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HIGH

CVE-2026-55532

CVE-2026-55532 — PraisonAI: Origin-validation bypass (startswith prefix match) enables unauthenticated cross-site request forgery against the PraisonAI MCP HTTP server

PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Prior to praisonai 4.6.58, MCP HTTP Stream _validate_origin uses request_origin.startswith(allowed), allowing the attacker-controlled localhost.attacker.com HTTP origin to satisfy the localhost allowlist. A webpage can send Content-Type: text/plain requests without preflight and invoke tools/call without an API key, including file writes that persist agent instructions. This issue is fixed in version 4.6.58.

Published Updated Sources: cvelistV5, GitHub_M

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Unreported

no source claims exploitation

EPSS

0%

chance of exploitation in 30 days

Affects

mervinpraison

praisonai

CVSS base

7.6

HIGH

CISA SSVC assessment

Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses · SSVC 2.0.3. A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.

CISA

Exploitation

PoC

none · proof-of-concept · active

Automatable

No

can an attacker script all four kill-chain steps

Technical impact

Partial

partial · total control of the vulnerable component

Affected scope

The catalog records vendors and products as separate lists, not pairs, so which product belongs to which vendor is not something this page can say.

Vendors (1)

Products (1)

praisonai

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactSource
7.6CVSS 3.1HIGHcvelistV5

Weakness & attack patterns

  • CWE-346
  • CWE-352

Attack patterns reported against this CVE. The ATT&CK techniques below are inferred from its weakness class.

  • T1557.002Adversary-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning
  • T1584.002Compromise Infrastructure: DNS Server
  • T1134Access Token Manipulation

Detection

Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.

  • Search application, proxy, and WAF logs for requests touching /plain, /call.

References

3 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.