Campaigns
PoeLLM Malware Infects Exposed AI Servers in Cryptomining Attacks

PoeLLM Malware Infects Exposed AI Servers in Cryptomining Attacks

PoeLLMCryptoMinerAI ServerBotnetEvasion
PoeLLM is a cryptomining botnet malware targeting exposed AI services such as LiteLLM, Ollama, Gotenberg, and Gitea, as well as Ivanti Sentry. The malware, an ELF file named libgcrypt, uses a novel C2 address retrieval method by extracting keywords from a poem hosted on GitHub and mapping them to IPv4 addresses via a hard-coded dictionary. Compromised servers are turned into scanners and exploit launchpads, with victims communicating with a Russian crypto-mining service called Kryptex.

Indicators of Compromise

No domains found for this campaign

Campaign Guidance

Remediation, mitigation, notes, history and related intelligence

REMEDIATION

DETECTION


Technique ID

Technique Name

Detection Strategy

T1595.001

Scanning IP Blocks

Monitoring the content of network traffic can help detect patterns associated with active scanning activities. This can include identifying repeated connection attempts, unusual scanning behaviors, or probing activity targeting multiple IP addresses across a network.

Monitor network data for uncommon data flows. Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious.

T1102

Web Service

Detects unusual outbound connections to web services from uncommon processes using SSL/TLS, particularly those exhibiting high outbound data volume or persistence. Detects command-line tools, agents, or scripts making outbound HTTPS connections to popular web services like Discord, Slack, Dropbox, or Graph API in an unusual context. Detects user agents or background services making unauthorized or unscheduled web API calls to cloud/web services over HTTPS. Detects guest VMs or management agents issuing HTTP(S) traffic to external services without a valid patch management or backup justification.

T1190

Exploit Public-Facing Application

Adversary sends crafted HTTP/S (or other service) input to an Internet-facing app (IIS/ASP.NET, API, device portal). Chain: (1) abnormal request patterns to public endpoint → (2) elevated 4xx/5xx or unusual methods/paths → (3) server process (w3wp.exe/other service) spawns shell/LOLbins or loads non-standard modules → (4) optional outbound callback from the host/container. Adversary exploits Apache/Nginx/app servers. Chain: (1) suspicious requests in access logs → (2) spike of 5xx or WAF blocks → (3) web server or interpreter (apache2/nginx/php-fpm/node/python) spawns /bin/sh, curl, wget, socat, or writes webshell → (4) outbound callback. Adversary targets macOS-hosted public services (e.g., nginx, node). Chain: suspicious inbound request → service crash/5xx → service spawns shell or writes file → new outbound connection. Adversary exploits containerized app via ingress or service. Chain: (1) suspicious request in ingress/app logs → (2) container process spawns a shell/exec/sidecar (kubectl exec/docker exec) → (3) egress to Internet or metadata service (169.254.169.254). Adversary targets cloud-hosted public endpoints. Chain: (1) ALB/ELB/Cloud LB logs show exploit-like inputs or error spikes → (2) workload spawns shell or reaches metadata API → (3) egress to new external hosts. Adversary exploits exposed OpenSLP on ESXi or vCenter public endpoints. Chain: inbound request pattern to mgmt service → hostd/vpxd error/crash/restart → unexpected process behavior or datastore access → outbound callback. Adversary exploits public admin services on routers/firewalls/switches. Chain: anomalous HTTP/SNMP/SmartInstall inputs → device syslog errors/restarts → config changes/CLI spawn → egress to attacker C2.

T1496

Resource Hijacking

Persistent high CPU utilization combined with suspicious command-line execution (e.g., mining tools or obfuscated scripts) and outbound connections to mining/proxy networks. Abnormal CPU/memory usage by unauthorized processes with outbound connections to known mining pools or using cron jobs/scripts to maintain persistence. Background launch agents/daemons with high CPU use and network access to external mining services. Sudden spikes in cloud VM CPU usage with outbound traffic to mining pools and unauthorized instance creation. High CPU usage by unauthorized containers running mining binaries or public proxy tools. Abuse of cloud messaging platforms to send mass spam or consume quota-based resources.

T1210

Exploitation of Remote Services

Correlates inbound network access to remote service ports (e.g., SMB/RPC 445/135, RDP 3389, WinRM 5985/5986) with near-time instability in the target service (crash, abnormal restart), suspicious child process creation under the service, and post-access lateral-movement behaviors. The chain indicates likely exploitation rather than normal administration. Links inbound network access to SSHD/SMB/NFS/Databases or custom daemons with subsequent daemon crash/restart, core dump, or spawning of shells/reverse shells from the service context, indicating remote exploitation. Detects exploitation targeting ESXi/vCenter by correlating attempts to reach known exploitable endpoints (OpenSLP 427, CIM 5989, Hostd/Vpxa HTTPS 443, ESXi SOAP) with vmkernel/hostd crashes, unexpected hostd/vpxa restarts, or new reverse/outbound connections from ESXi host/vCenter to internal assets. Ties inbound access to exposed services (ARD/VNC 5900, SSH 22, ScreenSharing, web services) with process crashes in unified logs and abnormal child processes spawned under those services (e.g., bash, curl) to indicate exploitation.

T1568

Dynamic Resolution

Correlate high-frequency or anomalous DNS query activity with processes that do not normally generate network requests (e.g., Office apps, system utilities). Detect pseudo-random or high-entropy domain lookups indicative of domain generation algorithms (DGAs). Monitor /var/log/audit/audit.log and DNS resolver logs for repeated failed lookups or connections to high-entropy domain names. Correlate suspicious DNS queries with process lineage (e.g., Python, bash, or unusual system daemons). Inspect unified logs for anomalous DNS resolutions triggered by non-network applications. Flag repeated connections to newly registered or algorithmically generated domains. Correlate with endpoint process telemetry. Monitor esxcli and syslog records for DNS resolver changes or repeated queries to unusual external domains by management agents. Detect unauthorized changes to VM or host network settings that redirect DNS lookups.

Observed Countries10

AT (709)
BE (860)
CH (813)
DE (899)
FR (555)
LI (730)
LU (806)
MC (523)
NL (267)
US (367)