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MEDIUM

CVE-2026-77266

CVE-2026-77266 — MCP Atlassian: Path traversal in upload_attachment allows arbitrary file read and exfiltration via MCP tool call

MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, upload_attachment accepts absolute paths and traversal sequences without constraining the resolved path to the server workspace. An MCP caller with attachment access can read a chosen server-local file and exfiltrate it through Jira or Confluence. The advisory traces the vulnerable input and processing flow through upload_attachment, file_path, and path traversal, which identify the affected entry points, controls, and code paths. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.

Published Updated Sources: cvelistV5, GitHub_M

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Unreported

no source claims exploitation

EPSS

0%

chance of exploitation in 30 days

Affects

sooperset

mcp_atlassian

CVSS base

6.5

MEDIUM

CISA SSVC assessment

Three decision points CISA publishes for the CVEs it assesses · SSVC 2.0.3. A stakeholder decision, not a severity score.

CISA

Exploitation

PoC

none · proof-of-concept · active

Automatable

No

can an attacker script all four kill-chain steps

Technical impact

Partial

partial · total control of the vulnerable component

Affected scope

The catalog records vendors and products as separate lists, not pairs, so which product belongs to which vendor is not something this page can say.

Vendors (1)

sooperset

Products (1)

mcp atlassian

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactSource
6.5CVSS 3.1MEDIUM——cvelistV5

Weakness & attack patterns

  • CWE-22

References

4 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.