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CRITICALpublic exploit

CVE-2026-33340

CVE-2026-33340 — LoLLMs WEBUI has unauthenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in /api/proxy endpoint

LoLLMs WEBUI provides the Web user interface for Lord of Large Language and Multi modal Systems. A critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability has been identified in all known existing versions of `lollms-webui`. The `@router.post("/api/proxy")` endpoint allows unauthenticated attackers to force the server into making arbitrary GET requests. This can be exploited to access internal services, scan local networks, or exfiltrate sensitive cloud metadata (e.g., AWS/GCP IAM tokens). As of time of publication, no known patched versions are available.

Published Updated Sources: cvelistV5, GitHub_M

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Exploit code

public exploit, none observed

EPSS

22%

chance of exploitation in 30 days

Affects

parisneo

lollms_webui

CVSS base

9.1

CRITICAL

CISA SSVC assessment

Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses · SSVC 2.0.3. A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.

CISA

Exploitation

PoC

none · proof-of-concept · active

Automatable

Yes

can an attacker script all four kill-chain steps

Technical impact

Total

partial · total control of the vulnerable component

Affected scope

The catalog records vendors and products as separate lists, not pairs, so which product belongs to which vendor is not something this page can say.

Vendors (1)

parisneo

Products (1)

lollms webui

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactSource
9.1CVSS 3.1CRITICAL——cvelistV5

Weakness & attack patterns

  • CWE-306
  • CWE-918

Public exploit

Capability, not use: code existing is a different claim from anyone running it.

Indexed by

poc in github

Detection

Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.

  • Search application, proxy, and WAF logs for requests touching /api/proxy, /GCP.

References

2 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.