campaign image
Chinese Threat Actors Target European Ministries And Embassies With HTML Smuggling In Smugx Campaign
SmugX PlugX Mustang Panda Red Delta HTML Smuggling

SmugX-related attacks have been observed since December 2022. The threat actors behind the campaign are using innovative distribution methods to distribute a variant of PlugX, a widely used malware associated with various Chinese threat actors. Researchers are monitoring the campaign and have identified links to a previously reported campaign attributed to RedDelta and Mustang Panda.

Domains Source Last Update
mod.mmgpms.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
segtic.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
waxmm.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
jsj1.linuxupdate.info SOCRadar 2023-07-11
kvnit-prod.api.kochova.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
pingless.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
update.hilifimyanmar.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
qpodn31.isdmfu1.xyz SOCRadar 2023-07-11
ftp.electrobist.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mm.portomnail.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mirros.microsoftcontents.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
qq.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
api.microsoftlab.xyz SOCRadar 2023-07-11
x.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
api.wensente.xyz SOCRadar 2023-07-11
d802f446.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
portomnail.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
cxitsolution.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mail.biateknos.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
polygons-stakes.site SOCRadar 2023-07-11
vividworld.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
www.jcswcd.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
static.adobe-cdn.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
update.microupdate.xyz SOCRadar 2023-07-11
worm.win32.pysis.sm SOCRadar 2023-07-11
exchange.portomnail.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
archivess.imangoim.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
9f78281a.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
down-flash.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
lllllllllll.loseyourip.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
down1.linuxupdate.info SOCRadar 2023-07-11
dataanalyticsclub.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
dns.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
quic.flashesplayer.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
down2.linuxupdate.info SOCRadar 2023-07-11
dl-flash.tk SOCRadar 2023-07-11
liveweatherupdate.online SOCRadar 2023-07-11
www.zlove.cc SOCRadar 2023-07-11
openmd5.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
91ac64d2.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
static.tcplog.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
halldie.fit SOCRadar 2023-07-11
microsoftcontents.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
protection.cloud SOCRadar 2023-07-11
api.imango.ink SOCRadar 2023-07-11
js.down-flash.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
download.hilifimyanmar.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
box.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
q.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
joyceyong.art SOCRadar 2023-07-11
time.ntp-server.asia SOCRadar 2023-07-11
officecdn-microsoft-com.akamaixed.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
a.linuxupdate.info SOCRadar 2023-07-11
down.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
www.linuxupdate.info SOCRadar 2023-07-11
sportsgross.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
cdn.imango.ink SOCRadar 2023-07-11
exchange.openmd5.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
cerradoforte.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
linux.updatelive-oline.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
9f78281a.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
center.veryssl.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
jcswcd.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
q2.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
adobe-cdn.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
fonts.google-au.ga SOCRadar 2023-07-11
www.microsoftcontents.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
peek.openssl-digicert.xyz SOCRadar 2023-07-11
fraudlabpros.at SOCRadar 2023-07-11
back.rooter.tk SOCRadar 2023-07-11
9f78281a.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
ns1.thorcom.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
help.tcplog.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
update.microsoftlab.top SOCRadar 2023-07-11
clubfiveforpeace.co SOCRadar 2023-07-11
music.nb-fk.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
help.down-flash.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
datetime.datetime.now SOCRadar 2023-07-11
quickconnect.io SOCRadar 2023-07-11
bahisaltv79.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
www.5xge.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
luyensex.club SOCRadar 2023-07-11
48b2137f.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
sempersim.su SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mail.jackbarber.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
linux.down-flash.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
perwish.email SOCRadar 2023-07-11
abre.com.my SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mayibeofservice.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
www.mmimchat.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
bankssy.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
travel.dianatokaji.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mirros3.linuxupdate.info SOCRadar 2023-07-11
diary.lojjh.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
system.save SOCRadar 2023-07-11
kunpengs.xyz SOCRadar 2023-07-11
docs.azure SOCRadar 2023-07-11
tcplog.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
ns1.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
codeforge.pro SOCRadar 2023-07-11
dach-loc.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
pricelulu.co.uk SOCRadar 2023-07-11
quangdecalshop.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
pastor.cntcog.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mawuqiis.xyz SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mail.divinecellcare.lk SOCRadar 2023-07-11
91ac64d2.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
xxe.linuxupdate.info SOCRadar 2023-07-11
q4.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
subscribe.3gbling.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
apps.imangolm.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
www.myanmarnewsonline.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
n2.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
jqueryllc.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
48b2137f.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
d802f446.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
update.ajaxrenew.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
b23q.xyz SOCRadar 2023-07-11
d802f446.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
echoesdesing.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
images.myanmarnewsonline.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
whneat.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mini.ptipexcel.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
mail.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
5avis.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
91ac64d2.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
48b2137f.org SOCRadar 2023-07-11
blackcreekbarns.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
yoursafepayments.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
dash.tcplog.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
akamaixed.net SOCRadar 2023-07-11
microsoftfile.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
themomerator.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
secure.azure SOCRadar 2023-07-11
txt.mm-film.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
lutanedukasi.co.id SOCRadar 2023-07-11
linuxupdate.info SOCRadar 2023-07-11
googleanalyticstag.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
cdn.google-au.ga SOCRadar 2023-07-11
coating.drrooter.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
nb-fk.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
xinhewood-cn.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
proxy.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
chrome.down-flash.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
ns2.xxe.pw SOCRadar 2023-07-11
gareloi-digit.com SOCRadar 2023-07-11
Hashes Source Last Update
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Ipv4s Source Last Update
209.95.60.92 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
160.20.147.254 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
5.101.4.196 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
8.208.94.94 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.117.141.202 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.226.155.96 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.79.122.225 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
111.90.148.95 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
202.79.173.228 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
23.106.122.81 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
104.255.174.58 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.32.248.92 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
203.175.9.97 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.93.76.135 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.61.187.7 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.137.10.3 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.90.58.69 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
106.52.144.29 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
66.42.60.66 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
193.239.154.44 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
193.42.36.214 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
69.90.190.110 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
64.34.205.41 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.231.14.171 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
64.34.216.50 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.79.77.178 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
43.229.155.38 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
62.233.57.49 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
138.128.163.242 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.77.169.228 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
154.204.26.120 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
116.204.134.123 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
116.204.211.59 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
209.94.59.32 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
172.105.229.30 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
38.54.4.48 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
91.243.59.210 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.77.250.209 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.93.130.45 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
85.9.26.104 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.56.19.113 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
152.152.12.12 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
68.65.122.214 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.61.187.240 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
146.88.240.4 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
77.73.133.12 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
27.102.114.105 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.76.178.177 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
5.181.4.59 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
14.18.191.150 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.209.233.172 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
61.97.248.72 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
43.229.155.39 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.32.102.50 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
116.204.211.35 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
217.12.207.164 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
54.39.48.95 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.151.229.35 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
185.216.71.149 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.120.82.243 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
185.207.155.146 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
8.136.179.117 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
27.71.235.46 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
205.185.124.143 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.61.185.231 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
92.38.135.71 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
194.124.227.90 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.147.26.45 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
139.180.193.182 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.77.252.157 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
43.229.155.41 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
149.127.176.12 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
195.2.71.214 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.32.101.7 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
95.85.67.48 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
38.55.223.221 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
198.54.122.135 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.255.45.24 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
202.79.173.211 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
137.220.185.203 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.151.229.74 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
8.218.156.56 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.27.108.20 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
116.204.211.62 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.32.121.100 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
119.8.100.209 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.151.229.139 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
139.180.188.58 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
154.215.115.107 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
91.229.239.182 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
77.68.32.33 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
77.75.230.128 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
188.127.249.169 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.9.148.203 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.138.82.215 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.143.73.116 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
134.122.188.187 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.77.47.149 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
5.34.178.156 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
154.201.144.60 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.61.139.38 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
8.209.255.168 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
27.124.37.62 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
104.253.89.235 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.27.109.182 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.79.77.200 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
167.179.78.160 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
137.220.178.43 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
5.101.5.196 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
122.10.46.213 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
43.229.155.42 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
213.59.118.124 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.61.186.52 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
43.129.188.223 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
62.233.57.136 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
43.229.155.40 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
167.71.236.226 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
185.158.94.217 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
152.32.139.128 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.61.185.36 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
192.239.154.221 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
188.138.69.102 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
39.106.32.186 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.91.66.116 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.56.19.157 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.138.82.202 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.79.78.48 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
106.52.174.66 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
134.122.134.140 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
51.195.62.160 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
51.89.194.123 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.77.38.191 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.134.1.74 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
89.128.218.110 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.43.10.182 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.255.45.23 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
144.76.229.26 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
98.142.251.29 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
120.79.8.23 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
154.215.96.211 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
23.225.199.164 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
23.133.5.48 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
156.232.2.100 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
110.4.45.81 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
173.254.227.204 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.32.101.191 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
188.116.48.62 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
185.80.201.4 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
149.127.176.22 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
137.220.55.36 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.121.147.172 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
43.254.218.128 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
91.245.253.72 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
149.28.151.244 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
137.220.53.224 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
152.32.133.68 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
124.248.202.122 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
82.56.190.35 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
178.215.228.24 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.134.83.4 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
36.255.220.179 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
107.155.50.198 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
116.204.211.68 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
175.45.176.27 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
156.240.104.149 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
192.51.188.100 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
104.225.129.103 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
27.124.37.65 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.169.90.132 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.134.83.29 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
156.240.107.248 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.44.22.56 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.254.75.140 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
163.197.34.109 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
172.105.36.249 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
211.239.213.13 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
104.225.129.86 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
154.6.26.2 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
139.180.216.65 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.197.133.12 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
217.12.206.116 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
202.79.173.220 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.56.19.42 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.192.226.87 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
23.225.199.165 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
202.182.121.16 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
193.239.154.221 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.79.76.88 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
64.62.197.106 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
60.161.81.116 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.151.229.130 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.76.152.71 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
163.197.32.39 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
44.4.53.4 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.133.139.23 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
156.240.104.115 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
193.200.149.195 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
27.124.37.63 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
158.247.202.188 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
192.185.171.113 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
213.122.149.93 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
146.185.26.150 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
64.34.216.44 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
45.142.214.193 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
154.38.118.107 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.79.76.232 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
193.239.191.95 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
23.237.32.34 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
164.155.51.9 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
23.225.199.162 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
103.133.139.29 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
149.127.176.14 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
Cves Source Last Update
CVE-2021-34527 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2023-0286 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2019-6225 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2021-26855 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2023-0216 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2021-4034 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2021-44228 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2023-0217 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2022-27925 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2021-27065 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2023-0401 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2020-3992 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2022-37042 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2021-26858 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2022-30190 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2022-4450 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2022-4203 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2021-40539 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2022-2294 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2017-11882 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2022-4304 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2023-0215 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2022-26766 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
CVE-2021-26857 SOCRadar 2023-07-11
Emails Source Last Update
[email protected] SOCRadar 2023-07-11
Domains Insert Date
Obfuscated Files or Information: HTML Smuggling
Other sub-techniques of Obfuscated Files or Information (11)
Adversaries may smuggle data and files past content filters by hiding malicious payloads inside of seemingly benign HTML files. HTML documents can store large binary objects known as JavaScript Blobs (immutable data that represents raw bytes) that can later be constructed into file-like objects. Data may also be stored in Data URLs, which enable embedding media type or MIME files inline of HTML documents. HTML5 also introduced a download attribute that may be used to initiate file downloads.[1][2]
Adversaries may deliver payloads to victims that bypass security controls through HTML Smuggling by abusing JavaScript Blobs and/or HTML5 download attributes. Security controls such as web content filters may not identify smuggled malicious files inside of HTML/JS files, as the content may be based on typically benign MIME types such as text/plain and/or text/html. Malicious files or data can be obfuscated and hidden inside of HTML files through Data URLs and/or JavaScript Blobs and can be deobfuscated when they reach the victim (i.e. Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information), potentially bypassing content filters.
For example, JavaScript Blobs can be abused to dynamically generate malicious files in the victim machine and may be dropped to disk by abusing JavaScript functions such as msSaveBlob.[1][3][2][4]

Procedure Examples

ID

Name

Description

G0016

APT29

APT29 has embedded an ISO file within an HTML attachment that contained JavaScript code to initiate malware execution.[5]

S0634

EnvyScout

EnvyScout contains JavaScript code that can extract an encoded blob from its HTML body and write it to disk.[6]

S0650

QakBot

QakBot has been delivered in ZIP files via HTML smuggling.[7][8]


Mitigations

This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.

Detection

ID

Data Source

Data Component

Detects

DS0022

File

File Creation

Monitor newly constructed files via JavaScript, developing rules for the different variants, with a combination of different encoding and/or encryption schemes, may be very challenging. Consider monitoring files downloaded from the Internet, possibly by HTML Smuggling, for suspicious activities. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities.


Mitigation Measures: To mitigate the risk of SmugX campaign and PlugX RAT attacks, organizations should consider the following measures: Implement robust security measures, including up-to-date antivirus and anti-malware solutions. Apply regular security patches and updates to operating systems and software. Conduct security awareness training for employees to educate them about potential phishing attacks and suspicious email attachments. Employ network segmentation and access controls to limit lateral movement within the network. Monitor network traffic and use intrusion detection systems to detect and block suspicious activity. Maintain up-to-date backups of critical data to mitigate the impact of data loss or ransomware attacks.





REMEDIATIONS
We recommend the following remediation steps to the affected organization to reduce the risk of HTML smuggling.
Ensure Safe Links and Safe Attachments are implemented to provide real-time protection against HTML smuggling and other email threats. Specifically check for the following to detect malware-smuggling HTML attachments:
– An attached ZIP file contains JavaScript
– An attachment is password-protected
– An HTML file contains a suspicious script code
– An HTML file decodes a Base64 code or obfuscates a JavaScript

 Ensure attack surface reduction rules block or audit activity associated with HTML smuggling.
          The following rules can help:
– Block JavaScript or VBScript from launching downloaded executable content
– Block execution of potentially obfuscated scripts
– Block executable files from running unless they meet a prevalence, age, or trusted list criterion

   Prevent JavaScript codes from executing automatically by changing file associations for .js and .jse files. This would certainly prevent the HTML smuggling, however, Javascript is indispensable for BC and therefore not a practical solution.

  Check Office 365 email filtering settings to ensure they block spoofed emails, spam, and emails with malware. Use Microsoft Defender for Office 365 for enhanced phishing protection and coverage against new threats and polymorphic variants. Configure
  Office 365 to recheck links on click and neutralize malicious messages that have already  been delivered in response to newly acquired threat intelligence.

  Check the perimeter firewall and proxy to restrict servers from making arbitrary connections to the internet to browse or download files. Such restrictions help inhibit malware downloads and command and control (C2) activity.

   Turn on network protection to block connections to malicious domains and IP addresses.

   Turn on cloud-delivered protection and automatic sample submission on Microsoft Defender Antivirus. These capabilities use artificial intelligence and machine learning to quickly identify and stop new and unknown threats.

 Educate users about preventing malware infections. Encourage users to practice good credential hygiene—limit the use of accounts with local or domain admin privileges and turn on Microsoft Defender Firewall to prevent malware infection and stifle propagation.

NOTES:
The SmugX campaign targets European ministries and embassies. These organizations possess sensitive information and hold strategic importance.

The primary objective of the campaign is to bypass traditional security measures using HTML smuggling techniques, allowing attackers to gain access to the target systems.

PlugX RAT is the main tool used in the SmugX campaign. PlugX is a modular RAT that provides remote access capabilities and has been utilized by various Chinese threat groups.

PlugX RAT offers a range of capabilities, including establishing persistence, file discovery, encryption, hiding, keylogging, and screen capturing on compromised systems.

The campaign has been linked to the RedDelta and Mustang Panda threat groups, which have previously conducted similar campaigns and are associated with state-sponsored cyber espionage.

The campaign focuses on sectors such as national security, international affairs, and public administration. These sectors are attractive targets due to the sensitive information and strategic significance they possess.

Regarding the SmugX campaign, it is important to employ up-to-date antivirus and antimalware solutions, apply regular software updates, provide security training to employees, and implement network security measures.

These notes contain important information about the SmugX campaign, its transports and possible countermeasures. For more details and specific measures tailored to your needs, you can seek help from our SOCRadar Extended Threat Intelligence page.

CONCLUSIONS
Chinese groups have persistently been targeting European government entities and have become part of a larger trend now. Organizations are advised to use the IoCs associated with the campaign to understand the attack pattern and implement effective security measures to detect and remediate unusual activities at the initial stage.
File Name Description Actions
Mustang-Panda-PlugX-RAT.pdf Smugx Campaign
APT Name Aliases Target Countries Source Countries Total IOCs
newspaper News

2024-06-06

An elderly veteran wearing many medals sits in a wheelchair, saluting, among many rows of headstones in a cemetery.
Aaron Chown / Getty

For the past week, sites in the United Kingdom and France have been hosting a number of events leading up to today, the 80th anniversary of the D-Day landings of June 6, 1944. Veterans, families, dignitaries, and visitors have gathered at former battlefields and cemeteries to commemorate the Allied landings on the beaches of Normandy, which turned the tide in World War II and led to the liberation of occupied France and the defeat of Nazi Germany. Gathered here are images of some of these events, and of some of the few remaining veterans who took part in that costly invasion eight decades ago.

