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HIGH

CVE-2019-6268

CVE-2019-6268 Vulnerability Analysis & Exploit Intelligence

RAD SecFlow-2 devices with Hardware 0202, Firmware 4.1.01.63, and U-Boot 2010.12 allow URIs beginning with /.. for Directory Traversal, as demonstrated by reading /etc/shadow.

Published Updated Sources: cvelistV5, mitre

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Unreported

no source claims exploitation

EPSS

1%

chance of exploitation in 30 days

Affects

rad

2 products listed

CVSS base

7.5

HIGH

CISA SSVC assessment

Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses · SSVC 2.0.3. A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.

CISA

Exploitation

PoC

none · proof-of-concept · active

Automatable

Yes

can an attacker script all four kill-chain steps

Technical impact

Partial

partial · total control of the vulnerable component

Affected scope

The catalog records vendors and products as separate lists, not pairs, so which product belongs to which vendor is not something this page can say.

Vendors (2)

Products (2)

secflow 2v firmwareu boot

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactSource
7.5CVSS 3.1HIGH——cvelistV5

Weakness & attack patterns

  • CWE-31

Detection

Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.

  • Search application, proxy, and WAF logs for requests touching /., /etc/shadow.

References

2 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

  • radevery CVE for this vendor
  • denxevery CVE for this vendor
  • CWE-31other pages naming this weakness

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.