18][9][12][19][20][21]

Lazarus Group malware KiloAlfa contains keylogging functionality.[3][8]

Lazarus Group has conducted internal spearphishing from within a compromised organization.[13]

Lazarus Group has disguised malicious template files as JPEG files to avoid detection.[18]

Lazarus Group has renamed system utilities such as wscript.exe and mshta.exe.[20]

Lazarus Group has used a scheduled task named SRCheck to mask the execution of a malicious .dll.[21]

Lazarus Group has renamed malicious code to disguise it as Microsoft's narrator and other legitimate files.[29][9][20]

Lazarus Group has used multi-stage malware components that inject later stages into separate processes.[19]

Lazarus Group has used the Windows API ObtainUserAgentString to obtain the User-Agent from a compromised host to connect to a C2 server.[18] Lazarus Group has also used various, often lesser known, functions to perform various types of Discovery and Process Injection.[19][20]

Lazarus Group has used nmap from a router VM to scan ports on systems within the restricted segment of an enterprise network.[14]

Some Lazarus Group malware uses a list of ordered port numbers to choose a port for C2 traffic, creating port-protocol mismatches.[3][23]

Lazarus Group has used multiple types of encryption and encoding for their payloads, including AES, Caracachs, RC4, XOR, Base64, and other tricks such as creating aliases in code for Native API function names.[3][22][23][15][17][9][18][26][13][19][20]

Lazarus Group has used Themida to pack malicious DLLs and other files.[13][26]

Lazarus Group has used a custom hashing method to resolve APIs used in shellcode.[19]

Lazarus Group has obtained a variety of tools for their operations, including Responder, PuTTy PSCP, Wake-On-Lan, ChromePass, and dbxcli.[9][13][14]

Lazarus Group has used code signing certificates issued by Sectigo RSA for some of its malware and tools.[9]

Lazarus Group has obtained SSL certificates for their C2 domains.[11]

Lazarus Group has targeted victims with spearphishing emails containing malicious Microsoft Word documents.[28][14][18][19][20]

Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.[14][13][9]

Lazarus Group has used social media platforms, including LinkedIn and Twitter, to send spearphishing messages.[12][13][9]

Lazarus Group malware WhiskeyAlfa-Three modifies sector 0 of the Master Boot Record (MBR) to ensure that the malware will persist even if a victim machine shuts down.[3][10]

Several Lazarus Group malware families gather a list of running processes on a victim system and send it to their C2 server. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also gathers process times.[3][22][15][25][17][19]

A Lazarus Group malware sample performs reflective DLL injection.[15][19]

Lazarus Group has used a compromised router to serve as a proxy between a victim network's corporate and restricted segments.[14]

Lazarus Group has used multiple proxies to obfuscate network traffic from victims.[30][17]

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia checks Registry keys within HKCU and HKLM to determine if certain applications are present, including SecureCRT, Terminal Services, RealVNC, TightVNC, UltraVNC, Radmin, mRemote, TeamViewer, FileZilla, pcAnyware, and Remote Desktop. Another Lazarus Group malware sample checks for the presence of the following Registry key:HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Bitcoin\Bitcoin-Qt.[3][22][15]

Lazarus Group has changed memory protection permissions then overwritten in memory DLL function code with shellcode, which was later executed via KernelCallbackTable hijacking. Lazarus Group has also used shellcode within macros to decrypt and manually map DLLs into memory at runtime.[19][20]

Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.[3][23]

Lazarus Group malware SierraAlfa accesses the ADMIN$ share via SMB to conduct lateral movement.[3][23]

Lazarus Group used SSH and the PuTTy PSCP utility to gain access to a restricted segment of a compromised network.[14]

Lazarus Group has used schtasks for persistence including through the periodic execution of a remote XSL script or a dropped VBS payload.[9][20][21]

Lazarus Group has used LinkedIn to identify and target specific employees within a chosen organization.[9][13]

Lazarus Group has stopped the MSExchangeIS service to render Exchange contents inaccessible to users.[10]

Lazarus Group has hosted malicious files on compromised as well as Lazarus Group-controlled servers.[13][9][26]

Lazarus Group has hosted custom and open-source tools on compromised as well as Lazarus Group-controlled servers.[9]

Lazarus Group has digitally signed malware and utilities to evade detection.[9][19]

Lazarus Group lnk files used for persistence have abused the Windows Update Client (wuauclt.exe) to execute a malicious DLL.[19][20]

Lazarus Group has used mshta.exe to execute HTML pages downloaded by initial access documents.[19][20]

Lazarus Group has used rgsvr32 to execute custom malware.[9]

Lazarus Group has used rundll32 to execute malicious payloads on a compromised host.[18][9][21]

Several Lazarus Group malware families collect information on the type and version of the victim OS, as well as the victim computer name and CPU information. A Destover-like variant used by Lazarus Group also collects disk space information and sends it to its C2 server.[3][10][22][15][25][19]

Lazarus Group has deployed malware designed not to run on computers set to Korean, Japanese, or Chinese in Windows language preferences.[13]

Lazarus Group malware IndiaIndia obtains and sends to its C2 server information about the first network interface card’s configuration, including IP address, gateways, subnet mask, DHCP information, and whether WINS is available.[3][22]

Lazarus Group has used net use to identify and establish a network connection with a remote host.[14]

Various Lazarus Group malware enumerates logged-on users.[3][10][22][23][15][16][19]

Lazarus Group has rebooted systems after destroying files and wiping the MBR on infected systems.[24]

A Destover-like implant used by Lazarus Group can obtain the current system time and send it to the C2 server.[25]

Lazarus Group has used DOCX files to retrieve a malicious document template/DOTM file.[13][18]

Lazarus Group has sent spearphishing emails in an attempt to lure users to click on a malicious link.[9][13]

Lazarus Group has attempted to get users to launch a malicious Microsoft Word attachment delivered via a spearphishing email.[28][13][14][19][20]

Lazarus Group has used administrator credentials to gain access to restricted network segments.[14]

Lazarus Group has used tools to detect sandbox or VMware services through identifying the presence of a debugger or related services.[13]

Lazarus Group has used GitHub as C2, pulling hosted image payloads then committing command execution output to files in specific directories.[19]

Lazarus Group has used WMIC for discovery as well as to execute payloads for persistence and lateral movement.[3][23][13][14][20]

Lazarus Group has used WMIC to execute a remote XSL script to establish persistence.[9]

Lazarus Group has been observed targeting organizations using spearphishing documents with embedded malicious payloads. [31] Highly targeted spear phishing campaigns have been conducted against a U.S. electric grid company. [32]