To receive an email notification every time new photo stories are published, sign up here.

emissary panda
gelsemium
granite typhoon
mustang panda
redhotel
toddycat

2024-05-29

When tracking adversaries, we commonly focus on the malware they employ in the final stages of the kill chain and infrastructure, often overlooking samples used in the initial ones.
In this post, we will explore some ideas to track adversary activity leveraging images and artifacts mostly used during delivery. We presented this approach at the FIRST CTI in Berlin and at Botconf in Nice.

Hunting early

In threat hunting and detection engineering activities, analysts typically focus heavily on the latter stages of the kill chain – from execution to actions on objectives (Figure 1). This is mainly because there is more information available about adversaries in these phases, and it's easier to search for clues using endpoint detection and response (EDR), security information and event management (SIEM), and other solutions.
Figure 1: Stages of the kill chain categorized by their emphasis on threat hunting and detection engineering.
We have been exploring ideas to improve our hunting focused on samples built in the weaponization phase and distributed in the delivery phase, focused on the detection of suspicious Microsoft Office documents (Word, Excel, and PowerPoint), PDF files, and emails.
In threat intelligence platforms and cybersecurity in general, green and red colors are commonly used to quickly indicate results and identify whether or not something is malicious. This is because they are perceived as representing good or bad, respectively.
Multiple studies in psychology have demonstrated how colors can influence our decision-making process. VirusTotal, through the third-party engines integrated into it, shows users when something is detected and therefore deemed "malicious," and when something is not detected and considered "benign."
For example, the sample in Figure 2 belongs to a Microsoft Word document distributed by the SideWinder group during the year 2024.
Figure 2: Document used by the SideWinder APT group
The sample in question was identified at the time of writing this post by 31 antivirus engines, leaving no doubt that it is indeed a real malware sample. In the process of pivoting to identify new samples or related infrastructure, starting with Figure 2, the analyst will likely click on the URL detected by 11 out of the 91 engines, and the domains detected by 17 and 15 engines, respectively, to see if there are other samples communicating with them. The remaining two domains (related to windows.com and live.com) in this case are easily identified as legitimate domains that were likely contacted by the sandbox during its execution.
Figure 3: Relationships within the SideWinder APT group document
In the same sample, if you go down in the VirusTotal report (Figure 3), the analyst will likely click on the ZIP file listed as "compressed parent" to check if there are other samples within this ZIP besides the current one. They may also click on the XML file detected by 8 engines, and the LNK file detected by 4 engines. The remaining files in the bundled files section probably won't be clicked, as the green color indicates they are not malicious, and also because they have less enticing formats — mainly XML and JPEG. But what if we explore them?

XML files generated by Microsoft Office

When you create a new Microsoft Office file, it automatically generates a series of embedded XML files containing information about the document. Additionally, if you use images in the document, they are also embedded within it. Microsoft Office files are compressed files (similar to ZIP files). In VirusTotal, when a Microsoft Word file is uploaded, you can see all these embedded files in the embedded files section.
We have mainly focused on three types of embedded files within Office documents:
  • Images:Many threat actors use images related to the organizations or entities they intend to impersonate. They do this to make documents appear legitimate and gain the trust of their victims.

  • [Content_Types].xml:This file specifies the content types and relationships within the Office Open XML (OOXML) document. It essentially defines the types of content and how they are organized within the file structure.

  • Styles.xml:Stores stylistic definitions for your document. These styles provide consistent formatting instructions for fonts, paragraph spacing, colors, numbering, lists, and much more.

Our hypothesis is: If malicious Microsoft Word documents are copied and pasted during the weaponization building process, with only the content being modified, the hashes of the [Content_Types].xml and styles.xml files will likely remain the same.

Office documents

To check our hypothesis, we selected a set of samples used during delivery and belonging the threat actors listed in Figure 4:
Figure 4: Number of samples per actor within the scope
Let’s analyze some of the results we obtained per actor.

APT28 – Images

We started by focusing on images APT28 has reused for different delivery samples (Figure 5).
Figure 5: Images shared in multiple documents by APT28
Each line in the Figure 5 graph represents the same image, and each point represents at least two samples that used that particular image.
The second image of the graph shows how it was used by different Office documents at different points in time, from 2018 to 2022 (dates related to their upload to VirusTotal).
Now, the chart in Figure 6 visualizes each of these images.
Figure 6: Content of the images shared in multiple documents by APT28
  • The first image is just a simple line with no particular meaning. It's embedded in over 100 files known by VirusTotal.

  • The second image is a hand and has 14 compressed parents.

  • The third image consists of black circles and also has over 100 compressed parents.

  • The last image is like a Word page with a table, presenting a fake EDA Roadmap of the European Commission. The image format is EMF (an old format) and it has 4 compressed parents

If we delve into the compressed parents of the second image (the one with the hand), we can see how the image is used in Office documents that are part of a campaign reported by Mandiant attributed to APT28. The image of the hand was used in fake Word documents for hotel reservations, particularly in a small section where the client was supposed to sign.
Figure 7: Pivoting through a specific image used by APT28

SideWinder – Images

SideWinder (aka RAZER TIGER) is a group focused on carrying out operations against military targets in Pakistan. This group traditionally reused images, which might help monitoring their activity.
Figure 8: Images shared in multiple documents by RAZOR TIGER
In particular, the image in Figure 9 was used in a sample uploaded in September 2021 and in a second one uploaded March 2022. The image in question is the signature of Baber Bilal Haider.
Figure 9: Two different samples of RAZOR TIGER share the same image of a handwritten signature

Gamaredon – [Content_Types].xml and styles.xml

For Gamaredon we found they reused styles.xml and [Content_Types].xml in different documents, which helped reveal new samples.
Figure 10 chart displays all the [Content_Types].xml files from Gamaredon's Office documents.
Figure 10: [Content_Types].xml shared in multiple documents by Gamaredon Group
There are a large number of samples that share the same [Content_Types].xml. It's important to highlight that these [Content_Types].xml files are not necessarily exclusively used by Gamaredon, and can be found in other legitimate files created by users worldwide. However, some of these [Content_Types].xml might be interesting to monitor.
Styles.xml files are usually less generic, which should make them a better candidate to monitor:
Figure 11: Styles.xml shared in multiple documents by Gamaredon Group
We see styles.xml files are less reused than [Content_Types].xml. This could be because some of the samples used by this actor for distribution are created from scratch or reusing legitimate documents.
We used identified patterns in the styles.xml files to launch a retrohunt on VirusTotal. Figure 12 visually represents the original set of style.xml files (left) and those that were added later after running the retrohunt (right).
Figure 12: Initial graph of the styles.xml and its parents used by Gamaredon (left). Final graph after identifying new styles.xml and their parents using retrohunt in VirusTotal (right)
One of the new styles.xml files found in our retrohunt has 17 compressed parents, meaning it was included in 17 Office files.
Figure 13: Number of parent documents for a specific styles.xml file used by Gamaredon
All the parents were malicious, some of them identical and the rest very similar between them. The content of many of them referred to "Foreign institutions of Ukraine - Embassy of Ukraine in Hungary," containing a table with phone numbers and information about the embassy, such as social media links and email accounts. Here's an example:
Figure 14: Document used by Gamaredon in one of its campaigns that includes multiple images which can be used to monitor new samples
The information for social media includes the logos of these platforms, such as the Facebook logo, Skype logo, an image of a telephone, etc. By pivoting, on the image of the Facebook icon, we find that it has 12 additional compressed parents, meaning it appears in 12 documents, all of them sharing the same styles.xml file.
Visualizing all together, we find a set of about 12-14 images used within the same timeframe by the actor. All of these images can be found in the “Embassy of Ukraine in Hungary” document.
Figure 15: Pivoting through the Facebook image that included the document in Figure 14
There's a pattern evident in the previous image where different images were included in files uploaded simultaneously. This pattern is associated with multiple documents used in the same campaign of the Embassy of Ukraine in Hungary, all of them were using the same social media images explained before.

Styles.xml shared between threat actors

Another aspect we explored was if different threat actors shared similar styles.xml files in their documents. Styles.xml files are somewhat more specific and unique than [Content_Types].xml files because they can contain styles created by threat actors or by legitimate entities that originally created the document and then were modified by the actor. This makes them stand out more and can help in identifying threat actor activity.
This doesn't necessarily imply they share information to conduct separate operations, although in some cases, it could be a scenario worth considering.
Figure 16: styles.xml shared between different threat actors
Of all styles.xml files related to actors in our initial set, only six of them were found to be shared by at least two actors. Some styles defined by the styles.xml file are very generic and could identify almost any type of file. However, there are others that could be interesting to explore further.
An interesting case is the Styles.xml file, which seems to be shared by Razor Tiger, APT28, and UAC-0099. Specifically, the samples from APT28 and UAC-0099 are attract because they were uploaded to VirusTotal within short time frames, suggesting they might belong to the same threat actor.
You can see the list of hashes in the appendix of this blog

[Content_Types].xml shared between threat actors

Like in the previous case, we checked if there were Office documents among different threat actors sharing [Content_Types].xml:
Figure 17: [Content_Types].xml shared between different threat actors
In this case, there are eleven [Content_Types].xml files that are shared by at least two different actors.
An interesting case here is the file dfa90f373b8fd8147ee3e4bfe1ee059e536cc1b068f7ec140c3fc0e6554f331a, which is shared by Gamaredon, APT37, Mustang Panda, APT28, SideCopy, and UAC-0099. Again, there could be different explanations for this.
Another interesting case that is worth analyzing in detail is [Content_Types].xml with hash 4ea40d34cfcaf69aa35b405c575c7b87e35c72246f04d2d0c5f381bc50fc8b3d, which is only shared by APT28 and APT29.
You can see the list of hashes in the appendix of this blog

AI to the rescue

The images reused by attackers seem to be a promising idea we decided to further explore.
We used the VirusTotal API to download and unzip a set of Office documents used for delivery, this way we obtained all the images. Then we used Gemini to automatically describe what these images were about.
Figure 18: Results obtained with Gemini after processing some of the embedded images in the documents used by the threat actors
Figure 18 shows some examples of images that were incorporated by certain actors. There were also other results that were not helpful, mainly related to images that did not show a logo or anything specific that indicated what they were.
Figure 19: Results obtained with Gemini after processing some of the embedded images in the documents used by the threat actors
Using the VirusTotal API to obtain documents that you might be looking for and combining the results with Gemini to analyze possible images automatically, can potentially help analysts to monitor potential suspicious documents and create your own database of samples using specific images, for example Government images or specific images about companies. This approach is interesting not only for threat hunting but also for brand monitoring.

PDF Documents

Images dropped by Acrobat Reader

Unlike Office documents, PDF files don't contain embedded XML files or images, although some PDF files may be created from Office documents. Some of our sandboxes include Adobe Acrobat Reader to open PDF documents which generates a thumbnail of the first page in BMP format. This image is stored in the directory C:\Users\\AppData\LocalLow\Adobe\Acrobat\DC\ConnectorIcons. Consequently, our sandboxes provide this BMP image as a dropped file from the PDF, allowing us to pivot.
To illustrate this functionality, see Figure 20 attributed to Blind Eagle, a cybercrime actor associated with Latin America.
Figure 20: Content of a PDF file related to Blind Eagle threat actor
Figure 20 was provided by our sandbox. In the "relations" tab, we can see the BMP image as a dropped file:
Figure 21: BMP file generated by the sandbox that can be used for pivoting
The BMP file itself also shows relations, in particular up to 6 PDF files in the "execution parents" section. In other words, there are other PDFs that look exactly the same as the initial one.
Typically, many actors engaged in financial crime activities utilize widely spread PDF files to deceive their victims, making this approach highly valuable. Another interesting example we found involves phishing activities targeting a Russian bank called "Tinkoff Bank."
The PDF files urge victims to accept an invitation from this bank to participate in a project.
Figure 22: The content of a PDF file used by cybercrime actors
Applying the same approach we identified 20 files with identical content, most of them classified as malicious by AV engines.
Figure 23: BMP file generated by the sandbox that can be used for pivoting, in this case having other 20 PDF with the same image
There are some limitations to this approach. For instance, the PDF file might be slightly modified (font size, some letter/word, color, …) which would generate a completely different hash value for the thumbnail we use to pivot.

Images dropped by Acrobat Reader

Just like the BMP files generated by Acrobat Reader, there are other interesting files that might be dropped during sandbox detonation. These artifacts can be useful on some occasions.
The first example is a JavaScript file dropped in another PDF attributed to Blind Eagle.
Figure 24: BMP file generated by the sandbox that can be used for pivoting, another example of Blind Eagle threat actor
The dropped JavaScript file's name during the PDF execution was "Chrome Cache Entry: 566" indicating that this file was likely generated by opening an URL through Chrome, possibly triggered by a sandbox click on a link within the PDF. Examining the file's contents, we observe some strings and variables in Spanish.
Figure 25: Artifact generated by the sandbox via Google Chrome when connecting to a domain
The strings “registerResourceDictionary”, “sampleCustomStringId”, “rf_RefinementTitle_ManagedPropertyName” are related to Microsoft SharePoint as we were able to confirm. These files were probably generated after visiting sites that have Microsoft Sharepoint functionalities. We found that all the PDFs containing this artifact dropped by Google Chrome came from a website belonging to the Government of Colombia.
Figure 26: Flow of artifact generation related to Google Chrome that can be used for pivoting in VirusTotal

Email files

Many threat actors incorporate images in their emails, such as company logos, to deceive victims. We used this to identify several mailing campaigns where the same footer was used.

Campaign impersonating universities

On November 13, 2023, we details about a new campaign impersonating universities, primarily located in Latin America. By leveraging the presence of social network logos in the footer, we were able to find more universities in different continents targeted by the same attacker.
Figure 27: Email impersonating a university that contains multiple images
Figure 27 shows several images, including the University of Chile's logo and building, as well as images related to social networks like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter.
Pivoting through the images related to the University of Chile doesn't yield good results, as it's too specific. However, if we pivot through the images of the social media footer, represented as email attachments, we can observe multiple files using the same logo.
Figure 28: Using the images from the email footer to pivot and identify new emails
Just by analyzing one of the social media logos, we saw 33 email parents, all of them related to the same campaign.
Figure 29: Other emails identified through image pivoting techniques

Campaigns impersonating companies

Another usual case is adding a company logo in the email signatures to enhance credibility. Delivery companies, banks, and suppliers are some of the most observed images during our research.
For example, this email utilizes the corporate image of China Anhui Technology Import and Export Co Ltd in the footer.
Figure 30: Email impersonating a Chinese organization using the company logo in the footer
Pivoting through the image we found 20 emails using the same logo.
Figure 31: Other emails identified through image pivoting techniques

Wrapping up

We can potentially trace malicious actors by examining artifacts linked to the initial spreading documents, and in the case of images, AI can help us automate potential victim identification and other hunting aspects.
In order to make this even easier, we are planning to incorporate a new bundled_files field into the IOCs JSON structure, which basically will help to create livehunt rules. In the meantime you can use vt_behaviour_files_dropped.sha256 for those scenarios where the files are dropped.
In certain situations, the styles.xml and [Content_Types].xml files within office documents can provide valuable clues for identifying and tracking the same threat actor. The method presented here offers an alternative to traditional hunting or pivoting techniques, serving as a valuable addition to a team's hunting activities.
We hope you found this research interesting and useful, and as always we are happy to hear your feedback.
Stay tuned for the next blog post on PDFs and emails approach!

