Campaign of Deception: WarmCookie Malware Delivered via Fake Browser Updates
Indicators of Compromise
Campaign Guidance
Remediation, mitigation, notes, history and related intelligence
REMEDIATION
T1566 PHISHING
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
Monitor for third-party application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.[14][15] URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Monitor call logs from corporate devices to identify patterns of potential voice phishing, such as calls to/from known malicious phone numbers. Correlate these records with system events. | |||
Monitor for newly constructed files from a phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. | |||
Monitor and analyze SSL/TLS traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s) that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)). Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed.[14][15] | |||
Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. |
T1204 USER EXECUTION
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
Monitor for third-party application logging, messaging, and/or other artifacts that may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. | |||
Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads. | |||
Monitor for newly constructed containers that may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. | |||
Monitor for the activation or invocation of a container (ex: docker start or docker restart) | |||
Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe). | |||
Monitor for newly constructed image that may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. | |||
Monitor for newly constructed instances that may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. | |||
Monitor for the activation or invocation of an instance (ex: instance.start within GCP Audit Logs) | |||
Monitor for newly constructed web-based network connections that are sent to malicious or suspicious destinations (e.g. destinations attributed to phishing campaigns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated by regsvr32.exe, rundll.exe, .SCF, HTA, MSI, DLLs, or msiexec.exe). | |||
Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated with web-based network connections that are sent to malicious or suspicious detinations (e.g. destinations attributed to phishing campaigns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections or unusual connections initiated by regsvr32.exe, rundll.exe, .SCF, HTA, MSI, DLLs, or msiexec.exe). | |||
Monitor for newly executed processes that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads. |
T1059.001 COMMAND AND SCRIPTING INTERPRETER:POWERSHELL
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
If proper execution policy is set, adversaries will likely be able to define their own execution policy if they obtain administrator or system access, either through the Registry or at the command line. This change in policy on a system may be a way to detect malicious use of PowerShell. If PowerShell is not used in an environment, then simply looking for PowerShell execution may detect malicious activity. It is also beneficial to turn on PowerShell logging to gain increased fidelity in what occurs during execution (which is applied to .NET invocations). [273] PowerShell 5.0 introduced enhanced logging capabilities, and some of those features have since been added to PowerShell 4.0. Earlier versions of PowerShell do not have many logging features.[274] An organization can gather PowerShell execution details in a data analytic platform to supplement it with other data. PowerShell can be used over WinRM to remotely run commands on a host. When a remote PowerShell session starts, svchost.exe executes wsmprovhost.exe For this to work, certain registry keys must be set, and the WinRM service must be enabled. The PowerShell command Enter-PSSession -ComputerName \<RemoteHost> creates a remote PowerShell session. | |||
Monitor for loading and/or execution of artifacts associated with PowerShell specific assemblies, such as System.Management.Automation.dll (especially to unusual process names/locations).[3][4] Analytic 1 - Processes loading PowerShell assemblies source="*WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="7" | where ModulePath LIKE "%system.management.automation%" OR FileDescription LIKE "%system.management.automation%" | |||
Monitor for newly executed processes that may abuse PowerShell commands and scripts for execution. PowerShell is a scripting environment included with Windows that is used by both attackers and administrators. Execution of PowerShell scripts in most Windows versions is opaque and not typically secured by antivirus which makes using PowerShell an easy way to circumvent security measures. This analytic detects execution of PowerShell scripts. Powershell can be used to hide monitored command line execution such as: net usesc start Note: - The logic for Analytic 1 is based around detecting on non-interactive Powershell sessions (i.e., those not launched by a user through explorer.exe). This may lead to false positives when used in a production environment, so we recommend tuning any such analytics by including additional logic (e.g., looking for suspicious parent processes) that helps filter such events.- The logic for Analytic 2 is based around detecting on remote Powershell sessions. PowerShell can be used over WinRM to remotely run commands on a host. When a remote PowerShell session starts, svchost.exe executes wsmprovhost.exe. Analytic 1 - Non-interactive Powershell Sessions (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") Image="powershell.exe" AND ParentImage!="explorer.exe" Analytic 2 - Remote Powershell Sessions (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") Image="wsmprovhost.exe" AND ParentImage="svchost.exe" Analytic 3 - Powershell Execution (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") Image="C:\Windows\\powershell.exe" ParentImage!="C:\Windows\explorer.exe"|stats values(CommandLine) as "Command Lines" values(ParentImage) as "Parent Images" by ComputerName | |||
