AI Exposure Check

AIClaudeChatGPTGeminiPerplexityMistralMeta AIGrokAIExposure Check

A saved AI password is where the intrusion starts, not where it ends. Infostealers take the login, the live session cookie, and the API keys sitting in the same profile.

Check your domain against 3 billion credential records.

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3B+ credentials88 AI platforms + developer toolsUpdated daily
record 04 of 129stealer: lumma c2exfiltrated 2026-07-14 09:22 utc
host
DESKTOP-4KQ2A1 / windows 11 / 92.13.—.—
url
https://claude.ai/login
user
@acme-industrial.com
pass
cookie
sessionKey= expires in 88d
api key
sk-ant-api03-
also
chatgpt.com, github.com, okta (+41 saved logins)

Illustrative record. Real reports redact passwords and cookie values the same way — we never show you a working credential.

Coverage

88 AI platforms — and the developer tools that hold your API keys

Plus self-hosted gateways and 30+ others. Matching is on the credential URL and the email address, so a login saved under a vanity domain or an SSO redirect still resolves to the right platform.

  • chatgpt.com
  • claude.ai
  • gemini.google.com
  • copilot.microsoft.com
  • perplexity.ai
  • deepseek.com
  • x.ai
  • meta.ai
  • mistral.ai
  • qwen.ai
  • huggingface.co
  • notebooklm.google.com

The chain

One saved password, five steps to your cloud bill

Each step uses what the step before it gave up. The credential record is only the part that is visible from outside your network.

Step 1

The saved login

A browser profile is emptied in seconds: every stored password, autofill entry, local file and crypto wallet. The log is sold or dumped in a Telegram channel within hours.

Step 2

The live session cookie

A stolen cookie is an authenticated session. It doesn't need the password, doesn't trigger your SSO policy, and doesn't ask for a second factor. Rotating the password leaves the attacker signed in.

Step 3

The API key and the routing endpoint

Operators now push file-grabber rules aimed at named AI config files. Those files hold plaintext keys and custom model endpoints — direct access to your paid quota and to whatever internal system the key was wired to.

Step 4

The non-human identity

With a key or a token, the attacker mints their own. In one 2026 intrusion a single exposed access token led to a rogue service account with Editor rights and exported credentials. Non-human identities have no MFA, no login alert and usually no owner. Your identity provider will not tell you one was created.

Step 5

The compute

The objective is often the hardware. Attackers raise GPU quota and launch large instances to run their own AI workloads — inference, credential harvesting pipelines, agent frameworks — inside your project, from your IP ranges, against your invoice.

This check shows you step one. It does not detect rogue service accounts or quota abuse, and no credential feed can. That is exactly why step one is worth finding.

Why it matters

Treat a stolen AI login like a stolen cloud console credential

Infostealers like Lumma, StealC, Vidar and ACRStealer empty a browser profile in seconds. When one of the saved logins is an AI platform, the account is not the prize — it is the entry point. Six things follow.

Your prompt history is an extortion asset

Staff paste source code, customer records, credentials, contracts and unreleased plans into prompts. Extortion crews have already exfiltrated proprietary prompts, model scripts and secrets and used them as leverage. An attacker with the account inherits a searchable archive of everything your team treated as a private scratchpad.

Session cookies walk straight past MFA

A stolen cookie is a live session. It doesn't need the password, and it doesn't trigger your SSO policy or a second factor. Rotating the password alone leaves the attacker signed in.

Stealers now hunt AI config files by name

This is not collateral damage from a browser dump. Stealer operators push file-grabber rules aimed directly at the secret stores of AI coding assistants — plaintext API keys and custom model routing endpoints. A stolen key doesn't just read chats. It bills to you, and it reaches whatever you wired it to.

The login is a human identity. What it reaches isn't.

One exposed token has been enough for an attacker to enter a cloud environment, create a service account with Editor rights, export its keys and raise GPU quota. Non-human identities outnumber your staff, authenticate without MFA and rarely appear in an offboarding process. Nobody gets an email when one is created.

LLMjacking: your quota is the target

Model access and high-performance compute are the main costs an adversary faces, so they steal capacity rather than buy it. Underground prices for major AI accounts more than doubled through 2026, and at least one state-linked cluster used hijacked accounts to bulk-register API access. A compromised account isn't only leaked data — it is infrastructure for someone else's campaign.

You can't rotate what isn't in your inventory

Most of these accounts were opened with a work email on a personal device, outside your identity provider. Shadow AI means the first time you learn the account exists is when you find it in a stealer log — or when the bill arrives.

F.A.Q.

Questions people ask before typing their address