APPENDIX

[Content_types].xml shared between threat actors

[Content_Type].xml sha256

Shared by

3d8578fd41d766740a1f1ddef972a081436a2d70ab1e9552a861e58d8bbf5321

APT33, APT32

4ea40d34cfcaf69aa35b405c575c7b87e35c72246f04d2d0c5f381bc50fc8b3d

APT29, APT28

4f7fa7433484b4e655d185719613e2f98d017590146d15eedc1aa1d967636b3a

FIN7, Gamaredon, APT28, APT32

529739886f6402a9cd5a8064ece73eef19c597ef35c0bc8d09390e8b4de9041b

FIN7, APT33, TA505, Mustang Panda

688dca40507fb96630f3df80442266a0354e7c24b7df86be3ea57069b25d12c6

Gamaredon, APT33

6f1ac5f0ebfb7e97d3dc4100e88eaab10016a5cac75e1251781f2ea12477af51

Gamaredon, Hazy Tiger, APT33,

7796c382cd4c7c4ae3bcf2eed4091fbb20a2563ca88f2aecadb950ad9cf661f8

Razor Tiger, APT28, UAC-0099

b4fa7f3faa0510e4d969219bceec2a90e8a48ff28e060db3cdd37ce935c3779c

Razor Tiger, SideCopy

dfa90f373b8fd8147ee3e4bfe1ee059e536cc1b068f7ec140c3fc0e6554f331a

Gamaredon, APT37, Mustang Panda, APT28, UAC-0099, SideCopy

fe98b3bcf96f9c396eb9193f0f9484ef01d3017257300cc76098854b1f103b69

FIN7, Hazy Tiger

ff5a5ba3730a8d2ec0cbad39e5edf4ad502107bd0ef8a5347f29262b3dfe8a43

Mustang Panda, APT32

styles.xml shared between threat actors

Styles.xml sha256

Shared by

13ed55637980452662cb6838a2931a5e54fbed5881bcbae368b3d189d3a01930

APT28, UAC-0099, Razor Tiger

2de1fc9c48c4b0190361c49cdb053fd39cf81e32f12c82d08f88aec34358257f

Hazy Tiger, Gamaredon, APT33

59df7787c7cf5408481ae149660858d3af765a0c2cd63d6309b151380f92adb2

TA505, Gamaredon

8f590f608f0719404a1731bb70a6ce2db420fd61e5a387d5b3091d47c7e21ac9

APT28, FIN7, Razor Tiger, APT32, APT33

de392cd4bf1d650a9cf8c6d24e05e0605bf4eaf1518710f0307d8aceb9e5496c

Hazy Tiger, FIN7

e16f84c5fd1df6af1a1f2049f7862f4ea460765863476afb17e78edee772d35b

APT32, SideCopy, Mustang Panda, Razor Tiger

virustotal.com
rss
forum
news
surface web
apt

2024-05-17

google.com
rss
forum
news
surface web

2024-05-16

I am a member of a strange club that nobody wants to belong to, but whose numbers are steadily growing: innocent people convicted in Iran of espionage for what Iranian officials call the “tyrannical Zionist entity” (in other words, Israel). Many among us are foreigners—businesspeople, journalists, tourists, and academics like myself, who traveled to Iran for what they thought would be a brief visit, only to find themselves thrown in prison on dubious charges.

The European Union diplomat Johan Floderus, a Swedish citizen, is but the latest high-profile victim of Iranian hysteria over Israeli spies on its territory. Currently awaiting sentencing from a revolutionary court in Tehran, Floderus faces allegations of “very extensive intelligence cooperation with the Zionist occupation regime” and a charge of “corruption on earth,” which carries the death penalty. Sweden’s foreign minister has stated publicly that the accusations against Floderus are “completely baseless and false,” and the head of the EU foreign service has labeled him “illegally detained.”

I was convicted of espionage for Israel under similarly spurious pretenses in 2019. I had been invited to an academic conference in Iran as the guest of a local university, and was arrested by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) at Tehran’s Imam Khomeini airport as I was about to fly home to Australia. I was handed a 10-year prison sentence, of which I served more than two years at the mercy of the IRGC before I was freed in a prisoner swap.

[Read: I was a hostage in Iran. The deals are part of the problem.]

During my time in the Iranian prison system, I learned Farsi and used every opportunity possible to study my captors. In addition to IRGC interrogators and prison guards, I encountered a number of influential regime figures, including the head of IRGC intelligence, the deputy foreign minister, and even Iran’s current chief nuclear negotiator. At various junctures, these men came to the prison to meet and speak with me, or agreed to do so while visiting for seemingly other purposes.

The fact that someone who had been convicted of espionage, however unjustly, was given access to such people is testament to the chaotic way in which intelligence work is conducted in the Islamic Republic. Indeed, although Iran’s authorities talk tough and cast an extremely wide net in their quest to capture the Mossad agents they believe are in their midst, a prevailing lack of competence has meant that very few actual spies ever seem to get caught.

Not only does the Islamic Republic arrest a large number of innocent people domestically, but the agents of its two intelligence bodies, the Ministry of Intelligence and Security and the IRGC’s intelligence unit, have a long history of bungling operations overseas. Many operatives get caught: Just last month, a suspected member of the IRGC Quds Force was arrested in Peru for plotting to kill Israelis living in the country. Indeed the three IRGC members who were released in exchange for me had been convicted in Thailand of targeting Israeli diplomats in a failed bomb plot. Rather than making final preparations in the days before their operation, these hapless agents had been photographed drinking alcohol and partying with local prostitutes. In the course of resisting arrest, one of them had even blown off his own leg with the bombs they’d assembled.

Of course, not every overseas Iranian-intelligence operation fails, and the consequences are devastating when they do not. In 1994, 85 people were killed at a Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires, in a bombing that Argentine courts later ruled was carried out on the orders of the Islamic Republic. Just last week, Argentina issued an Interpol red notice for Iran’s interior minister, Ahmad Vahidi, accusing him of having been behind the attack. The Islamic Republic is also apparently implicated in a string of assassinations and kidnappings of dissidents across Europe and the Middle East, as well as plots targeting Iranian opposition journalists in London and New York.

[Read: Iran’s deadly message to journalists abroad]

The incompetence and lack of professionalism of much of the Iranian intelligence apparatus stands in stark contrast to the efficiency of Israel’s, which is alleged to have carried out sophisticated sabotage and assassination plots on Iranian territory. Beginning in 2007, Israel is thought to have targeted scientists working on Iran’s nuclear program for assassination. At least six have been killed inside the country. In 2022 alone, seven officials affiliated with Iran’s missile or drone programs died under suspicious circumstances. Israel is also thought to have been behind two mysterious blasts at the Natanz nuclear facility, as well the theft of an enormous archive of documents relating to the nuclear program from a warehouse in Tehran. In 2023, Mossad even announced that it had kidnapped an IRGC hit man inside Iran; the Israeli agency released footage from his interrogation outside the country.

Somewhat bizarrely, my exchange for three blundering IRGC operatives wasn’t the only connection between my wrongful imprisonment and the high-stakes war of espionage that has long been playing out between Tehran and Tel Aviv. Less than 48 hours after I was freed from prison—and likely not unrelated to the deal that freed me—Israel carried out one of its most audacious missions on Iranian soil.

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was an IRGC commander and the shadowy mastermind of Iran’s covert nuclear-weapons program. While the regime was busy welcoming the three convicted terrorists home with garlands of flowers and sleek propaganda reels, agents acting for Israel parked a blue Nissan pickup truck on a highway intersection near the hamlet of Absard, north of Tehran. Hidden on the truck bed beneath a tarpaulin was a remote-controlled, AI-programmed machine gun. As Fakhrizadeh’s motorcade crossed the intersection, the sniper, watching via satellite from thousands of kilometers away, opened fire. Fakhrizadeh was killed in a hail of bullets. The truck then blew itself up.

The Israelis had clearly been surveilling Fakhrizadeh for months, if not years, prior to the attack. Yet they held their fire until after I had departed Iranian airspace, a move that was much to my benefit, as such a brazen operation would undoubtedly have scuppered the deal for my release. That the attack so closely coincided with my prisoner swap, however, was unlikely to be an accident, and had less to do with me than with the three IRGC terrorists exchanged for my freedom. Australia probably  had to secure Israel’s consent for trading them, as they had been caught targeting Israeli diplomats. The IRGC, of course, would have known that. And so the Israelis opted to send Tehran a message by allowing the deal to go through but killing Fakhrizadeh at nearly the same time: They would go after a bigger target, and on Iranian soil besides. Unlike the IRGC’s three amateurish agents in Thailand, they didn’t fail.

The Iranian regime has shown itself to be supremely adept at surveilling, arresting, and interrogating political dissidents, social-media activists, members of armed separatist groups, and even underground terror cells from organizations such as the MEK. As the unprecedented crackdown on the Woman, Life, Freedom demonstrations shows, the regime retains a fierce grip on the country and runs it like a police state. All of which leaves one to wonder: Why does Iran do such a poor job of countering Israel’s operations inside its territory?

One clue lies in the fact that many, if not most, of the assassinations and other plots attributed to Israel, including the killing of Fakhrizadeh, are conducted with the participation of local Iranian recruits. Interestingly, the quadcopter drones thought to have been used in Israel’s April 19 attack on a military facility in Isfahan province were also most likely assembled and launched from inside Iran.

The Islamic Republic’s security apparatus has long assumed that Israel is sending foreign tourists and other visitors to Iran to spy on its behalf. But this supposition seems more and more like a costly distraction from the real issue at hand: A not-insignificant number of Iranian citizens inside Iran appear willing to risk torture, imprisonment, and execution in order to assist enemies of their own government.

Iranian security agencies have had little success in thwarting Israeli activities inside their country in part because authoritarian regimes prioritize loyalty over competence. IRGC intelligence officials tend to owe their positions to either ideological conformity or to strong family or personal ties within the organization. If you weren’t a true believer (or at least good at pretending to be one) and didn’t have other IRGC members to vouch for you, you didn’t have a hope of becoming even a lowly prison official in a Revolutionary Guard detention facility. As one guard boasted to me, “Our positions aren’t advertised.” In such a system, aptitude, skill, and even security training are much lower priorities. The least suitable people can attain high ranks, while better-qualified candidates who are deemed insufficiently ideologically committed miss out.

The result is a lack of professionalism, which I observed firsthand during the 804 days I spent in IRGC custody. For example, I was once able to text the Australian embassy in the middle of an interrogation, because my interrogator had made the rookie error of leaving my confiscated phone in the room after he stepped out. On another occasion, I was able to trick one of my captors into revealing details of the diplomatic negotiations surrounding my release. And although I’m unable to go into specifics, female prisoners are routinely able to take advantage of the IRGC guards’ squeamishness about women’s bodies to smuggle information outside the prison.

Selected for ideological orthodoxy, the Revolutionary Guards I interacted with bought into all manner of conspiracy theories, which undoubtedly distorted their understanding of geopolitics and hamstrung their ability to interrogate suspects. I was regularly forced to listen to lengthy tirades about secretive Zionists pulling the levers of the global economy, or Israeli plots to poison the sperm counts of Muslim men in a scheme to achieve demographic supremacy. My handlers admitted to watching spy shows involving the Middle East, such as Fauda, Tehran, and Homeland. These seemed to reinforce their tendency to see the hand of Mossad behind every calamity that befell Iran, man-made or otherwise. Such paranoia helps explain the shockingly high numbers of innocent people, most of them Iranian, imprisoned on charges of working for Israel. Sadly, many of these people make false confessions under duress, which in turn gives the authorities the impression that they are catching real spies.

Institutional incompetence is not the sole reason Iran’s agencies have been losing the shadow intelligence war with Israel. Like all brutal authoritarian regimes, the Islamic Republic knows no language other than intimidation and the threat of violence. It has proved unable to offer positive incentives or rewards to those who might be in a position to assist it. The population, including the Islamic Republic’s traditional religious constituency, broadly loathes the regime; even the most disinterested and self-serving opportunist is reluctant to gather information on its behalf. The IRGC in turn distrusts the people it rules over and believes that cooperation can only be forcibly coerced.

[Read: How fake spies ruin real intelligence]

I experienced this approach myself in Evin Prison. Before I was put on trial, Revolutionary Guard interrogators accosted me with an offer of recruitment. Would I agree to travel to London to collect information on the Iranian dissident community? Would I use my status as an academic to visit Israel, effectively as an Iranian agent? Then, after the trial, they used the absurd 10-year sentence I was dealt as a lever of blackmail. The IRGC would only enter into negotiations over my freedom, I was told, if I agreed to work for them; if I did agree, I would be beholden to them in every way once freed.

“How do you know I won’t just run away after I’m allowed to leave Iran?” I asked the recruiters.

The answer was sobering. The IRGC had operatives on Australian soil, they told me, just as they did in Europe and North America. If I reneged, they would kill me. For more than 18 months, I resisted this pressure. It relented only after I leaked to the international press that I was a recruitment target.

The IRGC are better placed to blackmail Iranian or dual-national prisoners than they were with me. Anyone who has family members living in Iran faces an impossible choice: Agree to spy for the regime, or see your loved ones jailed and tortured alongside you. And because unwilling recruits can’t be fully trusted, they are then subjected to near-constant surveillance and threats to prevent them from escaping. During the years I spent in IRGC custody, I encountered several such people, three of whom were ultimately sent abroad on behalf of the IRGC.

Iran’s heavy-handed approach contrasts sharply with the methods that Israel is rumored to employ inside Iran. In prison I met several Iranian Muslims convicted of activities that linked them to Israel, and I heard stories of numerous others. Some were shown to have been calling Israel over Skype, or chatting with Israelis in internet message forums. Of course, many such people are innocent of any crime, and were likely just curious about a neighboring country whose name they had been encouraged to curse since primary school. There appeared to be slightly more substance to the allegations against a small number of others.

From what I came to understand, Israel has been able to capitalize on the Islamic Republic’s record of poor governance, economic mismanagement, poverty, and political repression to offer would-be collaborators valuable ways out. These could take the form of bundles of cash or offers of permanent residency, not only for Iranians who assist their operations, but for their family members as well. In this respect as in many others, the Islamic Republic has become its own greatest adversary: Having shown itself over the decades to be impervious to ideological moderation or reform from within, it has become so hated that its own people—its biggest victims—are willing to embrace the possibility that the enemy of their enemy is their friend. I lost track of the number of Iranians in prison who advocated for heavier economic sanctions and openly welcomed American or Israeli air strikes on Iran.

These sentiments have translated into robust support for Israel on social media, including from inside Iran, much of it making no reference to the horrors currently unfolding in Gaza. Some Iranians condemned the IRGC’s April 13 missile and drone attacks on Israel and cheered on Israel’s retaliation. Somewhat embarrassingly, the regime was forced to issue an official notice threatening to arrest anyone expressing these sentiments online. It followed through by arresting Mobina Rostami, a member of the national volleyball team, after she posted on social media: “As an Iranian, I am truly ashamed of the authorities’ attack on Israel, but you need to know that the people in Iran love Israel and hate the Islamic Republic.”

Israel and Iran’s tit-for-tat military strikes on each other’s territory will likely lead to a further intensification of their long-standing clandestine activities. As a result, Iran will likely throw more innocent people in prison; it will bungle more overseas operations; and ultra-hard-liners in its security establishment will double down on repressing a population that despises them. Such authoritarian tactics have already benefited Iran’s enemies and will continue to do so, offering Israel the upper hand in the covert war of espionage within Iran’s borders and abroad.

domains
urls
social media
israel
sweden

2024-05-15

Welcome to the Snap!

Your daily dose of tech news, in brief.

Image by Suzanne from Spiceworks (AI-Generated)


Flashback: May 15, 2011: Sony Begins Restoration of Its PlayStation Network after Cyber Attack (Read more HERE.)


Security News:

• Microsoft, Apple, and Google Release Fixes for Actively Exploited Flaws (Read more HERE.)

• VMware makes Workstation Pro and Fusion Pro free for personal use (Read more HERE.)

• 400,000 Linux Servers Hit by Ebury Botnet (Read more HERE.)

• Current Market Forces Disincentivizing Cybersecurity, Says NCSC CTO (Read more HERE.)


You need to hear this.

Solar-powered robot astronaut could soon be heading to China’s space station

According to Interesting Engineering:

"China’s Tiangong Space Station is set to welcome a new crew member, a humanoid robot called Taikobot. The robot will act as a sort of caretaker for the station and help assist the human crew whenever present. . . . In tests, Taikobot assisted workers with various tasks around the station, such as moving and maintaining equipment and handling tools like hammers and electric screwdrivers. . . .

Taikobot won’t be the first humanoid robot sent to space, however. NASA’s Robonaut-2 is widely seen as the first humanoid in space, launched to the International Space Station in 2011. . . . Russia’s space agency, Roscosmos, also sent its version, Skybot F-850 humanoid, to the ISS in 2019.

The [development] team [explained that as] space exploration missions are expected to become more numerous, lengthy, and complex, the use of robotic assistants to take over certain responsibilities will become increasingly common. “Compared with human astronauts that require a complex array of machinery to live in space, robotic assistants are capable of working 24/7 and consume only solar energy.” . . . “Robots are set to become our partners in space.”"

Learn more at Interesting Engineering.


Here’s Something Odd…

Virtual Boy: The bizarre rise and quick fall of Nintendo’s enigmatic red console

According to Ars Technica:

"The development of the Virtual Boy’s hardware began with the creation of a high-resolution portable display called the scanned linear array (SLA). . . This is the key piece of technology that made the Virtual Boy possible. Reflection Technology founder Allen Becker invented the SLA because he wanted to create a small, high-contrast heads-up display for use with a portable computer. . . . The Private Eye could simulate the view of a twelve-inch display seen eighteen inches away, but it had a catch: it could only display shades of red. . . .

While seeking a wider market for its SLA display invention, Reflection put together a virtual reality video game demo circa 1990 using two Private Eye displays, one for each eye, that were mounted to a welder’s mask. It added head-tracking and linked it to a portable PC that ran a first-person tank game. . . . Reflection unsuccessfully pitched its tank-based VR demo to toy and video game companies . . . . In 1991, Reflection offered the display to Nintendo where it caught the attention of one of Nintendo’s top inventors, Gunpei Yokoi. . . .

At the heart of Yokoi’s design philosophy lay a concept he called “lateral thinking with withered technology.” Yokoi’s design philosophy can be summarized as an approach that emphasized finding novel uses for existing, inexpensive technology. His philosophy arguably runs counter to conventional game industry wisdom where newer, flashier, cutting-edge technology is (assumed) better. . . . Yokoi saw the unlimited, enveloping blackness of the Private Eye’s LED-based display as an opportunity to create games without borders, hoping for a new kind of gameplay not constrained by the limitations of a TV screen. . . .

