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MEDIUMpublic exploit

CVE-2021-21239

CVE-2021-21239 — Open default xmlsec1 key-type preference

PySAML2 is a pure python implementation of SAML Version 2 Standard. PySAML2 before 6.5.0 has an improper verification of cryptographic signature vulnerability. Users of pysaml2 that use the default CryptoBackendXmlSec1 backend and need to verify signed SAML documents are impacted. PySAML2 does not ensure that a signed SAML document is correctly signed. The default CryptoBackendXmlSec1 backend is using the xmlsec1 binary to verify the signature of signed SAML documents, but by default xmlsec1 accepts any type of key found within the given document. xmlsec1 needs to be configured explicitly to only use only _x509 certificates_ for the verification process of the SAML document signature. This is fixed in PySAML2 6.5.0.

Published Updated Sources: cvelistV5, GitHub_M

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Exploit code

public exploit, none observed

EPSS

1%

chance of exploitation in 30 days

Affects

identitypython

pysaml2

CVSS base

6.5

MEDIUM

Affected scope

The catalog records vendors and products as separate lists, not pairs, so which product belongs to which vendor is not something this page can say.

Vendors (1)

Products (1)

pysaml2

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactSource
6.5CVSS 3.1MEDIUMcvelistV5

Weakness & attack patterns

  • CWE-347

Public exploit

Capability, not use: code existing is a different claim from anyone running it.

Indexed by

poc in github

References

6 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.