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highDenial of Servicepublic exploit

CVE-2026-91776

CVE-2026-91776 — jackson-databind: unbounded growth of the type id cache in TypeDeserializerBase retains every unknown raw type ID

TypeDeserializerBase._findDeserializer() in FasterXML jackson-databind caches the resolved deserializer under the raw, attacker-supplied type ID. When name-based polymorphism is configured with a fallback, for example @JsonTypeInfo(use = Id.NAME, defaultImpl = ...), every distinct unrecognized type ID resolves to the same fallback deserializer but is retained as its own key in the _deserializers map. That map has no configurable bound and lives for the lifetime of the type deserializer, so an attacker who can repeatedly supply fresh unknown type IDs causes monotonic memory retention across requests. The reporter observed 10,000 retained entries from 10,000 distinct unknown IDs, against a single entry for a control that repeated one unknown ID the same number of times, isolating attacker-controlled key cardinality from request volume. Exploitation requires an application that enables name-based polymorphism with a defaultImpl or equivalent fallback, accepts attacker-influenced type IDs, and reuses a long-lived ObjectMapper across requests. The fix stops caching fallback resolutions for unrecognized IDs and bounds both the number of cached entries and the length of a cacheable type ID.

Published Updated Sources: NVD, FasterXML (CNA), GitHub

Triage

Is it exploited, how likely is exploitation, what does it touch, and how severe do the scoring sources call it.

Exploitation

Exploit code

public exploit, none observed

EPSS

Not scored

FIRST has not published a score

Affects

FasterXML

5 products listed

CVSS base

7.5

high

Remediation

The vendor's own words where we have them.

Upgrade to com.fasterxml.jackson.core:jackson-databind 2.18.11, 2.21.7 or 2.22.3, or to tools.jackson.core:jackson-databind 3.1.7 or 3.2.3. Lines 2.0.x through 2.17.x, 2.19.x, 2.20.x and 3.0.x received no fix on their own branch and are no longer maintained upstream.

First 24 hours

Ordered from the record's own fields — exposure first, because you cannot patch what you have not found.

  • Identify exposed assets running affected vendor/product/version combinations.
  • Prioritize based on EPSS, PoC availability, and external exposure.
  • Search available logs for exploit probes, errors, authentication anomalies, or suspicious child processes matching the vulnerability class.

Affected scope

Vendor, product and version as the advisories word them.

VendorProductVersionsStatus
FasterXMLjackson-databind2.0.0 to <= 2.18.10Vulnerable
FasterXMLjackson-databind2.19.0 to <= 2.21.6Vulnerable
FasterXMLjackson-databind2.22.0 to <= 2.22.2Vulnerable
FasterXMLjackson-databind3.0.0 to <= 3.1.6Vulnerable
FasterXMLjackson-databind3.2.0 to <= 3.2.2Vulnerable

Attack characteristics

The CVSS vector, decoded. It describes the attack, not your exposure to it.

Availability

High

Confidentiality

None

Integrity

None

Scope

Unchanged

Attack Complexity

Low

Attack Vector

Network

Privileges Req

None

User Interaction

None

Every base score collected

Sources score independently and disagree; each row says who scored it and under which version.

ScoreVersionSeverityExpl.ImpactSource
7.5CVSS 3.1high3.93.6CNA, FasterXML (CNA)

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Weakness & attack patterns

  • CWE-400Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Inferred from the weakness class — not observed against this CVE.

CAPEC-125 · FloodingCAPEC-130 · Excessive Allocation
  • T1499Endpoint Denial of Service

Public exploit

Capability, not use: code existing is a different claim from anyone running it.

Repositories

1

Detection

Read off the CVSS vector and the weakness class. Starting points, not rules we have tested.

  • Prioritize edge telemetry for network-reachable jackson-databind.
  • Monitor for scanner or exploit-pattern traffic after 1 public PoC repositories were reported.
web/proxy/WAF logsapplication logsnetwork IDS/IPS

Timeline

What happened to this CVE, newest first — with the readings a source repeats on a schedule counted underneath rather than listed.

  1. 2026
  2. Added · CVSS 3.1 7.5 (AV:N)

    Sep 23, 2026 · NVD

  3. Initial · CVE published

    Sep 23, 2026 · NVD

References

2 on the record

Elsewhere on this site

Not in any source we poll

Listed rather than left blank: an empty field and an unmeasured one look identical on screen, and only one is a reason to look elsewhere.

  • No confirmed IOCs, IP addresses, domains, file hashes, or malware artifacts supplied.
  • No organization-specific asset inventory, compensating-control status, or patch deployment evidence supplied.
  • No exploit packet captures, log samples, or incident case IDs supplied.
Answered from this record1

What should defenders know first?

CVE-2026-91776 is jackson-databind: unbounded growth of the type id cache in TypeDeserializerBase retains every unknown raw type ID, a high vulnerability affecting jackson-databind from FasterXML. The current evidence does not list it in CISA KEV, and the exploit status is: Active exploitation is not confirmed from current sources for CVE-2026-91776. Public exploit evidence is: 1 public PoC repositories reported; 0 marked weaponized in current dataset. The affected-version evidence is listed in the key facts and affected products tables. Defenders should first verify whether exposed or business-critical assets run those versions, then apply vendor patches or mitigations, restrict reachable attack surface, and preserve logs for detection review. CVSS 7.5 describes technical severity, while EPSS 0% helps estimate near-term exploit likelihood; neither replaces asset context. Unknown fields should remain explicit in tickets, and threat actor, IOC, victimology, or payload claims should not be added unless a cited source supports them. Monitor CISA KEV, vendor advisories, NVD changes, public PoC repositories, and internal telemetry for update triggers.