For Yokoi, this was also a chance to broaden the audience for games. Yokoi believed that the population of people playing games was decreasing—with players less interested in having to spend a lot of money for new games that were also more difficult to play. The Virtual Boy was to be “geared toward people at the bottom of the game [pyramid]”; it was “aimed at aunts, uncles, and children.” . . .

After a brief, interesting lifespan, the star of the Virtual Boy burned out. In August of 1996, Gunpei Yokoi resigned from Nintendo, ending his long and influential run at the company. His influence on Nintendo lived on, however; the firm continued to develop products using “lateral thinking with withered technology”—the Nintendo DS and Wii are perhaps two standout examples. Yokoi’s philosophy is baked into Nintendo’s soul."

This is a super-long article, so I just chose some interesting things about the designer for this, but if you want more, by all means, read the article. :slight_smile:

Learn more at Ars Technica.


But there’s more going on in the world than that.

Sky OV: ‘Wingless’ hydrogen-powered jet could fly at supersonic speeds

According to Interesting Engineering:

"Spanish designer Oscar Viñal has revealed the design concept of a ‘wingless’ supersonic hydrogen jet, which can reach speeds of up to Mach 1.5 and transport up to 300 passengers. The futuristic, spaceship-like aircraft ‘Sky OV’ can travel at speeds up to 1,141 mph (1,837 km/h). . . .

Sky OV sports a delta design, which means the aircraft’s fuselage and wings are integrated into one big structure. . . . The aircraft’s propulsion system will run on a mix of hydrogen fuel and electricity, making zero-emission supersonic travel a reality. Instead of turbojets, the aircraft will get power from a hybrid pulse detonation engine (PDE) along with a turbofan.

The design concept also shows that the Sky OV’s exterior will be coated with quantum solar dots, which can help produce electricity from the Sun’s beams. . . .

The aircraft will have bedrooms, suites, bathrooms, and even an in-flight chef. . . . Those interested will, however, have to wait for years to see a jet like this taking to the skies in real life."

Learn more at Interesting Engineering.


And you can’t not know this.

Next-generation sustainable electronics are doped with air

According to TechXplore:

"Semiconductors are the foundation of all modern electronics. Now, researchers at Linköping University, Sweden, have developed a new method where organic semiconductors can become more conductive with the help of air as a dopant. . . .

To enhance conductivity and modify semiconductor properties, so-called dopants are typically introduced. These additives facilitate the movement of electrical charges within the semiconductor material and can be tailored to induce positive (p-doping) or negative (n-doping) charges.

The most common dopants used today are often either very reactive (unstable), expensive, challenging to manufacture, or all three. Now, researchers at Linköping University have developed a doping method that can be performed at room temperature, where inefficient dopants such as oxygen are the primary dopant, and light activates the doping process. . . .

“It’s also possible to combine p-doping and n-doping in the same reaction, which is quite unique. . . .” This simplifies the production of electronic devices, particularly those where both p-doped and n-doped semiconductors are required, such as thermoelectric generators.

The doped organic semiconductor has better conductivity than traditional semiconductors, and the process can be scaled up. Fabiano and his research group at the Laboratory of Organic Electronics showed earlier in 2024 how conductive plastics could be processed from environmentally friendly solvents like water; this is their next step."

That’s dope. (Sorry, couldn’t resist.)

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Did You Know?

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From Return Fire

Original title: Open letter from Return Fire magazine to the 2024.03.29-31 International Anti-Prison / Anti-Repression Gathering

The event aims to be an informal and self-organised gathering of activists, representatives and delegates from groups active in the prisoner solidarity / anti-prison / anti-repression struggle, one focused on the consolidation of international solidarity…”

second call-out for the International Anti-Prison / Anti-Repression Gathering, Brighton

Hi comrades, known and unknown to us.

We welcome this initiative, and send our love and gratitude to all gathering in Brighton with the aim of together building a more durable and combative struggle against the authoritarian nightmare of the present-day. From the limits of our own capacity, we’d like to offer some thoughts; reflections that have been born from decades of shared struggle and over 10 years of publishing our magazines with a strong presence of anti-repression/anti-prison documentation and agitation. (This has included putting out texts and translations from comrades behind bars, sometimes with the direct participation of the prisoners themselves.) As limited and fallible as they are, they are what we have to offer: they are here for you and the comrades back in your own areas to do with as you will. Considering the international dimension of the gathering, we have tried to provide adequate context for those less familiar with recent cycles of struggle on these isles, and we have also brought our thoughts into conversation with other writings produced in the course of the struggle in past years, with their questions, analysis and proposals.

We will address some patterns and strategies of social control and State targeting of liberatory movements, and then make some observations and suggestions which might be slightly ‘up-steam’ of the more visible moments of police action itself, yet which we consider vital to the resilient movements we need to build, rather than only attempting to plug a hole in the dam with a finger of anti-repression work after the fact. This is especially important when we consider that police action is in fact ongoing at all times; understanding modern State philosophies of counter-insurgency allows us to see that repression is the norm, not the exception, and that in a very real sense it is not hyperbole to describe this as the latest adaptation of a permanent social war[1] – sometimes nearly invisible yet ironically total – being waged against the population by those who would govern it. This encompasses the repressive apparatus of the security agencies/military, cops and other State agencies down to the smallest level, together with the media, academic collaborators, corporations and recuperated civil society organisations, not to mention our own fear and suggestibility. (As Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson set out in their essay ‘Virilio’s Parting Song,‘ increasingly the (social-)mediascape allows repression to circulate horizontally, free-floating, self-managed.)

Comrades attending to themes of repression know as well as anyone that our efforts are not bound to the same cycles of rise and fall as the social movements that draw overt police attention (although indelibly linked to our own cycles as living beings, our own moments of extroversion and introspection). Rather, we constitute a base-line rhythm which allows the maintenance of memory, collective learning, support for those under attack, and the patient, inexorable return of pressure to the camp of the oppressor. Or, we fail in the attempt.

In the UK context, a lot has happened since the international Gathering Against the Prison Society in Brighton in 2009, standing as it did at the door of a following wave of dynamic action in the first half-decade that followed (student revolts, militant squat defence/eviction offence, a 2011 uprising across England following a racialised police execution, the return of a combative anarchist street presence in the pacified wasteland of the capital, anarchist attacks proliferating in the West Country, and more). Repression in its broader sense also moved forward with leaps and bounds; ramping up of police armament and surveillance architecture (perhaps most dramatically under cover of preparations for the 2012 London Olympics), various terror panics over the Islamic-identified “internal enemy,” the “hostile environment” policy of immigration management and its continued internationalisation via partnered detention schemes from Jamaica to (coming soon) Rwanda, a never-ending raft of new legal restrictions on taking to the streets or targeting infrastructures and updated in the era of COVID-19, renewed State attacks on travelling communities and squatting, prisons over-filled to bursting, academic collaboration refining an insidious ‘soft cop’ policing of protests until it is time for the hammer to strike, collusion with right-wing street movements, the surveillance operations of undercover officers being exposed and intimidating both those previously targeted and those aspiring to act.

While an in-depth analysis of those years will not be attempted here, it is vital for those who have lived through those times (and those that preceded them) to share lessons they have learned and reflections with other generations. The focus for the first part of this letter will be on one specific arrow the enemy has in their quiver, which has rained down on us at certain moments and looks likely to continue: that being, counter-terrorism legislation and framing. We regret deeply not appearing at the Brighton gathering this March 29th-31st to present the following thoughts in person, but in March 2021, the Dutch police raided and seized the servers of the NoState tech collective, taking down a variety of anarchist counter-information and prisoner solidarity pages such as Act For Freedom Now!, Montreal Counter-Info, 325, North Shore Counter-Info, and Berlin Anarchist Black Cross, in the context of an undisclosed ‘criminal investigation’. Although our website is not hosted by NoState and was thus unaffected, news has trickled back to us that the cops were also demanding any information related to our publication project, Return Fire. (Most of the above important webpages are now reopened on new servers, and we send our greetings and solidarity to them.) For now, we will make our contribution from the shadows.

(Anti-)Anti-Terrorism & Counter-Information Projects

Anarchists, activists and environmentalists are targetted as “extremists” and “terrorists” with special police teams designed to infiltrate and dismantle their campaigns and organisations.”

first call-out for the International Anti-Prison / Anti-Repression Gathering, Brighton

When, in May 2020, the domestic intelligence agency MI5 announced that they were taking over the monitoring and tracking of “domestic terror threats” within the UK from the police, it was probably only a matter of time until the new unit (LASIT; left-wing, anarchist, and single-issue[2] terrorism) would be testing its mettle – and doubtless seeking to justify its budget – by playing a public hand.

Labelling anarchists and other anti-authoritarian enemies of the ruling order as ‘terrorists’ is not a novel development, the term having been leveled – with varied levels of success – against rebels from the French Revolution onwards. In the 20th century, it was the Spanish State that really first brought a comprehensive ‘anti-terrorism’ policy to bear as a permanent tool in its arsenal, at first against Basque independence struggles but quickly also against (other) youth in any self-organised and combative demonstrations and sabotages it could allege to be the work of Basque ‘terrorists’. (Though it wasn’t long before the UK took up the theme regarding independence struggles in the British-occupied north of Ireland, and Germany did so against the Marxist-Leninist and occasionally autonomist/anarchist urban guerrillas of the 1970s plus those it could associate with them.)

“Since 1991 and the fall of the Soviet Union,” we can read in the text ‘A Wager on the Future’ by Josep Gardenyes, “the capitalist world system has lacked an oppositional dichotomy that can modulate and recuperate all dissident movements.” After the jihadist attacks of September 2001, it looked for some time that such a dichotomy had been found: that of democracy versus the figure of the terrorist. Under that sign was gathered all whom jihadists and other authoritarian groups managed to recruit (or among whom they attempted to, or that the State could allege them to…) from what remained of the broader anti-colonial movements after the (nominal) independence wars of the 1960s and 1970s and the most alienated and disillusioned of their children, including those in the West. What followed was its deployment on a truly international scale “as a conjunction of moral narrative, political discourses, institutional mandates, interstate connections, and juridico-military resources that any government allied with the global powers could make use of.”[3] What this looks like in practice ranges from unlimited surveillance to the fact that people can stay in prison for months or even years without clear accusation or trial and severe restrictions once released, not to mention social – or even literal – assassination.

During one of the earliest of the anti-terrorist cases which anarchists in France have faced, in 2008 you could read the following on a poster on the streets:

In this world upside down, terrorism is not forcing billions of human beings to survive under unacceptable conditions; it’s not poisoning the earth. It’s not continuing a scientific and technological research which everyday further subjugates our lives, penetrates our bodies and modifies nature in an irreversible way. It’s not imprisoning and deporting human beings because they don’t have an adequate little scrap of paper. It’s not killing and mutilating at work for the enrichment to infinity of the bosses. All that is called economy, civilization, democracy, progress, public order.

The media, as ever, have been instrumental in this effort, not least because of the level of public complicity that a charge like ‘terrorism’ requires (clearly a moral category they shape and promote rather than one ‘objective’ enough to include the endless list of State-inflicted or far-right/racist attacks), to achieve its task of not only neutralising individuals but of disciplining populations. But the media is not the only other non-State (or para-State) institution that plays and has played a significant role; we are talking about academics. Take the 2020 report published by Paul Gill, Zoe Marchment and Arlene Robinson of Univeristy College London’s ‘Department of Security and Crime Science’. In the paper, ‘Domestic Extremist Criminal Damage Events: Behaving Like Criminals or Terrorists?‘, these lackeys of the securitisation industry and cops specifically take the wave of anarchist attacks on a wide variety of corporations, State agencies, animal exploiters, fascists, transport lines, and communications infrastructure that has characterised the south-westerly city and environs of Bristol, England, during the last decade or two, and offers clear recommendations to the repressive organs of the State as to how to equate these sabotages – legally and propagandistically – with terrorism.

(Police efforts to apply the term so far in that area have been somewhat anemic, such as the confused and ambiguous interview with then-head of the unsuccessful[4] Operation Rhone investigation aired on a BBC documentary on the topic[5] after the iconic 2013 destruction-by-fire of the soon-to-open multi-million-pound police firearms training facility was described by the local Chief Constable as ‘domestic extremism’; that so far they had not found the actions to fit within the “clear legislation” of terrorism, but that “possibly” they were looking at a terrorist cell?)

Their analysis identified priority interventions for the cops as – among other things like increased stop-and-search and extensive forensic/DNA profiling, as we have seen in other anti-anarchist operations across the theatre of Europe this past decade in both legal and illegal forms – working with the media to portray anarchist and other liberatory movements that use direct action as “domestic extremism” (the term already in vogue but potentially falling from favour[6]) and then equivocate this directly to “terrorism.” They also specifically recommended targeting anti-repression networks and solidarity groups.

They needn’t of bothered; this is already old hat to a variety of States directly involved with repressing combative anarchism in the world today, though the prize for that task surely is a tie between Greece and Spain in that regard (with France as a runner-up). Where anarchists in those countries have succeeded in mobilising a counter-discourse against terrorism charges and their social validity, the criminal cases have sometimes fallen flat (to the investigators chagrin);[7] and worldwide, anarchist tensions within social movements and explosions of mass rage have often led to their destructive techniques spreading to be used by other exploited and rebellious actors rather than being contained by the repression. What we have seen increasingly, though, is State attempts to close down our means of digital communication and diffusion of our ideas on grounds of incitement, terrorist apologism, even hate-speech.[8]

Two of the three authors of the paper on anarchist action around Bristol, Paul Gill and Zoe Marchment, subsequently had their photos, phone numbers and emails circulated by anarchists.[9] Not yet have we seen responses to match those in territories claimed by the Chilean State, for example, where the following year anarchists smuggled a bomb into the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies (ANEPE)at night on the eve of the commemoration of 2019-2020’s popular revolt in those lands, where they knew of “permanent academic activities intended for police forces, in terms of intelligence, investigative and counterinsurgency strategies. It is a repressive body under the Ministry of Defence which also shares knowledge internationally with States such as Spain, Colombia, Israel, etc. Different academics of this den of Power have written about anarchist practices and tendencies, trying to analyze our ideas, dynamics and proposals,” the responsibility claim reads. Previously last decade, other anti-capitalists exposed a member of Brighton’s own Leftist journal Aufheben, John Drury, as a long-standing academic collaborator with the cops, helping to devise policing strategies for protests. (Perhaps more disappointing was the reactions – or lack of reactions – from much of the movements he claimed to be supporting but was actually a parasite upon, earning his wages informing to the enemy.[10])

Our circles have benefited from various forms of using security culture to defend ourselves from policing and journalists; we need to go further and consider how to prevent being compromised by academics (or the communications technologies which we increasingly rely on and which the latter, like the cops, can easily access and analyse). We have to popularise this broad suspicion as far as possible in the movements we participate in (even when there are now an increasing amount of anarchist academics whose studies could benefit us but too often only end up in the hands of their supervisors, the State, and a tiny handful of other scholars). The scandal of recent years of the anti-fascist researcher Alexander Reid Ross, co-founder of the Earth First! Newswire and contributor to an anarchist academic journal, going on to work with former CIA and Department of Homeland Security agents for an ‘anti-extremism’ centre providing intelligence and analysis to technology companies, law enforcement and public officials (and which also produced a report on how anarchists use social media to “instigate widespread violence”,[11] comparing them to jihadis and right-wing militias) should bring this awareness to the fore.

Where the State succeeds in framing their blows against us as “counter-terror operations,” it attempts to ‘monster’, delegitimise and ultimately disappear our ideas and practices, at precisely the point when in many places across the world we are at the frontlines in messy and many-faceted struggles that can still be said to hold a glimmer of liberatory potential. Here in the UK previous generations have also faced this threat at times of heightened struggle; our minds go to the ‘GANDALF’ case that MI5 also backed a generation ago against our circles in an attack on Green Anarchist magazine due to its publishing of Animal Liberation Front (ALF) communiques (clearly intended as a dampener on a decade of generalised dissent and popular participation in ecological action), an example collective memory has failed to keep as alive in the present moment as it should.[12] However, on a global scale right now it is clear that, even if the paradigm of anti-terrorism is failing to stabilise the capitalist world-system as it is rocked by revolts, crises, pandemics and wars, it is in sporadic but systematic use against anarchists (amongst others) in most countries with sizeable anarchist movements.

The annual European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend report (TE-SAT) released a new edition in December,[13] with the usual chapter dedicated to “left-wing and anarchist terrorism.” The authors express concern that “anarchist terrorists and violent extremists continue to pose a threat to public safety and security in the EU by damaging critical infrastructure resulting e.g. in large-scale power outages.”[14] They note a sharp increase in the number of Leftist/anarchist “terror” attacks in the year they studied compared to the year before, although they admitted that this may index to the fact of “changes in Member States’ classification of attacks as terrorist versus violent extremist.” They note that “anarchist extremists and terrorists in the EU place high importance on the legal and financial support provided to detained ‘comrades’.” The most common “offence” leading to arrest during the period in question, according to them, was not partaking in action, but “membership of a terrorist organisation.”[15]

Lest you imagine that simply not committing the more spectacularised acts of what the system projects as terrorism will protect you (or, worse, that denouncing other anarchists for “terrorist tactics” – such as the UK Anarchist Federation did following the 2012 knee-cap shooting of a top nuclear executive in Italy – will keep you safe), consider some of the deployments of terrorism charges of late.

