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CRITICAL

CVE-2026-47140

CVE-2026-47140 — vm2: NodeVM builtin denylist bypass via process and inspector/promises allows host code execution

vm2 is an open source vm/sandbox for Node.js. Prior to version 3.11.4, NodeVM blocks several dangerous Node.js builtins such as module, worker_threads, cluster, vm, repl, and inspector. However, the denylist misses process and inspector/promises. Both can be used from sandboxed code to reach host-side execution primitives. This allows sandboxed code to bypass the intended builtin restrictions and execute code in the host process. This issue has been patched in version 3.11.4.

Published Updated Sources: cvelistV5, GitHub_M

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Unreported

no source claims exploitation

EPSS

1%

chance of exploitation in 30 days

Affects

patriksimek

vm2

CVSS base

10

CRITICAL

CISA SSVC assessment

Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses · SSVC 2.0.3. A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.

CISA

Exploitation

PoC

none · proof-of-concept · active

Automatable

Yes

can an attacker script all four kill-chain steps

Technical impact

Total

partial · total control of the vulnerable component

Affected scope

The catalog records vendors and products as separate lists, not pairs, so which product belongs to which vendor is not something this page can say.

Vendors (1)

patriksimek

Products (1)

vm2

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactSource
10CVSS 3.1CRITICAL——cvelistV5

Weakness & attack patterns

  • CWE-693

Attack patterns reported against this CVE. The ATT&CK techniques below are inferred from its weakness class.

  • T1574.010Hijack Execution Flow: ServicesFile Permissions Weakness
  • T1083File and Directory Discovery
  • T1574.005Hijack Execution Flow: Executable Installer File Permissions Weakness

Detection

Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.

  • Search application, proxy, and WAF logs for requests touching /sandbox, /promises.

References

3 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.