CVE-2026-18415
CVE-2026-18415 — Out-of-bounds write in the IEEE 802.15.4 L2 transmit path for oversized non-6LoWPAN frames
ieee802154_send() in subsys/net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154.c copies the outgoing packet into a single fixed 125-byte transmit buffer (tx_frame_buf_pool, sized IEEE802154_MTU). In builds with CONFIG_NET_L2_IEEE802154_FRAGMENT enabled (the default whenever CONFIG_NET_6LO is set), the branch taken when 6LoWPAN fragmentation is not required performed an unchecked net_buf_add_mem(frame_buf, pkt_buf->data, pkt_buf->len). The only guard was __ASSERT_NO_MSG() inside net_buf_simple_add(), which is compiled out without CONFIG_ASSERT, so an oversized packet silently overran the frame buffer. The defect is not reachable from the radio: for NET_AF_INET6 packets ieee802154_6lo_encode_pkt() compares the whole packet length against IEEE802154_MTU and takes the fragmentation path when it does not fit, so every buffer copied on the unfragmented branch is within bounds. It is reachable through NET_AF_PACKET sockets bound to an 802.15.4 interface: for NET_SOCK_RAW the 6LoWPAN block is skipped entirely and for NET_SOCK_DGRAM it returns early on the address-family test, leaving no length validation anywhere on the transmit path (net_context_sendto() and net_if_tx() apply none, and pkt_buffer_length() does not clamp the allocation for this L2). An application — or, in a CONFIG_USERSPACE build, an unprivileged application thread using the zsock_socket()/zsock_sendto() syscalls — can therefore drive a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write of chosen bytes past the 125-byte pool buffer. With the default CONFIG_NET_BUF_FIXED_DATA_SIZE of 128 bytes the overrun is bounded to roughly ll_hdr_len + 3 bytes; with CONFIG_NET_BUF_VARIABLE_DATA_SIZE a single storage buffer can be as large as CONFIG_NET_PKT_BUF_TX_DATA_POOL_SIZE, making the overrun far larger. The consequence is corruption of memory adjacent to the pool, with a crash or further compromise of kernel state as the practical impact. The fix validates ll_hdr_len + net_pkt_get_len(pkt) + authtag_len against IEEE802154_MTU before any copy and adds a tailroom-checking copy_pkt_to_frame() helper that returns -EMSGSIZE instead of overrunning the buffer. The same change also linearizes the whole net_buf chain into one MAC frame, so packet storage boundaries no longer become frame boundaries on the wire.
Published Updated Sources: NVD, zephyrproject (CNA), GitHub
Triage
Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.
Exploitation
Exploit code
public exploit, none observed
EPSS
Not scored
FIRST has not published a score
CVSS base
6.3
medium
Remediation
The vendor's own words where we have them.
Upgrade zephyr to a fixed release. Apply vendor patches per advisory and restrict external exposure of the affected component until patched.
First 24 hours
Ordered from the record's own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found.
- Identify exposed assets running affected vendor/product/version combinations.
- Prioritize based on EPSS, PoC availability, and external exposure.
- Search available logs for exploit probes, errors, authentication anomalies, or suspicious child processes matching the vulnerability class.
Affected scope
Vendor, product and version as the advisories word them.
| Vendor | Product | Versions | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr | 3.2.0 to < 4.4.2 | Vulnerable |
Attack characteristics
The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.
Availability
High
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Scope
Unchanged
Attack Complexity
High
Attack Vector
Local
Privileges Req
Low
User Interaction
None
Every base score collected
Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.
| Score | Version | Severity | Expl. | Impact | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.3 | CVSS 3.1 | medium | 1 | 5.2 | zephyrproject.org (CNA), zephyrproject (CNA) |
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Weakness & attack patterns
- CWE-787Out-of-bounds Write
Inferred from the weakness class — not observed against this CVE.
Public exploit
Capability, not use: code existing is a different claim from anyone running it.
Repositories
6
Detection
Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.
- Search application, proxy, and WAF logs for requests touching /net/l2/ieee802154/ieee802154.c, /zsock_sendto().
- Monitor for scanner or exploit-pattern traffic after 6 public PoC repositories were reported.
Timeline
What happened to this CVE, newest first — with the readings a source repeats on a schedule counted underneath rather than listed.
- 2026
Added · CVSS 3.1 6.3 (AV:L)
Sep 28, 2026 · NVD
Initial · CVE published
Sep 28, 2026 · NVD
References
2 on the record
- github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/3d4c6177d2dbd77d12d9b14cd75a00cdbd826227
Exploit, Third Party Advisory
- github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j76j-jrjc-xgvp
Exploit, Third Party Advisory
Elsewhere on this site
- zephyrprojectevery CVE for this vendor
- Memory Corruptionsame class
- CWE-787other pages naming this weakness
Not in any source we poll
Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.
- No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
- No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
- No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record1
What should defenders know first?
CVE-2026-18415 is Out-of-bounds write in the IEEE 802.15.4 L2 transmit path for oversized non-6LoWPAN frames, a medium vulnerability affecting zephyr from zephyrproject. The current evidence does not list it in CISA KEV, and the exploit status is: Active exploitation is not confirmed from current sources for CVE-2026-18415. Public exploit evidence is: 6 public PoC repositories reported; 0 marked weaponized in current dataset. The affected-version evidence is listed in the key facts and affected products tables. Defenders should first verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run those versions, then apply vendor patches or mitigations, restrict reachable attack surface, and preserve logs for detection review. CVSS 6.3 describes technical severity, while EPSS 0% helps estimate near-term exploit likelihood; neither replaces asset context. Unknown fields should remain explicit in tickets, and threat actor, IOC, victimology, or payload claims should not be added unless a cited source supports them. Monitor CISA KEV, vendor advisories, NVD changes, public PoC repositories, and internal telemetry for update triggers.