In the Siberian territories claimed by the Russian State, three teenage anarchists were convicted for terrorism; for having ‘built’ a headquarters of the state intelligence service in an online game, then virtually ‘blowing it up’. In the US during the insurrection of 2020, the time-honoured anti-capitalist and anti-colonial practice of blocking trainlines is what has got some terror charges. Spanish police, according to the media, contemplate attack on a police station (during rioting itself sparked by the conviction of a communist rapper for ‘supporting terrorist violence’ when speaking of armed struggle, as another singer previously was for the same reasons) as grounds for the same.

As climate heats and ecological communities of life melt down, the hostage-takers at the helm of industrial society will be eager to use the hammer of counter-terrorism (as they never stinted from doing, even when it wasn’t already too late to stop the tipping point) against saboteurs, land-defenders and development-blockers trying to slow the accelerating catastrophe: witness the clamour from the German media and prosecutors over the recent wave of ‘Switch Off!‘ sabotage actions. Prosecutors in Turkey also recently referred anarchist detainees to the counter-terrorism office for incitement over published calls regarding State atrocities; however in that case the charges were also ultimately not brought down on them.

The European Union is considering putting anti-fascist groups on the list of those designated as terrorists (recall the 14 European Arrest Warrants requested by Hungary for German, Italian, Albanian and Syrian comrades, mostly yet to be captured), and Lina, an anti-fascist from Leipzig, was imprisoned on charges of having beaten some fascists, i.e., “having formed and being part of a criminal organization” under §129 of Germany’s criminal code; a.k.a, its Anti-Terror Laws. In Belarus, comrades who have taken responsibility for burning police stations and the like during the 2020 revolts there received long sentences on terror charges as a result as a clear disciplinary message to participants in the uprising, in a country where the death penalty has previously been applied in a terrorism case there. And if we’re not to commit the common error of forgetting the necessity of sustained and long-term solidarity, from Italy to the so-called US it’s already decades since some anarchist comrades have been under continual imprisonment because of ‘terrorism’ convictions.

The actions the prosecutors target seem to us, without fail, necessary and important contributions towards movements with teeth, able to take the offensive and also defend ourselves, imposing costs on the system for their moves against us and steady destruction of our lives, dignity and the Earth we both are and are of. And to us these acts are magnified when they hold resonance in a social context, going hand-in-hand with attempts to address our own needs and lives in a variety of contexts of struggle, refusal, and reconnection with the land and its many beings.

It is also our belief that combating the device of ‘anti-terrorism’ is itself a social process, because that is the terrain that ‘anti-terrorism’ tries to cut us off from by making us appear (to whoever is still fooled by the police spokespersons and their media or academic auxiliaries) as unrelatable, monstrous, fit only for extermination in the white cells of democracy; the oblivion of which they have been throwing those of various Muslim cultural backgrounds and Irish militants into on these isles for so long already with so little social opposition. The question we believe remains to be developed is, what strategies on the social level should we apply to prevent this enclosure, now and in the cases sure to come? How to use the opportunity opened by the repression not to close in on ourselves but to open a social conversation about the deployment of this discourse of terrorism and terrorists? Efforts in the past – looking to the international context – have ranged from “the State is the only real terrorist” to “we are all terrorists then!” How have these discourses aided or hindered, and in which contexts? Perhaps the Brighton gathering this month will collectively shed some light on this issue, with the attention both of those familiar with contexts of the UK and those with experience of counter-terror operations in other countries.

We think that counter-information platforms and publishing projects have a lot to think about here, not just because we offer a primary form of communicating our ideas and discourses which would challenge the terrorism narrative (though doubtless all anti-authoritarians need to be able to speak about these subjects with all the people in their lives, not just those who will pick up a magazine or read a blog), but because increasingly we ourselves are the target of the counter-terror operations, on the basis of incitement or providing instruction.

This is significant because – despite the large amount of brave comrades in jails across the continents for direct actions in many forms – law enforcement has long admitted that anarchist affinity groups are especially hard to penetrate, surveil and take out of action.[16] “The propagandists of Anarchist doctrines will be treated with the same severity as the actual perpetrators of outrage,” reads a declaration from the Spanish government in 1893 (during the heyday of the “propaganda by the deed” attacks on government and military figures and heads of State), and over a century later – having still failed to stem the anarchist insurgency by other means – this strategy seems set to continue. November 2021, the Italian State launched yet another wave of raids and charges against comrades in its claimed territories; they were accused of being another group that publishes a magazine it seems the police would rather didn’t exist. The charges? “Having constituted and promoted an association with aims of terrorism.”

It does not surprise us that the UK State is, like its neighbours on the continent, eager to repress the channels anarchists and others use to propagate our critiques and project our dreams. Attacks on publications and web-projects have been rising around the world, in both legal and extra-legal forms – comrades of the Indonesian Anarchist Black Cross (to give but one example) speak of how this “has been increasingly encouraged by the Indonesian Police, with initiatives such as the creation of a “cyber police” or social media police, with one of their aims being to isolate the spread of information not only from anarchist networks but also from other political dissidents and those who have the courage to criticize the state”:

The Indonesian Police from 2014 to 2019 have disbursed funds of ± 900 billion rupiah, which are used as funds for buzzers[17] to curb the spread and growth of counter-information media. In 2018 the Indonesian Police began to re-focus on the anarchist movement in Indonesia. Also, national police recently made a statement about banning media from covering police violence. However, we are sure that both individuals and groups who are focusing on counter-information and grassroots reports will continue to exist and grow. Given the severity of this situation in which all the tools of the State and Capitalism try to carry out silencing and repressiveness either online or physically, this is not the time to be silent and surrender ourselves to fear.

We do not agree with those who say that these repressive moves specifically target us because of the fear that the system feels from our actions and ideas in and of themselves; rather, it is when those practices manage to seep out across the social terrain, especially in moments of contestation, that our ideas become truly dangerous to the State and its order.[18] (For example, the EU “terrorism” report cited above worries about the increasing amount of violence targeting police stations, personnel and even their personal property: during the years when we have seen some of the most intense anti-police rioting of recent years, from France to the so-called United States, often in places with a history of anarchist anti-police agitation and action.)

For this reason, resisting the enclosure that repression always attempts (whether by the name of anti-terrorism or something else) is always more helpful than allowing the enclosure to do its work, even as we support those directly targeted. Lastly, making fighting repression into a social process rather than an anarchist specialisation also allows for the possibility of prisoner solidarity to become a practice for a wider section of society than our own resources can allow, sustaining us in combating the extreme isolation that terror suspects are often subjected to, and – just as importantly – allowing prisoners a greater possibility to continue to participate in some ways in the struggles that often led them to the cells in the first place, circumventing the efforts of the jailers and investigators to wear us down, hem us in and destroy us.

Terror charges are a way to strip struggles of intelligibility, of history, of context, reducing the accused to ‘bare life’ that can be done with as seen fit. How to we break out (discursively, spiritually, and of course ultimately practically) of the enclosure raised around us? At least in part, by improving our own intelligibility, history, context, and showing – not just telling – the values which give our lives meaning. Doubtless, beyond simply protesting the ‘excessive’ application of the term, a part of this ‘anti-anti-terrorism’ is too often disavowed by the more populist among us: that part is throwing the dichotomous partner of the dominant terrorism discourse – democracy – into the wastebin as yet another revolutionary dead-end or diversion, to be surpassed along with every other false dichotomy. (After all, which democracy hasn’t been built on a foundation of alienation, slavery, warfare and genocide: on terrorism, if you like?) Before the blackmail of totalitarianisms – democratic, communist, or fascist – revolutionary anti-state solidarity in words and acts.

The State here (and especially under the Conservative government) has for some time been pursuing a course of successively criminalising every form of rebellion or protest that even edges towards effective disruption of the status quo, a strategy that could be characterised as “shut up or blow up.”[19] When even the usual release-values of “democratic dissent” are stopped up (possibly because the global elite, bloated on its own arrogance since the 1960s, barely remembers a time when they were last forced to offer concessions due to powerful movements threatening revolution), we are sitting on top of a powder-key that seemingly could go off at any moment.

“In other words,” continues ‘A Wager on the Future’, “we live in a world where the powerful are trying to hide and to crush revolts, the desire for freedom, and revolutionary movements behind a curtain of antiterrorism”:

Antiterrorism is still convincing, it still mobilizes people and serves to justify more repression and control, but at the same time, this is a world in crisis, in which the majority of perturbed people, angry people, precarious people, are reluctant to trust either of the two poles of power. It is a dichotomy made to be taken apart, to allow us to again create a self-defined space of struggle and freedom. […] Yet it seems that few anarchists have taken notice that attacking antiterrorism, discursively and in practice, will not only decommission one of the most potent weapons in the state arsenal, it might also be our only chance of regaining our protagonism, self-defining a subjectivity of negation and rebellion, and projecting revolutionary paths in the coming years.

In the face of all this, it serves us well to ask how to proceed given that – as anarchists – we are not simply trying to attend to the ravages of repression after the manner of lawyers and human rights campaigners, but rather with an eye to fortifying the very struggles which the enemy is trying to shut down or preempt. Ultimately, the strongest base we have for resisting repression is neither a sound counter-discourse nor the most impenetrable security culture (though both are invaluable), but the maintenance of strong and well-rooted struggles themselves which can continue to give context to the cases of repression and allow those targeted by the State to continue participating, and it is to this – albeit still within the framework of our efforts countering repression – that we now turn.

Expanding Our Horizons

In the face of escalated attacks against workers, young people, migrants and the living conditions of prisoners, we call for an encounter to learn how we can combine our struggle…”

first call-out for the International Anti-Prison / Anti-Repression Gathering, Brighton

Combining struggles might be easier if we cultivated the ability to see the value in a symphony of complementary roles that each individual struggle, to be successful, must already contain. Yet more often than not this is not what we see in anarchist spaces. Either we find a valorisation of a couple of roles at most (mostly some variation of Warrior and Messenger) at the expense of all others, or we find the malignant heritage of the democratic imaginary in our spaces: everyone is expected to be able to do everything, to ultimately be interchangeable (to use the democratic parlance, ‘equal’). To be clear, more roles than this already exist, and have always existed, else we would never have survived this long as a tendency: but they often are neither valued nor developed (or rather, they are not developed communally and in complementarity, rather than as an individual project or even profession). Hence, we do not let them develop to their full potential. Those dedicated to tackling repression already know this; it is easier to find participation in the Warrior and Messenger roles than in those of attending to the emotional and practical needs of everyone impacted, tasks which are – not coincidentally – feminised in this society.

A recent Catalan text (forthcoming in English translation) by Josep Gardenyes, ‘Organization, Continuity, Community’, examines this exact dynamic. It lists a whole raft of existing modes of responsibility (sometimes more than one being fulfilled by the same person at some point of their life, but probably with a natural limit to how much time and energy one has to develop skills necessary for too many roles) which are visible once we really examine our spaces and struggles; fighters, healers, caretakers, builders, links, mediators, mediums, storytellers, and – at present – “be-theres”, those without as yet a defined contribution; and finally of course, ideologues who propagate justifications for their own current’s approach instead of actually performing any other role.

Many of these roles are necessary for multiplying the force of any struggle. This is impossible as long as any one element considers itself the most important; we have lived with the consequences of this arrogance for too long. The few healers among us are over-used and under-appreciated (for example, by the fighters who see themselves as the most vital or even sole agents, yet don’t know how to articulate their emotions or address the endless conflicts they generate around them). The healers, for their part, like the caretakers and mediators, end up turning to pacifist conceptions of struggle. The builders, mostly seeing themselves as the most pragmatic, have their pragmatism channeled away from the struggle (when they feel the model of their former comrades is simply to fight and get locked up for it, rather than anything “constructive”), and their efforts end up fortifying some charitable or otherwise non-revolutionary endevour. Does this sound familiar to anyone else?

Hence, we would like to bear in mind for the rest of this open letter that the basis of how we do what we do could ultimately be what determines the success – rightly identified in the call-out for this gathering as a necessity – of combining our struggles. We are convinced that this also holds keys to resolving difficulties and/or failures of anti-repression practice, both in specialised groups and as a sentiment (or lack of it) in the movements more broadly.

Before the Blow

It’s time to stop wringing our hands and instead get organised. What do we have in common and can we build a common platform of action and discussion that helps us build a better world.”

first call-out for the International Anti-Prison / Anti-Repression Gathering, Brighton

What framework do we have in mind when we speak of getting organised? To begin to answer this question, of course on the one hand we must have some kind of more specific idea of what the task at hand is. (That organisation must be a verb, a process of action, and not a static end in itself, was known to the comrades of the MIL and the OLLA[20] – that organisation is the organisation of the tasks of the struggle.)

For the purposes of what follows, without entering into justifications for this analysis, we will consider the basic needs of the current situation (at least in the circles we move in and know) as fitting within three themes. Namely, intervening in social conflicts, attempting to widen, deepen, and radicalise them (as we in turn are often radicalised by them). Rooting ourselves in the territories where we live and which we live as (obscured as this is by capitalism), including the land but also our histories and knowledge of how we came to be where and what we are. And, finding communal ways to address our vital necessities of life, away from the mediation of markets, State welfare, and colonial extractivism on any scale, and ensuring dignified survival in the face of attacks (pollution, borders, bosses, queer-bashing, gentrification, imprisonment, whatever it might be). Properly speaking, these three needs are not distinct but overlapping. Nonetheless some of our efforts will be more easily identifiable as relating to one or another of these needs.

Only once we have already established a provisional framework for what the tasks at hand are, and staked something in realising the projects to achieve those goals, is it necessary to discover which form of organisation will be most fitting for what we are already doing. Hence, each locality and tradition of struggle, with its own intensity of social conflict and internal dynamics, will have its own appropriate organising to address these three needs (or others): that is up to those who live in that reality to determine. To stay with the theme of repression, the strategies of State intervention will differ along with its interplay with media, culture, other social movements and tensions and more, and a valuable task for rebels would be to identify what those dynamics are in their own area.

But something that all comrades will have to face is how to address, realise, or resolve conflicts in their own circles and organisations. Again and again, we see reluctance or inability to do this hamstring efforts to organise. To not have dead words in our mouth when we speak of our dreams of a world without police or prisons, that has to change: not because – as some prison abolition activists might insist (and unconvinced neighbours might demand) – we must have blueprint solutions for a future we cannot yet know, but because they are the very means needed to carry collective struggle for prison demolition forward without faltering at every step.

For a start, we should accept that conflicts are not the exception, but the norm. Conflict is our companion through life, and is often clarifying, a means to grow and learn and change. Hence, when we fear and avoid conflict (or try to prematurely ‘solve’ it), we rob ourselves of this possibility. Not only this, but such discomfort can lead to people simply penalising whoever made the conflict impossible to ignore (thinking here of people who have been abused, or who simply cannot continue to ignore a shared problem). Others simply make the most of the situation to accrue points to their own status, without fundamentally changing the conditions leading to the problem.

It is a question of ‘when’ and not ‘if’ when it comes to a group needing to address conflict, and so we need to talk about it before the fact. To be able to take the collective opportunity, we have to envisage a process in which everyone involved is transformed in the process of a conflict, and not just reduce it to two or more individuals. This is very difficult in a culture which basically boils down to identifying good guys and bad guys, and justifying harm against the latter. There is, of course, an alternative: to pool our abilities and, through a healing process, we all grow together, and we don’t lose comrades.

But too often people simply prefer not to have to position themselves, or to expel the supposed ‘bad apple’ and leave themselves feeling clean. We need the ability to hold more levels of complexity than that, even (or especially) in the conflicts in which, as so often happens, one person has submitted another to harm and oppression. There is a further step to take beyond simply knowing all the theories around patriarchy, racialisation, and difference in its many forms: educating ourselves of the struggles against them, including how many of the resulting conflicts touch many intersections of power and privilege, and so are messy and complex, not black and white.

Only experience and intentionality will help us to see if someone (or, more likely, a social space) has caused harm and now seeks to respond to the suffering they have caused – and so will be willing to transform along with us – or they are a danger we must deal with otherwise, so as to protect ourselves. The former of these cases needs to be given the time it needs to play out; but the fear we have too often of conflict leads to people simply weighing up the resources or friendships they would lose depending on whose ‘side’ they would take (in situations often without the idealised duality of ‘abuser/abused’ when we are really honest) and then voting with their feet, not their self-professed values.

Weathering the Blow

What more does this have to do with repression? An attentiveness to counter-insurgency and other modern policing theories shows that the chief effect of repression is usually not the direct impact of the blow, but the fault-lines it opens up in the targeted group (or between the targeted group and other groups). If we are not practiced at how to deal with stressful situations, all too often the fault lines tear us from one another; and the tears often occur along the already-fraying parts of internal relationships, and map to power differentials that are best not left unexamined. Therefore, a holistic anti-repression practice to model will take this into account. Looking at how previous police operations affected each locality, how that was dealt with, and who reacted in what way, is without question a job that our enemies are conducting: we should not let them be the only ones to learn and adapt from that knowledge.

