CVE-2026-82428
CVE-2026-82428 — Apache Storm Client: Cross-Tenant Dependency Jar Substitution via Predictable Blob Keys
Description Dependency artifacts uploaded with `storm jar --artifacts` were stored under a blob key derived only from the Maven coordinate, for example `dep---.jar`. The key was therefore identical for every user of the cluster and predictable in advance. When the blob already existed, the uploader caught `KeyAlreadyExistsException` and silently reused it, with no check that the existing blob's content or owner matched the artifact the submitter had resolved. A user who uploaded a blob under such a key first therefore controlled the bytes that every later submitter of the same coordinate would receive on the worker classpath, resulting in code execution inside another tenant's topology. This affects deployments where more than one principal may create blobs and where the `--artifacts` dependency feature is used. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where each uploaded artifact receives a key carrying a freshly generated UUID and a pre-existing blob is no longer silently reused. Note that the corrected key generation is on the SUBMITTING CLIENT, so upgrading the cluster alone does not close this; every client that runs `storm jar --artifacts` must also be upgraded. Operators should audit existing `dep-` blobs for unexpected owners before upgrading. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should avoid the `--artifacts` mechanism in multi-tenant clusters and distribute dependencies inside the topology jar instead. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.
Published Updated Sources: NVD, Apache Software Foundation (CNA), GitHub, GitHub Security Advisory, SOCRadar CTI
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.
Exploitation
Unreported
no source claims exploitation
EPSS
0%
ahead of 0% of scored CVEs
CVSS base
Unscored
no source published a base score
Remediation
The vendor's own words where we have them.
Upgrade Apache Storm Client to a fixed release. Apply vendor patches per advisory and restrict external exposure of the affected component until patched.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record's own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found.
- Identify exposed assets running affected vendor/product/version combinations.
- Prioritize based on EPSS, PoC availability, and external exposure.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors, authentication anomalies, or suspicious child processes matching the vulnerability class.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and version as the advisories word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apache | Apache Storm Client | 3.0.0 to < 3.1.0 | Vulnerable |
What this weakness leads to
MITRE's own consequences and mitigations for the weakness class — the authority's wording, not guidance derived from the CVSS vector.
CWE-22 · Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
- Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands
- Modify Files or Directories
- Read Files or Directories
- DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
Mitigation: Assume all input is malicious. Use an accept known good input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, boat may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as red or blue. Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright. When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single . character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as / to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434. Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering / is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if ../ sequences are removed from the .../...// string in a sequential fashion, two instances of ../ would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the ../ string.
Weakness & attack patterns
- CWE-22Path Traversal
Attack patterns reported against this CVE. The ATT&CK techniques below are inferred from its weakness class.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first — with the readings a source repeats on a schedule counted underneath rather than listed.
- 2026
Initial · CVE published
Sep 14, 2026 · NVD
Added · GHSA-5f32-8637-hcrg published (unknown)
Sep 14, 2026 · GitHub Security Advisory
CVE published by MITRE.
Sep 14, 2026 · SOCRadar CTI
References
3 on the record
- lists.apache.org/thread/pj3fspp4l10fgk2jkvrnqsmxycmjv622
Vendor Advisory
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-82428
NVD
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-5f32-8637-hcrg
Exploit, Third Party Advisory
Coverage
1 story from the feeds we poll
Elsewhere on this site
- Apacheevery CVE for this vendor
- Path Traversalsame class
- CWE-22other pages naming this weakness
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record1
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-82428 is Apache Storm Client: Cross-Tenant Dependency Jar Substitution via Predictable Blob Keys, a unscored vulnerability affecting Apache Storm Client from Apache Software Foundation. The current evidence does not list it in CISA KEV, and the exploit status is: Active exploitation is not confirmed from current sources for CVE-2026-82428. Public exploit evidence is: A public PoC is not confirmed from current sources for CVE-2026-82428. The affected-version evidence is listed in the key facts and affected products tables. Defenders should first verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run those versions, then apply vendor patches or mitigations, restrict reachable attack surface, and preserve logs for detection review. CVSS null describes technical severity, while EPSS 0% helps estimate near-term exploit likelihood; neither replaces asset context. Unknown fields should remain explicit in tickets, and threat actor, IOC, victimology, or payload claims should not be added unless a cited source supports them. Monitor CISA KEV, vendor advisories, NVD changes, public PoC repositories, and internal telemetry for update triggers.