Consider monitoring for Windows event ID (EID) 400, which shows the version of PowerShell executing in the EngineVersion field (which may also be relevant to detecting a potential Downgrade Attack) as well as if PowerShell is running locally or remotely in the HostName field. Furthermore, EID 400 may indicate the start time and EID 403 indicates the end time of a PowerShell session.[275] | |||
Monitor for any attempts to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. Analytic 1 - Script Block Logging Events (source=WinEventLog:"Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell/Operational" EventID="4104" AND Image="powershell.exe" AND (CommandLine="-enc" OR CommandLine="-ep bypass" OR CommandLine="-noni*") |
T1082 SYSTEM INFORMATION DISCOVERY
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. For network devices, monitor executed commands in AAA logs, especially those run by unexpected or unauthorized users. | |||
Monitor for API calls that may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations. | |||
Monitor newly executed processes that may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. |
T1053 SHEDULED TASK/JOB
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. | |||
Monitor for newly constructed containers that may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. | |||
Monitor newly constructed files that may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. | |||
Monitor for changes made to files that may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. | |||
Monitor for newly executed processes that may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. | |||
Monitor newly constructed scheduled jobs that may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. On Windows systems, security event ID 4698 (A scheduled task was created) provides information on newly created scheduled tasks. It includes the TaskContent field, which contains an XML blob that captures key information on the scheduled task including the command to be executed. Analytic 1 - Scheduled Task Execution source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4698" | WHERE UserName LIKE "\SYSTEM" AND (TaskContent LIKE suspicious_parameter OR TaskContent LIKE "powershell.exe*") |
T1113 SCREEN CAPTURE
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may attempt to take screen captures of the desktop to gather information over the course of an operation. | |||
Monitoring for screen capture behavior will depend on the method used to obtain data from the operating system and write output files. Detection methods could include collecting information from unusual processes using API calls used to obtain image data, and monitoring for image files written to disk, such as CopyFromScreen, xwd, or screencapture.[1][2]. The sensor data may need to be correlated with other events to identify malicious activity, depending on the legitimacy of this behavior within a given network environment. |
T1059.003 COMMAND AND SCRIPTING INTERPRETER:WINDOWS COMMAND SHELL
ID | Data Source | Data Component | Detects |
Monitor executed commands and arguments that may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. Usage of the Windows command shell may be common on administrator, developer, or power user systems depending on job function. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. | |||
Monitor for newly executed processes that may abuse the Windows command shell for execution. Note: Try an Analytic by creating a baseline of parent processes of cmd seen over the last 30 days and a list of parent processes of cmd seen today. Parent processes in the baseline are removed from the set of parent processes seen today, leaving a list of new parent processes. This analytic attempts to identify suspicious programs spawning cmd by looking for programs that do not normally create cmd. It is very common for some programs to spawn cmd as a subprocess, for example to run batch files or Windows commands. However, many processes don’t routinely launch a command prompt - e.g., Microsoft Outlook. A command prompt being launched from a process that normally doesn’t launch command prompts could be the result of malicious code being injected into that process, or of an attacker replacing a legitimate program with a malicious one. Analytic 1 - Unusual Command Execution (source="WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon/Operational" EventCode="1") OR (source="WinEventLog:Security" EventCode="4688") AND CommandLine="cmd.exe" AND (CommandLine REGEXP "./c." OR CommandLine REGEXP ".._ \/k.*") |