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lowMemory Corruptionpublic exploit

CVE-2026-18416

CVE-2026-18416 — Out-of-bounds read in CoAP well-known-core Uri-Query href matching (match_path_uri)

The CoAP link-format helper match_path_uri() in subsys/net/lib/coap/coap_link_format.c compares a registered resource path against the URI carried in a Uri-Query href= option. That URI is not NUL terminated, but the inner character loop advanced its index k once per path character without ever testing it against the option length len. When a registered path segment is longer than the supplied URI and the URI is a prefix of it, the loop reads uri[len] and beyond, past the end of the option value. The path is reached from coap_well_known_core_get_len() and coap_well_known_core_get() via match_queries_resource(), i.e. by any unauthenticated GET /.well-known/core?href=/<prefix> request to a device that serves /.well-known/core (for the CoAP server subsystem, CONFIG_COAP_SERVER_WELL_KNOWN_CORE, default y) and has at least one resource that declares struct coap_core_metadata attributes. The over-read does not reach the receive buffer. The well-known-core builders parse the query into a stack-local struct coap_option, whose value is a fixed array (value[12], or CONFIG_COAP_EXTENDED_OPTIONS_LEN_VALUE bytes) that the option bytes are copied into, so uri points into that copy. Reading past len therefore reads the unused, uninitialized tail of the array and, when the option fills it, the bytes just past it in the same stack frame. (In the ZoAP library of v1.8.0 to v1.9.x the option value was instead a pointer into the received packet, and the over-read ran past the option inside the packet buffer.) The impact is bounded. The number of bytes read past the end is limited by the length of the resource path segment, and each additional byte is only read if it happens to equal the next path character, so in practice the over-read is one byte. It also cannot influence the response: returning a match requires the final compared index to be len - 1 or len, both in bounds, so out-of-bounds bytes only ever steer the loop to the next candidate resource. The consequence is undefined behaviour, not information disclosure and not a matching error. The fix adds a k >= len guard at the top of the inner loop, so every uri[k] dereference is within the option value while still allowing a trailing * wildcard to match a longer path.

Published Updated Sources: NVD, zephyrproject (CNA), GitHub

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Exploit code

public exploit, none observed

EPSS

Not scored

FIRST has not published a score

Affects

zephyrproject

zephyr

CVSS base

3.7

low

Remediation

The vendor's own words where we have them.

Upgrade zephyr to a fixed release. Apply vendor patches per advisory and restrict external exposure of the affected component until patched.

First 24 hours

Ordered from the record's own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found.

  • Identify exposed assets running affected vendor/product/version combinations.
  • Prioritize based on EPSS, PoC availability, and external exposure.
  • Search available logs for exploit probes, errors, authentication anomalies, or suspicious child processes matching the vulnerability class.

Affected scope

Vendor, product and version as the advisories word them.

VendorProductVersionsStatus
zephyrprojectzephyr1.8.0 to < 4.4.2Vulnerable

Attack characteristics

The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.

Availability

Low

Confidentiality

None

Integrity

None

Scope

Unchanged

Attack Complexity

High

Attack Vector

Network

Privileges Req

None

User Interaction

None

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactSource
3.7CVSS 3.1low2.21.4zephyrproject.org (CNA), zephyrproject (CNA)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Weakness & attack patterns

  • CWE-125Out-of-bounds Read

Inferred from the weakness class — not observed against this CVE.

CAPEC-100 · Overflow BuffersCAPEC-123 · Buffer Manipulation

Public exploit

Capability, not use: code existing is a different claim from anyone running it.

Repositories

2

Detection

Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.

  • Search application, proxy, and WAF logs for requests touching /net/lib/coap/coap_link_format.c, /.well-known/core?href=/, /.well-known/core.
  • Prioritize edge telemetry for network-reachable zephyr.
  • Monitor for scanner or exploit-pattern traffic after 2 public PoC repositories were reported.
web/proxy/WAF logsapplication logsnetwork IDS/IPS

Timeline

What happened to this CVE, newest first — with the readings a source repeats on a schedule counted underneath rather than listed.

  1. 2026
  2. Added · CVSS 3.1 3.7 (AV:N)

    Sep 28, 2026 · NVD

  3. Initial · CVE published

    Sep 28, 2026 · NVD

References

2 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record1

What should defenders know first?

CVE-2026-18416 is Out-of-bounds read in CoAP well-known-core Uri-Query href matching (match_path_uri), a low vulnerability affecting zephyr from zephyrproject. The current evidence does not list it in CISA KEV, and the exploit status is: Active exploitation is not confirmed from current sources for CVE-2026-18416. Public exploit evidence is: 2 public PoC repositories reported; 0 marked weaponized in current dataset. The affected-version evidence is listed in the key facts and affected products tables. Defenders should first verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run those versions, then apply vendor patches or mitigations, restrict reachable attack surface, and preserve logs for detection review. CVSS 3.7 describes technical severity, while EPSS 0% helps estimate near-term exploit likelihood; neither replaces asset context. Unknown fields should remain explicit in tickets, and threat actor, IOC, victimology, or payload claims should not be added unless a cited source supports them. Monitor CISA KEV, vendor advisories, NVD changes, public PoC repositories, and internal telemetry for update triggers.