Many great resources are already circulated by comrades regarding how we should react in the face of repression (although updating the versions that exist with new information and legal/technological changes is always a valuable endeavor), from cultivating a wide-spread culture of zero-cooperation with law enforcement to dealing with overt or covert surveillance of our spaces. We are suggesting that attending to the quality of our internal dynamics should also be considered key before the hammer drops. This sentiment was shared by the reflection ‘Green Scared?‘, published in Rolling Thunder magazine in the confusion and paranoia in anarchist scenes of lands dominated by the United States following an extensive‘Green Scare’ anti-terror operation against activities of the ALF and Earth Liberation Front around the turn of the millennium, during which many former radicals collapsed under pressure and division and informed on each other:

State disruption of radical movements can be interpreted as a kind of “armed critique,” in the way that someone throwing a brick through a Starbucks window is a critique in action. That is to say, a successful use of force against us demonstrates that we had pre-existing vulnerabilities. This is not to argue that we should blame the victim in situations of repression, but we need to learn how and why efforts to destabilize our activities succeed. Our response should not start with jail support once someone has been arrested. Of course this is important, along with longer-term support of those serving sentences – but our efforts must begin long before, countering the small vulnerabilities that our enemy can exploit. Open discussion of problems – for example, gender roles being imposed in nominally radical spaces – can protect against unhealthy resentments and schisms. This is not to say that every split is unwarranted – sometimes the best thing is for people to go their separate ways; but that even if that is necessary, they should try to maintain mutual respect or at least a willingness to communicate when it counts.

Needless to say, many of you reading this will have experienced stresses coming from repressive situations, and seen people handling this more or less skillfully. (This includes conduct between prisoners and supporters, between co-defendants, etc.) The time to put skills into practice is now, not once the blow has already landed.

Recovering from the Blow

Our communities are increasingly turned into open prisons, “a prison society”, through new technologies of social control.”

first call-out for the International Anti-Prison / Anti-Repression Gathering, Brighton

The sadder truth is, that practically none of us had an experience of community in the first place. Why are we so weak that (acceptance of) the prison relationship so easily flourishes among us, when even societies under full colonial occupation or martial law managed to maintain more zones of resistance and insubordination than we see around us today on these isles and neighbouring countries?

Once again, many gathering in Brighton will be dedicating considerable effort already to prisoner support/solidarity efforts, but it is well known that this is not a general predisposition among our movements; it is often a specialisation (which while we do not necessarily want to reject, it is common knowledge that we want to involve more people in these practices). And the truth is that “we” (in this wider sense) are not good at prisoner support for many of the same reasons that we are not good at supporting each other in general. That is not solely an individual failing, but because here we live, breathe and eat capitalism, and shit out alienation.

There are many factors that amplify this alienation (neo-liberal dynamics penetrating even into resistance movements, the isolating effects of cybernetic technologies we are presently hostage to, patriarchal socialisation), but they are already known to many of you. Suffice to say that often we don’t know how to ask for help, we don’t know how to receive help, and certainly we don’t know how to give help; or on the contrary, we only know how to receive it as an entitlement or how to give it as a gendered, classed and/or racialised expectation, sabotaging liberatory potential in the act. So, overwhelmingly, we rely on the poisoned gifts of patriarchy and capitalism more than we rely on each other.

Until we are capable of transforming this sad fact, it is too early to speak of communities here: yet that is precisely what we need to struggle and survive. Not out of a romanticisation of the term: in fact, it is necessary to demystify it. Community is not the best thing ever. It’s not the solution to all problems, all loneliness, all frustration. It’s not everyone being of the same age and radical, sexual or temperamental persuasion. It’s just a body of imperfect people who share their survival. It is (at least sometimes) difficult, painful, life-giving and essential. Because it is how we can finally speak of destroying capitalism and the State.

There are glances of this potential to be had, even in Brighton: the organisational efforts to exercise mutual aid during the COVID-19 pandemic point to the ability to mobilise resources and connectivity, showing up the State as indifferent to our survival (let alone flourishing), when not an active hindrance. But, like Rhiannon Firth and others have cataloged, for the moment these initiatives only really take wing in the midst of disaster (manufactured or not), and can end up in the worst cases only supporting the return to isolated ‘normality’ while the neo-liberal State stands back: we have yet to treat everyday life as the disaster it truly is, marching us off the cliff of devastation and indignity.

“The varied attempts to create liberated communities cannot all be measured with the same ruler,” it is written in ‘Against Self-Sufficiency, the Gift‘ (by Sever), “but one failing that crops up pervasively in our present context is worth mentioning”:

Nowadays most people who have grown up with Western cultural values don’t even know what a community is. For example, it is not a subculture or a scene (see: “activist community” or “community accountability process”), nor is it a real estate zone or municipal power structure (see: “gated community” or “community leaders”).

If you will not starve to death without the other people who make up the group, it is not a community. If you don’t know even a tenth of them since the day either you or they were born, it is not a community. If you can pack up and join another such group as easily as changing jobs or transferring to a different university, if the move does not change all the terms with which you might understand who you are in this world, it is not a community.

A community cannot be created in a single generation, and it cannot be created by an affinity group. In fact, you are not supposed to have affinity with most of the other people in your community. If you do not have neighbours who you despise, it is not a healthy community. In fact, it is the very existence of human bonds stronger than affinity or personal preference that make a community. And such bonds will mean there will always be people who prefer to live at the margins. Whether the community allows this distinguishes the anti-authoritarian one from the authoritarian one.

Yet efforts to judge the communities we are trying to midwife into this world cannot fall into perfectionism; because perfectionism is incompatible with community in this sense. The tension shouldn’t surprise us: properly speaking, no community can coexist under the State, and so any that takes form under its reign is in a constant tension between expanding its autonomy and being liquidated. The only interesting question is where on that spectrum our efforts are at any one time, and how to re-adjust that balance, always pushing for the destruction of the State.

The consequences of this challenge for facing repression are apparent. Why, to take one example, did so many people in the Green Scare case turn informant? The theme is complex, but ‘Green Scared?’ notes that “[h]istorically, the movements with the least snitching have been the ones most firmly grounded in longstanding communities”:

Arrestees in the national liberation movements of yesteryear didn’t cooperate because they wouldn’t be able to face their parents or children again if they did; likewise, when gangsters involved in illegal capitalist activity refuse to inform, it is because doing so would affect the entirety of their lives, from their prospects in their chosen careers to their social standing in prison as well as their neighborhoods. The stronger the ties that bind an individual to a community, the less likely it is he or she will inform against it. North American radicals from predominantly white demographics have always faced a difficult challenge in this regard, as most of the participants are involved in defiance of their families and social circles rather than because of them. […] Here we see again the necessity of forging powerful, long-term communities with a shared culture of resistance; dropouts must do this from scratch, swimming against the tide, but it is not impossible.

[…] Healthy relationships are the backbone of such communities, not to mention secure direct action organizing. Again – unaddressed conflicts and resentments, unbalanced power dynamics, and lack of trust have been the Achilles heel of countless groups. The FBI keeps psychological profiles on its targets, with which to prey on their weaknesses and exploit potential interpersonal fissures. The oldest trick in the book is to tell arrestees that their comrades already snitched on them; to weather this intimidation, people must have no doubts about their comrades’ reliability.

Superseding the Blow

We stand before a crucial weakness our movements suffer, at least in the countries we know best: and more than a weakness, it is a tragedy, because it speaks to one of the few advantages that the enemy consistently enjoys in the social war. Once again, it goes deeper than a personal failing, although we all participate and have responsibilities and possibilities to overturn this condition. That disadvantage is the lack of continuity (generational, strategic, spiritual) in our struggles.

The State (and similar hierarchies), as James C. Scott has often emphasised, necessarily simplifies reality so as to be able to understand (that simplified version of) it enough to exert control. Often it is slow, parasitic, lumbering, unwieldy, imprecise. Our living webs of resistance and reciprocative survival – shifting, decentralised and chaotic (to reclaim a maligned term) – have proved infinitely more adaptable, intelligent and agile; this is one reason among many why it is vital to resist efforts to move us towards forms of organisation and imagination that more resemble those of the State itself, as is the proposal of the Left.[21] Yet this full potential is not realised, because the hegemony enjoyed by a confluence of the State, colonialism and patriarchy (and their capitalist consolidation then expansion) has managed to effectively break our transmission of knowledge and wisdom over the centuries. The result is that we are constantly starting again from zero when trying to break out of the dominant culture, without understanding how we came to be where we are: whereas the modern State maintains an almost-unbroken institutional memory of how to defeat us again and again, a memory they are constantly updating and refining.

Counter-repression organising sees this before us in the starkest and most depressing ways: often social revolt erupts, stones are thrown and police confronted, a new human potential emerges upon the barricades even from those we never expected. Then, after the rebellion has been crushed or bought off (or has simply burned itself out), that human potential dissipates back into routine, work, family, amnesia. What in other territories is achieved by genocidal levels of violence and intimidation is fulfilled just as efficiently (or more) by anti-depressants, social welfare, elections, media technology, and regular but sparing applications of policing, torture and imprisonment for those not yet pacified. We are left with prisoners of a war that nobody seems to even remember was raging weeks or months before, one that we are still fighting.

(Or, we thrust ourselves forward to attack – based not on an analysis of the conditions we find ourselves in, of our strengths and weaknesses, but on a fetishisation of abstract and unchanging principles – without heed for how the revolt can expand and extend itself by seeking solidarity from other social bodies. Sure enough, within a certain number of months or years, we are isolated by our need for security, by individualised survival strategies, the prison system, generational changes we haven’t worked out how to address, health break-downs and exhaustion. And, again and again, the line of transmission of our experiences across generation and phases of struggle is severed, and we’re back to reinventing the wheel.)

There are heroic efforts to keep that flickering memory alive (often dependent on forms of struggle that are not even recognised as such in the above scenario), and a vital part of that is not letting those repressed become forgotten (most importantly, including outside of our own circles): on that note, we can note the incredible continuity that the Brighton Anarchist Black Cross has maintained over the last decades, a rock in the UK prisoner support landscape, who perhaps will have something to say on this subject. In part, combating this amnesia has been a major goal of the format in which we release our magazine, Return Fire. The idea was to present something sizable and durable, less prey than slimmer and more frequent publications to be thrown away each year, with editorial explanations for those not already versed in our movements, to build collective reflection and memory you could find in one place when thinking about past years and cycles of struggle (as, in fact, has always been a focus in our ‘Memory as a Weapon’ column). Inspirational in this regard would be our eco-anarchist predecessors of the journal Do or Die, published from Brighton, who preserved records from otherwise-ephemeral sources of the ’90s/early ’00s struggles that the newest climate movements make so little reference to and learn so little from.

There’s a lot we could do differently to address this in our own movements (hints: not basing all our social spaces around the inclinations and rhythms of young militants alone, not modeling relationships that end up in self-isolating couples or criticism-allergic cliques, not managing conflicts so they only end in dynamics of win-lose or lose-lose…) But the memory we are talking about preserving or constructing cannot stay limited to our own small circles; it must draw breath in the streets, it must play on others lips as well. Anti-repression focuses have much to offer here, because – once presented in the messy and heterogeneous spaces where our potential comrades can be found – they can serve as a bridge to connect newer participants with those the State and media are attempting to isolate and annihilate.

As much was suggested by Peter Gelderloos’ ‘Diagnostic of the Future‘ when, writing in 2018 amidst a riotous US-wide prison labour strike and a resurgent far-right countered by those seeking a progressive democratic renewal, he asked “what are the positions that cut to the heart of the problem, no matter who is in power, while also speaking to the specific details of how power is trampling people down?”:

It is not that hard to conceive of a way to oppose state power and racist violence that leaves us ready, primed, and on our feet no matter who wins in November, and many anarchists are doing just that. As anarchists, we will always fight against borders, against racism, against police, against misogyny and transphobia, and thus we will always be on the frontlines against any right-wing resurgence. But are not borders, police, the continuation of colonial institutions, and the regulation of gender and families also a fundamental part of the progressive project?

The principal hypocrisy of progressives can often be found in their tacit support for repression, that unbroken chain that connects the most vicious fascist with the most humanistic lefty. That’s why it makes sense for anarchists to highlight the prisoners’ strike and to bring the question of solidarity with detainees from anti-pipeline struggles and prisoners from anti-police uprisings into the heart of any coalition with the left. If they want to protect the environment, will they support Marius Mason and Joseph Dibee?[22] If they think building ever more oil and gas pipelines at this advanced stage of global warming is unconscionable, will they stand with Water Protectors? If they loathe police racism, will they support the people still locked up after uprisings in Ferguson, Baltimore, Oakland and elsewhere, primarily black people fighting back on the frontlines against police violence?

Such an emphasis will separate Democratic Party operatives from sincere activists in the environmental, immigrant solidarity, and Black Lives Matter movements. It will also challenge the illusion that new politicians will solve these problems, and spread support for the tactics of direct action and collective self-defense.

We can also greatly deepen our understanding of repression in our areas and our resilience to it by making sure that older comrades (those with knowledge of the struggles and repression of previous decades) are still part of the conversation.

Considering that our struggles are at heart international (and turning this awareness into more than a simple slogan), forging meaningful connections with comrades in other territories is a necessity too. This gathering in Brighton is invaluable to support those links.

“Despite the advances in technology, radical communications has not kept pace,” as Eepa put it in ‘Building International Solidarity: Human Relations for Global Struggle‘; “Sure, many anarchics are aware of other struggles through communiques, news reports, or social media posts, but there is a deep rift between these casual interactions and meaningful relation building needed for resilient, effective, and meaningful struggle.”

They go on to emphasize the potentials that we only enjoy when such a network is under active maintenance and reinforcement, allowing us “to call for advice, to call for reinforcement, or to announce new projects of continental interest”:

Continental networks also act to ensure that the many varied regions, cultures, and political situations have a fast and effective means of reaching every other group on the continent, without relying on word-of-mouth, algorithms, or news releases.

[…] It can not be understated how much we can avoid stumbling blocks by learning from those who have been there and done that. International networks are also keenly important for ensuring that the relative wealth of even poorer comrades in the industrialized regions of the global north, gets shared with comrades in dire struggle with access to almost no monetary/material resources. We must find ways to ensure that we are getting funds and materials to the most dire struggles. This can only be done when we have developed resilient relationships with comrades across the globe.

Vital parts of this process of learning will be study of languages and of cultural differences, being observant and adaptive. “If you have a dozen comrades in your group,” Eepa reminds us, “you have enough people to learn lingua-francas for most of the colonized world”:

Everything you have in life starts with reaching. A toe dipped in the water before you learn to swim, your hand reaching out to grasp a rope you are about to climb, the raised hand in greeting of a new face. You take the first step by reaching out. Communications and solidarity is no different.

Taking this a step further, we can imagine an anti-repression network (or rather, many) of a city or region which not just keeps up to date on the struggles of anarchist circles in other countries or continents but actually commits to “partnering” with another one across borders. This could look like collectively raising travel funds to send comrades there to learn and share, keeping the relationships alive with long-distance communications and with repeat visits and hosting comrades from there here, always with an eye to sharing resources, contexts and ideas. What this would not look like would be how anarchist travel too often happens; basically as tourism, with the emphasis being on personal experiences (rather than on collectivising contacts we make with our struggles back home), spreading the stupider conflicts among us onto an international level, or – in terms of visiting countries with which our own exercises some variant of a colonial relationship – continuing to see our own countries as the centre of the world and being unable to listen and learn, let alone see the international entanglements of both the global system and of our struggles against it.

On the local level, the building of our capacities for genuine mutual aid back from the abyss we currently dangle over could be challenging ourselves to each connect with a willing comrade who is not already in our immediate circle – examples could range from prisoners, younger or older people, people who are parenting, people medicalised and/or suffering – and try to commit to a mutually-supportive, transformative relationship with them. (And them with us – the emphasis should be on mutuality, rather than charity, and each person who might fit the above descriptions should also think of who they could choose to support.) Perhaps over time this could expand to more than one person who isn’t already close to us, but we suspect that even engaging one person will be challenging enough for most people already (although those accustomed or expected to perform this kind of care already for gendered reasons will perhaps find it easy to “add” more people, in those cases creating a truly mutual – rather than extractive – relationship will doubtless be the more challenging part). But that could be a path to widening the scope of our relationships, expanding beyond what we are allowed access to under capitalist daily life.

Not Fearing the Next Blow

We know that we are likely to see more (and more intense) policing operations against our movements, our environments and friends, our families. We knew, since before we even became anarchists, what this society holds in store for the disobedient, the questioning, those with solidarity and will. The task ahead, ever trying to keep one pace out of reach of our annihilation, may lie not in obsessively avoiding the blow of repression if doing so keeps us isolated, or in obsessively returning the blow if doing so over-reaches and drains us. Rather, it may lie in superceding the blow (which, of course, given the circumstances could well include either avoiding or returning it!) on the social field: breaking the enclosure, and losing the fear.

