Campaigns

Ransomware needs a way in. Stolen credentials are the cheapest one.

Check Your Exposure
XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX

XaocMail ClickFix Campaign Drops Phantom53 and HavoX

XaocMailPhantom53HavoXClickFix
A Russian-speaking threat actor runs a multi-stage campaign uncovered by the SOCRadar Threat Research Unit (STRU), chaining the XaocMail phishing platform with ClickFix document-sharing lures, the Phantom53 C2 framework and the Havoc post-exploitation framework. Phantom53 hides command traffic in DNS-over-HTTPS queries to trusted resolvers, runs from Cloudflare serverless infrastructure and uses a weekly DGA for failover. Preparation began in October 2025 and the operation launched in August 2026, targeting Latin America, Asia and Europe. The codebase shows AI-assisted development with Claude Code.

Indicators of Compromise

cdn-assets-api.cfchk902834.workers.dev
bestutyresdomaonupder2324.com
cdn-assets-api.makeneg458.workers.dev
linkrot.fypahedupal2-0maz.workers.dev
a8f2aac37385.xyz
cdn-assets-api.busykifukek2-8psk.workers.dev
bestutyresdomaonupder.top
544504d7fe1e.xyz
sync-node-serv.com
dns.cdn-syncnode-server.com
cdn-analytics-3f4033.rosamariaeadeshtvfud.workers.dev
securedoc.makeneg458.workers.dev
bestutyresdomaonupder.com
dns.timesyncserver-312453.com
kfkwrfdd.xyz
cdn-assets-api.kessler-m88.workers.dev
cdn-analytics-p53.makeneg458.workers.dev

Campaign Guidance

Remediation, mitigation, notes, history and related intelligence

REMEDIATION & DETECTION

Technique ID

Technique Name

Detection Strategy

T1204.004

User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0340 / AN0962: A user is socially engineered (web page, email, document) to open Run, PowerShell or CMD and paste an obfuscated one-liner, with user context active in a browser or email application followed by the pasted command. [Campaign: explorer.exe launching msiexec, mshta or PowerShell with a workers.dev URL shortly after browser activity.]

T1218.007

System Binary Proxy Execution: Msiexec

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0158 / AN0445: Detection of msiexec.exe execution where command-line arguments reference remote MSI packages, UNC paths, HTTP or HTTPS URLs, or DLLs, correlated with subsequent module loads or network connections. [Campaign: msiexec /i hxxps://.../m?id=<linkId> /qn installing an MSI that poses as Visual Studio Tools, Python or Node.js.]

T1059.006

Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0063 / AN0172: Detects Python execution with anomalous parent lineage, execution from unusual directories, or chained network, PowerShell or system-level activity. [Campaign: pythonw.exe started by svchost.exe (Task Scheduler) running a .pyw file from %APPDATA% or %LOCALAPPDATA%.]

T1129

Shared Modules

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0018 / AN0052: A process loads a DLL from a user-writable path or with an unsigned or invalid signer, shortly after it was written to disk or before network activity. [Campaign: pythonw.exe loading .pyd files outside a standard Python install, named after cv2 or numpy files.]

T1053.005

Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0441 / AN1221: Detects the creation, modification or deletion of scheduled tasks through Task Scheduler, WMI, PowerShell or API-based methods followed by execution from svchost.exe. [Campaign: tasks named MicrosoftEdgeUpdateTask, OneDriveSyncTask, WindowsDefenderScheduledScan, OfficeBackgroundTaskHandler or AdobeAcrobatUpdateTask with a random suffix, registered through COM without schtasks.exe.]

T1071.004

Application Layer Protocol: DNS

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0400 / AN1121: Detects high-frequency or anomalous DNS queries initiated by non-browser, non-system processes such as PowerShell, rundll32 or python.exe used for DNS tunneling. [Campaign: the analytic assumes visible DNS queries, but Phantom53 uses DoH over HTTPS. Substitute signal: pythonw.exe opening HTTPS to DoH resolver IPs such as 1.1.1.1, 8.8.8.8 or 76.76.2.11, or UDP 53 to them as a fallback.]

T1568.002

Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation Algorithms

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0419 / AN1178: Correlate DNS queries for domains with high entropy or gibberish patterns, combined with short-lived connections from unusual processes. [Campaign: 12-character hex .xyz domains generated weekly, queried in a three-week window around the current ISO week.]

T1548.002

Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass User Account Control

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0388 / AN1094: Detects UAC bypass attempts via known auto-elevated binaries, unauthorized registry changes to UAC-related keys, and anomalous process lineage. [Campaign: fodhelper.exe registry hijacking used to launch an elevated, hidden PowerShell payload.]

T1620

Reflective Code Loading

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0300 / AN0838: Detect anomalous chains of memory allocation and execution inside the same process, such as VirtualAlloc, memcpy, VirtualProtect and thread creation. [Campaign: pythonw.exe performing VirtualAlloc and per-section VirtualProtect followed by DllMain, with a Global\P53Demon_<id> mutex.]

T1497.003

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: Time Based Checks

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0141 / AN0396: Process creation involving suspicious delays followed by sensitive system access or lateral movement behaviors. [Campaign: beacons deferred on hosts with uptime under 20 minutes, and a first task execution delayed by 2 minutes.]

T1059.001

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0455 / AN1252: Detects PowerShell launched with encoded commands, unusual parent processes or suspicious modules, potentially followed by network connections or child process spawning. [Campaign: powershell -NonInteractive -WindowStyle Hidden -EncodedCommand spawned by pythonw.exe, with exfiltration to 145.63.138[.]67:8125/up/.]

T1036.005

Masquerading: Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location

MITRE Detection Strategy DET0347 / AN0983: Detects processes or binaries using trusted names where the metadata, hash or parent process does not align with legitimate activity. [Campaign: cv2.pyd and core.pyd names reused for implant modules inside randomized AppData directories.]

Observed Countries5

BR (721)
ES (410)
ID (41)
IN (560)
PE (776)