What is CVE-2026-19184?

CVE-2026-19184 is Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch. The supplied enrichment data classifies it as Memory Corruption mapped to CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write.

Which versions are affected?

Affected product and version evidence is listed in the product table above. Current public advisories should be checked for exact version scope before patch targeting is finalized.

Is there active exploitation?

Active exploitation is not confirmed from current sources for CVE-2026-19184. If exploitation is not confirmed from current sources, teams should document that status and continue monitoring KEV, vendor, and telemetry updates.

No. CVE-2026-19184 is not listed in CISA KEV in the supplied enrichment data. KEV status should be monitored because it can change after initial disclosure or after exploitation becomes publicly confirmed.

Is there a public exploit?

2 public PoC repositories reported; 0 marked weaponized in current dataset. Public exploit or PoC availability should raise triage priority, especially for exposed or business-critical systems.

How can defenders detect it?

Start with Not reported where available. Look for vulnerability-class behavior, product errors, suspicious authentication events, exploit probes, and abnormal process activity based only on evidence that applies to the affected product.

How should teams prioritize it?

Prioritize CVE-2026-19184 using CVSS 8.4, EPSS 0%, KEV status, public PoC status, and asset exposure. Internet-facing, privileged, or business-critical deployments should be handled first.

Are workarounds available?

The supplied mitigation guidance says to apply vendor patches and restrict external exposure until fixed. Fixed-version evidence is listed in the mitigation section above.

Which threat actors are linked publicly?

No public threat actor linkage is confirmed from current sources. Do not attribute exploitation to a threat actor unless the source evidence explicitly supports that linkage.

What should be done in the next 24 hours?

Identify exposed assets running affected vendor/product/version combinations. Prioritize based on EPSS, PoC availability, and external exposure. Search available logs for exploit probes, errors, authentication anomalies, or suspicious child processes matching the vulnerability class. Open remediation tickets with affected assets, owners, evidence status, and detection coverage so decisions are traceable.

highMemory Corruptionpublic exploit

CVE-2026-19184

CVE-2026-19184 — Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch

The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as "large enough" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds. adc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler — which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions — to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing. The overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence->options->extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled — sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer. The fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written.

Published Oct 5, 2026Updated Oct 5, 2026Sources: NVD, zephyrproject (CNA), GitHub, SOCRadar CTI

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Exploit code

public exploit, none observed

EPSS

ahead of 0% of scored CVEs

Affects

zephyrproject

zephyr

CVSS base

8.4

high

Remediation

The vendor's own words where we have them.

Upgrade zephyr to a fixed release. Apply vendor patches per advisory and restrict external exposure of the affected component until patched.

First 24 hours

Ordered from the record's own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found.

Identify exposed assets running affected vendor/product/version combinations.
Prioritize based on EPSS, PoC availability, and external exposure.
Search available logs for exploit probes, errors, authentication anomalies, or suspicious child processes matching the vulnerability class.

Affected scope

Vendor, product and version as the advisories word them.

Vendor	Product	Versions	Status
zephyrproject	zephyr	3.7.0 to < 4.5.0	Vulnerable

Attack characteristics

The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.

Availability

High

Confidentiality

None

Integrity

High

Scope

Changed

Attack Complexity

Low

Attack Vector

Local

Privileges Req

Low

User Interaction

None

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

Score	Version	Severity	Expl.	Impact	Source
8.4	CVSS 3.1	high	2	5.8	zephyrproject.org (CNA), zephyrproject (CNA)

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

What this weakness leads to

MITRE's own consequences and mitigations for the weakness class — the authority's wording, not guidance derived from the CVSS vector.

MITRE

CWE-787 · Out-of-bounds Write

Modify Memory
DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart
Execute Unauthorized Code or Commands::

Mitigation: Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid. For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer. Be wary that a language's interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

Weakness & attack patterns

CWE-787Out-of-bounds Write

Inferred from the weakness class — not observed against this CVE.

CAPEC-100 · Overflow BuffersCAPEC-123 · Buffer Manipulation

Public exploit

Capability, not use: code existing is a different claim from anyone running it.

Repositories

Detection

Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.

Search application, proxy, and WAF logs for requests touching /adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c), /adc/adc_handlers.c.
Monitor for scanner or exploit-pattern traffic after 2 public PoC repositories were reported.

Timeline

What happened to this CVE, newest first — with the readings a source repeats on a schedule counted underneath rather than listed.

2026
Added · CVSS 3.1 8.4 (AV:L)
Oct 5, 2026 · NVD
Initial · CVE published
Oct 5, 2026 · NVD
CVE published by MITRE.
Oct 5, 2026 · SOCRadar CTI

References

2 on the record

github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/82b11958065aa85f8644ddc318ff4a328d1443c8
Exploit, Third Party Advisory, Mitre, NIST
github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-j86w-mfgw-fxj9
Exploit, Third Party Advisory, Mitre, NIST

Elsewhere on this site

zephyrprojectevery CVE for this vendor
Memory Corruptionsame class
CWE-787other pages naming this weakness

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.

Answered from this record1

What should defenders know first?

CVE-2026-19184 is Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch, a high vulnerability affecting zephyr from zephyrproject. The current evidence does not list it in CISA KEV, and the exploit status is: Active exploitation is not confirmed from current sources for CVE-2026-19184. Public exploit evidence is: 2 public PoC repositories reported; 0 marked weaponized in current dataset. The affected-version evidence is listed in the key facts and affected products tables. Defenders should first verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run those versions, then apply vendor patches or mitigations, restrict reachable attack surface, and preserve logs for detection review. CVSS 8.4 describes technical severity, while EPSS 0% helps estimate near-term exploit likelihood; neither replaces asset context. Unknown fields should remain explicit in tickets, and threat actor, IOC, victimology, or payload claims should not be added unless a cited source supports them. Monitor CISA KEV, vendor advisories, NVD changes, public PoC repositories, and internal telemetry for update triggers.