Fear is natural and logical given what we know the enemy is capable of (often from personal experience and that of our loved ones). Fear can keep us safe in some circumstances, keep us sharp, keep up wary. It can also disable us, or lead us to seek false securities. For thousands of years, when they didn’t find ways to directly oppose them, our anarchic ancestors on all continents where States formed fled from them and often outlived them, keeping themselves and their anti-authoritarian rejection alive in the process, forging cultures in zones out of imperial reach. Now, as the last mountain and jungle vastnesses are brought under the map and the satellite (if not necessarily under control) and the seas rise to met us while the sky falls down on our heads, the task of destroying the State – not just attacking it, but superceding it in the process – could not be clearer.

Fear of the struggle will, in fact, keep us in greater danger; but to appreciate this, we have to think of ourselves as part of a larger social body struggling to be born, not as the isolated individuals repression aims to reduce us to when some of us are inevitably jailed. “So long as there are prisons,” according to one statement for the annual Week of Solidarity with Anarchist Prisoners, “the most courageous, sensitive, and beautiful among us will end up inside them, and the most courageous, sensitive, and beautiful parts of the rest of us will be inaccessible to us.” What will keep us strong – whether in the streets, under arrest or on the prowl from the margins – will be the social connections we manage to create; and which will creature us, in a constant process of becoming which we choose to call anarchy, here and now.

Because the fear we often confront, beyond the simple self-preservation of the flesh we like to call our own, speaks to the isolation and alienation we live in: we too often think that if we cannot create all the changes we need in the world at once, or at least in the course of our individual lives, we will have failed. Perhaps a part of the fear is the desire to not be seen to have been defeated, to have been overcome. But do we not carry the ghosts of every past struggle with us? Are they really so vanquished, or are they still there in the soil we feed from and eventually return to, the dreams we barely remember, the molotovs we throw and the arms we link? Will we not be there when generations we have yet to know assume the same tasks, defending or re-gaining the same freedoms; were we not always there? Or is the undead rationalist spirituality of capitalism – its religion of profits and loss, atoms and cells, borders and straight-jackets – the only imagination we have left?

Up with the Spring

Winter begins to turn her face from us, having let us take the opportunities – when we’ve been able – for introspection, healing, sharpening our weapons and theories. Now is the time for planting seeds and tending to them, whether those seeds are the letters we send across prison walls and borders, the fires we light under the structures and arses of our oppressors, or the memories we share so our multi-generational body doesn’t continue to be constantly ripped asunder by the march of capitalist daily life. We enter the aspect of Spring, of fruition, the popping of buds and imaginations. A time for renewal, stands taken and promises given.

Our affection and solidarity to each sincere heart which will beat in the presence of its kind in Brighton; we look forward to hearing the reflections and proposals of those comrades and more. Anti-repression will remain at the heart of any anarchism in movement, in rebellion, in self- and mutual-defence on a burning planet. We hope some of our provocations will relate to the concerns in this arena, and how it could sit with the rest of our lives as radicals. We hope this could be more fuel for collective conversations in which we identify our capacities, abilities and roles we can develop, finding a harmony between our desires and skills and the needs of others and the present moment; in other words, a shared survival, without which we can never speak in truth of liberation.

Strength and courage to all dignified prisoners and those on the streets.

Solidarity to the (other) comrades maintaining – or who have maintained – publications and counter-information websites under the shadow of the “counter-terror” regime and its disturbed dreams.

Let’s keep this fire from dying.

Until MayDay,

– R.F., Spring Equinox, 2024.

This essay also will be distributed in zine form as a companion piece – with an appendix in the form of the text version of Toby Shone’s phone-in from high-security prison to the debate “Thought and Action: Repressive Attacks on the Anarchist Written Word” held in El Paso Occupato, Turin (Italy), March 9th-10th, 2024 to the final (double-)issue of Return Fire magazine, vol.6 chap6 & chap7, forthcoming

“From 1990, GA and groups associated with us were targeted by MI5 provocateurs to manufacture an “eco-terrorist threat.” […] After the propaganda came the Special Branch raids, a whole year of them, 55 in all. […] They wanted to link GA’s editors and spokespeople for the ALF to a letter bombing campaign by the Justice Department (no, over here they’re animal lib militants), but by the time it reached the court, the State had decided it was easier to prove we’d just conspired to report such actions. The press continued to report this Gandalf (GA-aND-ALF) prosecution as against a “bomb plot” anyway. As far as the State were concerned, legally and politically, it didn’t matter. In UK, inciting an act carries the same penalty as the act itself – a potential life sentence in this case – and MI5 were busy redefining all “subversion” as “terrorism.” The idea was to criminalize the direct action movement through us, giving the security forces a monopoly when it came to representing it in the media.
“The odds were massively stacked against all the defendants. Under the conspiracy/incitement laws, thoughtcrime and the rules of evidence that applied in 16th century witch trials still apply in UK. You can be tried simply for your beliefs, your lifestyle, and those of people that may only know you at four or more degrees of separation. Furthermore, the normal burden of proof is reversed – to establish your innocence, you must disprove prosecution conspiracy theory, whilst their interpretations are presumed to be “reasonable inferences.” Not only were news reports deemed incitement, but reviews of text published by others overseas, T-shirt slogans and even listing too many political prisoners on one page! The most trivial associations were deemed evidence of conspiracy – who’d written letters of support to ALF press officer Robin Webb in prison, who’d attended a meeting any defendant had, or received a GA t-shirt through the post, all were raided and threatened with arrest for conspiracy. The State spent 4 million pounds on this prosecution; involved the RCMP [R.F. – Royal Canadian Mounted Police], FBI, Italian and Finnish political police; rigged it so that the trial was heard in Portsmouth, home of the Royal Navy and the court with the highest conviction and sentencing rates in UK; and had a former NATO major general presiding and at least a third of the jury from military backgrounds, despite the judge agreeing to exclude such individuals! Defense witness Darren Thurston was deported on arrival in UK as an “undesirable alien” before he could even testify. Judge Selwood blocked defense motions and witness questions as a matter of course, informed jurors he considered defendants guilty even as the defense case was being made, and spent 3 ½ days at the end of the 12 week trial convincing the jury of the defendant’s guilt. Of six charged, one was actually acquitted and two others had their trials deferred until a year later, November 1998. Consistent with the security forces’ gameplan, the judge described the three GA writers convicted as “terrorists” and sentenced them each to three years imprisonment, the same some squaddy who’d strangled his wife and buried her under the patio got in the same court a month previously.
“During the course of the first Gandalf trial, its implications dawned on the alternative press and the first of many statements of solidarity and defiance were drawn up in support of the defendants. Names came in from across the world including the Nobel laureates Noam Chomsky and Harold Pinter, GA continued to be published as usual, and other alternative zines also started running defiant direct action diaries, there were protests at British embassies in the Czech republic and New Zealand, trucks were burned and butchers forced out of business in UK. What finally forced the State to let the Gandalf Three go after 4 ½ months inside was the project of Amnesty International classifying them as political prisoners because of the injustice of their trial. The Three’s release has severly undermined the viability of the Gandalf-2 trial, judge Selwood’s career is now on hold, the Hampshire Special Branch fronting for the Security forces are trying to shift blame and refusing comment to even their own tame media, and the provocateurs are now getting a lot of embarassing attention from the movement. Victory on this may be close, but we appreciate it will be only temporary – Europeanization is continuing regardless and the security forces will still need to validate their new National Public Order Intelligence Unit.”

[1] Reading from ‘Power’, a presentation made by Xander at the 2014 Berkeley Anarchist Students of Theory & Research & Development (BASTARD) conference: “A reoccurring theme in anarchists milieus, social warfare is as complicated as it is simple that can be plainly understood as the war of social relationships and by extension the war to maintain the social body – society. The term originates from the Roman Social War (91–89 BC) between Rome and their Italian allies (Socci), who were instrumental in the wars that established the Roman Republic, but were regarded as less-than Roman and subject to the “unrestricted imperium” of Rome. Their second class status, the Roman slave plantation, and limited powers in deciding Roman foreign policy laid the grounds for the Socci to secede from Rome, set up their own capital, and government (modeled after Rome’s), spawning what became known as the Roman Social War. Relevant to social war today is how the Roman Republic learned the importance of political concessions and developed the technique of political inclusion, as opposed to exclusion, using rights and citizenship to pacify insurrection and create stability and growth for the Empire.
“Class warfare as it is used today finds its root in social warfare, with the latter attempting to widen the social analysis of power to acknowledge the positive features that invest into people, encouraging self-identification and regulation to prolong and propel the dominate political system. Social warfare touches on the most sensitive, complex and powerful aspects of people, their sociality, and their relationship to society, and the general question of governance and order.”

[2] Within this definition they put animal rights/animal liberation action.

[3] Being put into comparison with an enemy so supposedly irrational, bloodthirsty and ‘uncivilised’ as fundamentalist Islamic cells may have set a very low bar for what kinds of violence and desolation the State itself was able continue wrecking on populations in the Global South – or individuals/demographics accused of involvement in the North – without provoking uproar. But it seems like on a global level the mechanism of ‘anti-terrorism’ has already shown significant weaknesses in creating a dualistic pole of tamable ‘opposition’ that efforts like our own could be forced in to. ‘A Wager on the Future’ notes that “the figure of jihadism is much less inclusive than that of communism. It is incredible for the Right to accuse the typical anarchist of being an agent of fundamentalist Islam, or for the Left to accuse them of being impragmatic for not supporting it, like they accused us for not supporting state communism. Worldwide, the majority of marginalized people are culturally distant enough from Islam that they are unlikely to ever identify with Islamic fundamentalism (although there are a billion people whom organizations like the Islamic State are seeking to represent and influence as coreligionists).
“The new dichotomy has another weakness: quite the opposite of the ruling dichotomy during the Cold War, the current one has been constructed in an era when the principal world powers enjoy very little legitimacy and trust. The bloated, greedy, and arrogant figure of the United States in 2001 is a far cry from the heroic protector of liberty from the first two World Wars. And the Europe of 2015 [R.F. – year of spectacularised jihadist attacks in Paris and Brussels], the Europe of austerity, of corruption, of bloody borders, doesn’t look much better.” More recently, it seems that the framework of biosecurity in the name of fighting COVID-19 has been more effective in mobilising public sentiment and passing an endless raft of repressive measures both temporary and permanent, though also not without its limitations.

[4] Although there was one Bristol comrade jailed during the course of this operation – Emma Sheppard, now out – her arrest was not intelligence-led (despite the investigators being quick to try to lump the arrest in with Operation Rhone, which featured at least 10 permanent detectives working full-time) but incidental in that she was unfortunately captured during the course of an action itself by staff at the police station which was the target.

[5] Apologies for the link to a trash conspiracy theory take in the video description, the YouTube version has been removed already.

[6] The text ‘Priti Fascist: Another civil liberties crackdown announced’ suggests that “the state has abandoned the tired old label of “domestic extremist” with its unfortunate whiff of SpyCops and state sanctioned abuse of women and replaced it with an all new and equally vague idea of “aggravated activist”. Despite lack of real clarity around what an aggravated activist actually is the justice secretary has dreamed up the concept of Criminal Disruption Prevention Orders (CDPOs) to combat them.
CDPOs are another development in the hybridisation of criminal and civil law that began under Blair [R.F. – then UK Prime Minister, architect of thwarted national ID obligation and back in the public eye during the COVID-19 pandemic as a champion of vaccine passports…] that gave us control orders, ASBOs [R.F. – Anti-Social Behaviour Orders], football banning orders and injunctions protecting corporations under the Protection from Harassment Act. What all these processes have in common is that criminal sanctions can be imposed on a civil standard of proof (balance of probablities). They grant the courts powers to regulate an individuals life to point of house arrest; with curfews, rules on places to avoid, people not to see, programmes to engage with, social media not to use etc etc with, and this is the kicker, criminal sanctions including prison for lack of compliance. The far reaching implications of this can be seen clearly with the impact on young Black lives of the Knife Crime Prevention Orders (KCPOs) as acts that are not regularly criminalised are punished under the criminal law.”

[7] A good example of this could be the multiple police “anti-terror” operations in the Spanish State from 2013-2018, which – despite considerable sensationalist media hype – resulted in a large social reaction declaring ‘I Too am an Anarchist’, defeating in large part the attempts to demonise and isolate our comrades there. The majority of the cases collapsed without convictions; although the toll on our movements and structures there was of course high, anarchists on the whole did not emerge more socially isolated than before.

[8] Examples could be the social media crackdown against a variety of prolific anarchist outlets in the so-called United States in recent years such as CrimethInc. and It’s Going Down, among others, having their pages shut. This has been taking place within an atmosphere of increased calls for censorship from the Left – who have taken over that social role from the Right of the generation previous – in the name of (statist) anti-fascism and the removal of hate-speech, “conspiratorial” and otherwise pro-oppressive content online. When every tool in the State’s arsenal will sooner rather than later be wielded against those of us who still take to the streets, all the Left is doing is helping lift the guillotine over all of our heads. Other examples of ‘hate-speech’ charges in recent years would be anarchist agitation against ‘Eurocrat’ politicians in Brussels, the seat of the European Union, or the Russian anarchist Elizaveta Tsvetkova’s 2016 conviction for ‘hatred or enmity towards a “social group”’ for spreading leaflets criticising the police, or Kristina Cherenkova of Belarus similarly targeted for similar online posts.

[9] September of the same year, UK “anarchist action” resulted in right-wing media outrage after they published the home addresses and telephone numbers of Conservative MPs who support a badger cull fiercely opposed by animal liberation and animal rights movements.

[10] From ‘Cop-Out: The Significance of Aufhebengate’ by Sam FantoSamotnaf: “The failure of “revolutionaries” to deal with something that they could clearly and directly effect, as opposed to, for example, writing about things that they can’t influence very much, indicated an attachment to abstraction as self-defeating as a drowning man clinging onto his chest full of gold. The fact that Libcom admin could justify a cop consultant and lie about those who oppose him, calling them liars, and that this cowardly attitude is acceptable to other “anarchists”, “communists”, or whatever makes a total mockery of their supposed “libertarian” anti-state attitudes. A symptom of utter decay. For them, the “radical milieu” is just like any other family, a cosy set of complacent roles happy to shove that awkward skeleton back in the family cupboard. The social movement that seriously wants to contribute to the supercession of this futureless society needs to seriously confront its recuperators, the enemy within.”

[11] The authors deploy the usual troupes of an ‘extremist’ online culture of ‘hate’ against police in their review of anarchist and socialist militancy, expressing particular concern over what they call the ‘martyr’ status of Willem Van Spronsen (the comrade who died during his suicidal armed action against the infrastructure and guards of a US immigration concentration camp on the eve of a massive pre-announced detention sweep by the Trump regime) and the fact that he carried an AR-15 “ghost gun”; “a firearm either assembled from a home delivered kit or made with a 3D printer, untraceable by law enforcement.” They shamelessly label our movements as ‘toxic’, not the systems we fight against: such as, for instance, the US Border Patrol, who have a standard internal term for migrants based on the sound they joke about being made when they smash their clubs or torches into the latter’s skulls.

[12] It’s worth considering some of the precedents that this case aimed to set, so here’s part of a late ‘90s interview printed in Anarchy: A Journal of Desire Armed with an editor of the Green Anarchist (GA) paper: “Things are getting hotter for revolutionaries post-Cold War. Internally, the security forces are looking for new targets to keep themselves in work and externally, they’re collaborating more with the ongoing formation of the European super-state, exchanging repressive techniques and levelling them up.

[13] https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/European%20Union%20Terrorism%20Situation%20and%20Trend%20report%202023.pdf – we recommend using security tools such as Tails to access this document.

[14] Consider, for example, this recent power-line attack which crippled the infamous Tesla electric car “giga-factory” near Berlin for a week or more: https://actforfree.noblogs.org/2024/03/14/berlin-germany-sabotage-of-a-high-voltage-pylon-brings-tesla-factory-to-a-standstill/

[15] They also highlight that “creation and use of squats, so-called free autonomous spaces, remained important for anarchist terrorists and extremists in 2022. Those spaces might serve as hide-outs as well as operations bases, and are also utilised to host left-wing and anarchist terrorists and extremists from abroad. Evacuations of those squats regularly present a challenge to law enforcement authorities, given that left-wing and anarchist terrorists and extremists do not hesitate to make use of grave violence against officials intervening.” The attempt to amalgamate ever-new forms of dissent under the rubric of “extremism” and incitement is also visible in other parts of the report, such as that concerning environmentalism. “The line between environmental activism and environmental extremism is often a blurred one,” – blurred, that is, by architects of repression like themselves – “yet some of environmental activists’ narratives might have the potential to incite violence among extremists.”

[16] See, for example, the 2005 paper ‘Anarchist Direct Actions: A Challenge for Law Enforcement’ by Randy Borum of the University of South Florida and Chuck Tilby of the Eugene Police Department for the journal Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. The above-mentioned EU terrorism report, almost 20 years later, laments that “The number of arrests for left-wing and anarchist terrorist and extremist offences is generally not very high. Perpetrators and support networks show a high level of security awareness, and the majority of the attacks are carried out at night. This can lead to a very high number of offences committed by individual extremists active over a number of years.”

[17] R.F. – Buzzers are in use across the political spectrum in Indonesia (as well as other countries), from underground jihadists to the political mainstream, flooding social media from multiple false accounts per buzzer to spread messages (often ‘fake news’) and receiving payment for doing so.

[18] A good example of this could be the wave of arson attacks against phone masts – 5G or otherwise – that also happened (in the UK like other countries) during the timespan between the creation of the new MI5 group and the raids which shut down the NoState server.
Anarchists had been burning communications infrastructure (for a variety of solid reasons possibly not entirely shared by those torching the masts during the first COVID-19 lockdown onwards, though that’s another topic) for a good couple of decades or so, often communicating in plain detail their methodology and ‘recipes’, including in the UK. However, it was not until this point of the spread of the tactic outside of our own circles – while 325 hosted ‘how-to’ posters for that task and another in solidarity with Badger, a comrade underground since 2011 and sought for questioning by UK police concerning one such arson in previous years – that the Dutch cops moved against the server, while British cops launched Operation Adream and arrested the anarchist Toby Shone (see appendix). This does not seem coincidental to us.
The operation was authorised by Max Hill, then Director of Public Prosecutions, formerly the UK’s Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and who lead the prosecution of various high-profile terror trials such as over the 2005 jihadist bombings in London (including defending the government during the case that lead to Binyam Mohamed being awarded £1m compensation after alleging MI5 complicity in his interrogation while under torture), and who was knighted this year.
They initially charged Toby under terrorist legislation for being the 325 administrator (as well as for possession of explosive and phone-mast arson manuals, and soliciting funds deemed for terrorist purposes) – but eventually did not present evidence upon trial, although infamously his prison term for unrelated activities and bail terms have been marked by the application of anti-terror conditions regardless, the investigators continue tailing and harrassing his comrades, and the case seems far from closed. Thankfully we are not aware of any public attempts at dissociation with the accused or the project targeted from within the anarchist space, unlike during the preceding Operation Rhone (see the pamphlet ‘Dining with Vultures: Bristol Anarchists & the UK Media’ for reflections on those events which may have contributed to collective learning), despite the “terrorism” framing of the initial arrest.

[19] Here in the UK we’ve recently heard threats to treat the home demonstration against a pro-Israel politician as ‘extremism’; almost comic in the face of the bloodiest massacre of the century so far in service of a settler-colonial machine (see Peter Gelderloos’ ‘Israel is Committing Genocide’ for important context) that seems to specialise in murdering children. Yet behind this disparity lies the very real need that various States across the world conducting as-yet-less-intense counter-insurgency on their respective populations have to procure the surveillance and killing technologies pioneered and battle-tested in the Gaza open-prison society. (Here in the UK, the infamous Israeli arms firm Elbit Systems – key to the current genocidal push – rents its UK headquarters directly from Somerset Council, which was targeted by activists for this reason while we were finishing this article.) On this latter point, see the recent short film by SubMedia, Gaza is an Image of the Future.

[20] The Movimiento Ibérico de Liberación and the Grups Autònoms, agglomerated into OLLA by the police that hunted them. Non-vanguardist armed groups comprised of anarchists and dissident Marxists during the long Spanish dictatorship of General Franco, fighting not just for the democracy which that regime eventually transformed into voluntarily, but against capitalism in any form.

[21] As we have tried to consistently do throughout the volume 6 of Return Fire, here we mean the Left not in terms of everyone whose tastes vary in a specified way from the followers of the Right, but the Left as a historical project continued by self-presenting leadership, as one sprout of a common root with the Right: the State. Each require their own specific analysis and approach when we encounter them in movements, and our attention to the more important tensions that lie beneath these labels at the non-institutional level. As Peter Gelderloos states in ‘Geopolitics for 2024’, “The Right and the Left are the two hands of the State, equally dangerous. The real line of conflict runs between above and below. However, Right and Left are not the same. The followers of the Left are mostly sincere. We need to be present to them to help spread meaningful forms of revolt, and we need to show them the true nature of their leaders. As for the Right, we must always attack its lies and paranoias. The key is to leave the door open for followers of the Right to betray authority, but never accommodating their anxieties. We need to build power based on expansive solidarity to show them what that could look like, but they need to take the step of abandoning identities based on oppression.”

[22] R.F. – Joseph Dibee, from the aforementioned ‘Green Scare’ case, was one of its remaining fugitives after being snitched on by another defendant who he had previously been in a relationship with. Having escaped from the US and spent more than 10 years underground in his country of origin – Syria – and in Russia, he was captured in 2018 while flying from El Salvador on a false passport during the stop-off in Cuba, and tortured before being extradited. On trial he repented for his actions and took a plea-deal, leading to one of the charges against him (a 1998 arson of a U.S. Department of Agriculture building) being dropped. Sentenced – by the same judge, Ann Aiken, who has overseen the entire decades-long case and served terrorism enhancements to multiple of the convicted – in November 2022 to community service but no extra prison time (after 29 months of pre-trial detention, during which he was permanently disfigured by a white-supremacist attack and contracted COVID-19) and ordered to pay a portion of $1.3 million in restitution for his two highly-effective arsons. (A much-hated wild horse slaughterhouse – never rebuilt – and a wild horse corral.) He continues to use his skills for solidarity projects with indigenous peoples in so-called Alaska, who are farming kelp as salmon disappear from industrial over-fishing and climate change.


unc3524
cranefly
anarchistnews.org
rss
forum
news

2023-10-17

This post will explain the process you can follow to create a VT Livehunt rule from a VT Intelligence query. Something typical in threat hunting and threat intelligence operations.
Let’s assume that, as a threat hunter, you created robust VT intelligence (VTI) queries getting you reliable results without false positives. Your queries are so good that you run them daily to obtain fresh new samples, which is a tedious job to do manually (pro tip - you can automate using the API).
A good alternative would be converting your VTI query into a LiveHunt rule, so you will be immediately notified every time any uploaded indicator matches your criteria. Unfortunately, there is not an automated way to convert intelligence queries into LiveHunt rules (and vice versa), and in some cases it is not even possible to obtain exactly the same results (technical tldr - due to limitations of the stored data structure).
But do not despair. In this post we are going to show many practical cases showing LiveHunt rules based on VT intelligence queries, how you can do it yourself, and pros, cons and limitations for this approach.

The perfect query ̶d̶o̶e̶s̶n̶’̶t̶ exist

Bitter APT
Bitter APT is a suspected South Asian cyber espionage threat group. Security researchers like StopMalvertisin, among others, regularly publish information about this actor in both X and VirusTotal community.
To start hunting for files related to Bitter APT, you probably want to subscribe to any attributed VirusTotal collection or the threat actor profile itself.
You can also search for what the community is discussing about this APT directly by searching on community comments. For example, the next query returns samples related to Bitter APT.
entity:file comment:"Bitter APT"

When checking these samples’ behavior we can find interesting patterns that can be used to hunt for other similar ones. For instance, Bitter seems to specially like the "chm" file format, as seen in the initial Twitter/X reference and when calculating Commonalities among these files, along with the use of scheduled tasks to achieve persistence on targeted systems, and run the %comspec% environment variable through the scheduled task created to execute msiexec.exe followed by an URL.
All these behavioral characteristics will help us create good LiveHunt rules and queries to detect additional samples. For example:
behavior_processes:"%Comspec%" behavior_processes:"schtasks.exe" tag:chm
The query returns 39 different samples, most of them apparently related to Bitter based on behavior similarities.
Now it's time to translate our query into a LiveHunt rule. Certain functionalities available for VTI queries are not ready (yet) in VT LiveHunt and vice versa. We are working to maximize the integration between both systems, and we will get back with more details as we progress in this.
As we published, we can create a LiveHunt rule from a sample by simply clicking - we are going to create a rule based on 7829b84b5e415ff682f3ef06b9a80f64be5ef6d1d2508597f9e0998b91114499.
First, we are interested in identifying the use of the process “schtasks.exe” during sample detonation. In the behaviour details of this sample, we can find “schtasks.exe” in the “Process Tree” and “Shell Commands” sections.
At the moment, it is not possible to use "Process Tree" in LiveHunt rules, however we can search for processes in "Shell Commands" and "Processes Created" sections to start creating the logic of our rule. In future updates, we will integrate more fields to be used in the creation of LiveHunt YARA rules.
There is no "Processes Created" section, maybe sandboxes were unable to extract such information. But this does not mean it will be the same for future uploaded samples. We will add both the "Shell Commands" and "Processes Created" fields to the condition.
We will follow the same steps to detect the use of the environment variable “%comspec%” in the command line during detonation.
We look for the same information in the two sections (shell and processes) and in two different ways as Bitter used upper and lower case letters to spell %coMSPec%. We can simplify this with the "icontains" condition to enforce case insensitiveness.
Finally, we want to add two extra conditions. The first is that samples have the "chm" tag since it is the format we look for. The second is to get notifications exclusively for new uploaded files.
And that’s it! You can download and use this YARA rule from our public GitHub, to be integrated into our Crowdsourced YARA Hub in the future.
RomCom RAT
BlackBerry Threat Research and Intelligence team published about Targeting Politicians in Ukraine using the RomCom RAT. During the campaign, threat actors used a trojanized version of Remote Desktop Manager.
Taking a look at the behavior of the samples provided in this publication, we can find interesting behavioral indicators to generate a VTI query.
Different samples related to RomCom RAT seem to usually drop DLL files in the path “C:\Users\Public\Libraries” with different extensions, and execute them using “rundll32.exe”. That means there are also file creation events in the same path.
All of these indicators, along with others used by RomCom RAT in different intrusions, can be used to create a potential query that can later be translated into a LiveHunt.
These samples export up to three different functions:
  • fwdTst
  • #1
  • Main
“Main” is probably the most common function exported by many other legitimate DLLs, so we will ignore it. The VTI query we use is as follows:
((behavior_processes:".dll,fwdTst") OR (behavior_processes:"dll\",#1" behavior_processes:"\\Public\\Libraries\\") OR (behavior_processes:*.dll0* behavior_processes:"\\Public\\Libraries\\")) AND ((behaviour_files:*\\Public\\Libraries\\*) AND (behavior:*rundll32.exe*))
Even if you don't know that the "Main" function is common in the use of DLLs, when building our query we would observe a large number of samples matching our logic. For this reason, it is important that before creating a rule we use a query when possible to understand if results align with our expectations, and iterate the condition until we are satisfied with it.
The last query provides samples related both to RomCom RAT and Mustang Panda. This might indicate that both threat actors are using similar procedures during their campaigns.
To convert this query to LiveHunt, we will split the original query into different sections and adapt them to the rule. As previously explained, the rule will be slightly different from the original query for compatibility reasons.
  1. First, we only want DLLs, EXE or MSI files.
  2. As a precaution to minimize false positives, we want to skip samples that are not detected as malicious by AntiVirus vendors.
  3. Something that we can’t do in VT intelligence queries is determine behavioral activity related to file write actions. VTI behavior_files modifier performs a generic search for any literal within file activity, including creation, modification, writing, deletion… LiveHunt gives us more precision to specify our search only for written files during detonation.
  4. Rundll32.exe is used during execution since this DLL should be executed along this sample's process. We will search for it in different fields.
  5. Finally, we are interested in obtaining the functions exported by the observed DLLs, which are written in the command lines. We are also interested in the existence of a .DLL extension, which will indicate that there is some type of activity involving libraries.
You can also find this rule in our public Github repository. Feel free to modify it based on your needs!
Gamaredon
Our last example is related to the Gamaredon threat actor. As per MITRE “Gamaredon Group is a suspected Russian cyber espionage threat group that has targeted military, NGO, judiciary, law enforcement, and non-profit organizations in Ukraine”.
The use of the remote template injection technique is common by this threat actor. This feature involves making connections to a remote resource to load a malicious template. The external domains used to host it generally use some URL pattern. According to publications from different vendors, this actor usually registers domains in the “.ru” TLD.
Gamaredon also uses the DLL “davclnt.dll” with the “DavSetCookie” function. This behavior is related to flags that may be connected to exfiltration or use of WebDav to launch code. In other words, this is used to load the remote template. We can quickly check this with the following query:
threat_actor:"Gamaredon Group" behavior:"DavSetCookie"
Putting all this information together, we can create the next VT intelligence query to get samples related to Gamaredon:
(behavior_processes:*.ru* and behavior_processes:*DavSetCookie* and behavior_processes:*http*) and (behavior_network:*.ru* or embedded_domain:*.ru* or embedded_url:*.ru*) (type:document)
The query is designed to discover file-type documents where the following strings are found during execution:
Behavior_processes:
  • First we want to identify the use of the string “.ru” in the command line. This will be related to domains with this TLD.
  • Another string that we want to match in the command line is “DavSetCookie”, since it was used by Gamaredon to accomplish remote template loading.
  • Finally the string “http” must be in the command line as well.
Behavior_network:
  • See if there are communications established with domains having the “.ru” TLD.
Embedded_domain:
  • Domains embedded within the document containing the TLD “.ru”. It is not necessary that a connection has existed. We do it this way in case our sandboxes have had problems communicating or the sample has simply decided not to communicate.
Embedded_url:
  • URLs embedded within the document containing the TLD “.ru”. It is not necessary that a connection has existed. We do it this way in case our sandboxes have had problems communicating or the sample has simply decided not to communicate
This VT intelligence query provides results that seem to be consistent with known Gamaredon samples, based on the previously discussed patterns. It is always possible we get false positives among the results.
Let's convert this VT intelligence query to a LiveHunt to receive notifications for new interesting files.
  1. First, we want to make sure the exported DLL function is found for any command line or process-related behavior, as well as finding traces of the “.ru” TLD is found for http communication. It is important to mention that we look for information about the TLD ".ru" and the string "http" in the command lines because it could be the case that the connection is not established, but there was an intention to establish it.
  2. Communications are important, for that reason we need to check if there were connections established with domains having the TLD .ru. Remember the next block will match only if communications existed
  3. And for this example, we are just interested in document files, although you can change it to any other file type to adapt it to your needs.
As usual, you can find and download the YARA rule in our public repository.

Actual limitations

We are aware of the limitations that currently exist when translating fields from VT intelligence to LiveHunt rule and vice versa, and we are working to obtain maximum compatibility between both systems. However, for the moment this could be an advantage as they complement each other.
VTI modifiers such as behavior_processes, behavior_created_processes or even behavior are somewhat more generic than the possibilities that LiveHunt currently offers, allowing us to specify whether we want information about the processes created, completed or commands executed.
However, something that cannot be used yet in LiveHunt rules is the process tree. On some occasions, dynamic executions of our sandboxes only offer information at the process tree level, which means that this information is not available for our rules. But if you want to search information within the process tree with VT intelligence queries, you can use the “behavior” file modifier. The "behavior" modifier the process tree could be consulted to find information.

Wrapping up

Converting VT intelligence queries to LiveHunt rules is getting easier. The recently added "structure" feature in LiveHunt allows creating rules in a much simpler way by clicking on the interesting fields, creating the rule conditions for you and eliminating the need to know all available fields in the VT module.
This post describes with examples a potential approach that analysts might use for their hunting and monitoring. In particular, using VT Intelligence queries before starting working on a YARA rule is really helpful during the initial fine tuning stage of our condition. This practice minimizes noise and ensures we get quality results before we go for our LiveHunt rule. Finally, a quality VTI query can be translated into a YARA with just a few minor changes.
We hope you find this useful, and as always we are happy to hear from you any ideas or feedback you would like to share. Happy hunting!
References that could be interesting

sha256s
domains
urls
attack_techniques
bitcoin_addresses
github

2023-07-14

email_addresses
domains
fraud
global
china

2023-07-10

cve-2023-27997
cve-2023-36934
cve-2023-36460
cves
japan

2023-07-06

slovakia
czech republic
hungary
china
europe

2023-07-05

slovakia
czech republic
hungary
indonesia
mongolia

2023-07-04

google.com
rss
forum
news
surface web

2023-07-03

google.com
rss
forum
news
surface web

2023-05-09

china
japan
philippines
india
israel

2023-04-25

google.com
rss
forum
news
surface web

2021-10-26

cve-2020-5902
cve-2021-26605
email_addresses
domains
cves

2018-07-26

google.com
rss
forum
news
surface web

2013-05-29

google.com
rss
forum
news
surface web

2013-03-22

google.com
rss
forum
news
domains

timeline History Timeline

  • Tue, 11 Jul 2023 13:03:26 GMT
    New IOC's Added

    Total 2163 IOC's added.

  • Tue, 11 Jul 2023 12:56:58 GMT
    New Report Added

    Mustang-Panda-PlugX-RAT.pdf report added.

  • Tue, 11 Jul 2023 11:35:05 GMT
    Created!

    New Campaign created.

  • Mon, 03 Jul 2023 00:00:00 GMT
    SmugX: Chinese APT uses HTML smuggling to target European Ministries and embassies
    A China-linked APT group was observed using HTML smuggling in attacks against Foreign Affairs ministries and embassies in Europe, reports the cybersecurity firm Check Point. Go to Link

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