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Earth Baku 2.0: Revealing the Advanced Tactics Behind the APT Group’s Next-Gen Cyberespionage Campaign
Earth Baku Public-Facing Applications StealthVector StealthReacher IIS servers

Earth Baku, an APT group linked to APT41, has expanded its operations beyond the Indo-Pacific to target Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, including countries like Italy, Germany, UAE, and Qatar. The group's recent tactics involve exploiting public-facing applications, particularly IIS servers, to gain initial entry for cyber attacks. Their sophisticated and persistent methods pose a significant challenge to global cybersecurity, highlighting the need for robust defensive measures.

Domains Source Last Update
parça.cdn78544.ru SOCRadar 2024-08-28
www.mircoupdate.https443.net SOCRadar 2024-08-28
www.sitennews.com SOCRadar 2024-08-28
www.cdn7854.workers.dev SOCRadar 2024-08-28
Hashes Source Last Update
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Ipv4s Source Last Update
212.87.212.115 SOCRadar 2024-08-28
78.108.216.20 SOCRadar 2024-08-28
5.182.207.28 SOCRadar 2024-08-28
Cves Source Last Update
Emails Source Last Update
Domains Insert Date

MITIGATION

Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols


ID

Mitigation

Description

M1031

Network Intrusion Prevention

Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.


Account Discovery


ID

Mitigation

Description

M1028

Operating System Configuration

Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located HKLM\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\CredUI\EnumerateAdministrators. It can be disabled through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Administrative Templates > Windows Components > Credential User Interface: E numerate administrator accounts on elevation. [8]

M1018

User Account Management

Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to user accounts.




Valid Accounts



ID

Mitigation

Description

M1036

Account Use Policies

Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[71]

M1015

Active Directory Configuration

Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead.

M1013

Application Developer Guidance

Ensure that applications do not store sensitive data or credentials insecurely. (e.g. plaintext credentials in code, published credentials in repositories, or credentials in public cloud storage).

M1027

Password Policies

Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment.[72] When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and properly secured.

Policies should minimize (if not eliminate) reuse of passwords between different user accounts, especially employees using the same credentials for personal accounts that may not be defended by enterprise security resources.

M1026

Privileged Account Management

Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. [3] [73] These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. [74]

M1018

User Account Management

Regularly audit user accounts for activity and deactivate or remove any that are no longer needed.

M1017

User Training

Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications.



REMEDIATION


Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols


ID

Data Source

Data Component

Detects

DS0029

Network Traffic

Network Traffic Content

Monitor and analyze traffic patterns and packet inspection associated to protocol(s), leveraging SSL/TLS inspection for encrypted traffic, that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns, anomalous syntax, or structure). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).



Network Traffic Flow

Monitor for web traffic to/from known-bad or suspicious domains and analyze traffic flows that do not follow the expected protocol standards and traffic flows (e.g extraneous packets that do not belong to established flows, or gratuitous or anomalous traffic patterns). Consider correlation with process monitoring and command line to detect anomalous processes execution and command line arguments associated to traffic patterns (e.g. monitor anomalies in use of files that do not normally initiate connections for respective protocol(s)).



Account Discovery


ID

Data Source

Data Component

Detects

DS0017

Command

Command Execution

Monitor logs and other sources of command execution history for actions that could be taken to gather information about accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery.

System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.

DS0022

File

File Access

Monitor access to file resources that contain local accounts and groups information such as /etc/passwd, /Users directories, and the SAM database.

If access requires high privileges, look for non-admin objects (such as users or processes) attempting to access restricted file resources.

DS0009

Process

Process Creation

Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts and groups such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.[9] Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.

CONCLUSION

Earth Baku has notably expanded its operations, extending from the Indo-Pacific region to target Europe and the MEA since late 2022. This campaign showcases the group’s advanced techniques, including the exploitation of public-facing applications like IIS servers for initial access, followed by the deployment of sophisticated malware such as the Godzilla webshell for control. The use of advanced loaders like StealthVector and StealthReacher to stealthily launch backdoor components, along with the modular backdoor SneakCross, highlights the group's evolving tactics.


Additionally, Earth Baku employs various tools during post-exploitation, including a customized iox tool, Rakshasa, and TailScale for persistence, as well as MEGAcmd for efficient data exfiltration. These developments underscore the group’s increasing sophistication and present significant challenges for cybersecurity defenses.


To counter such advanced threats, organizations need robust cybersecurity measures. Implementing the principle of least privilege, regularly updating systems, enforcing strict patch management, and developing proactive incident response strategies are essential steps. The 3-2-1 backup rule also ensures data integrity, even in the event of an attack.


Organizations should consider deploying advanced security technologies such as SOCRadar's Extended Threat Intelligence, which offers continuous attack surface identification and comprehensive prevention, detection and response capabilities. Backed by advanced threat research, intelligence and artificial intelligence, this feature significantly improves the overall security posture. In addition, the Extended Detection and Response (XDR) service provides expert threat monitoring, correlation and analysis, delivering powerful protection without overburdening IT teams, enabling organisations to scale securely with the cloud.


File Name Description Actions
Earth Baku Report 2.pdf We state with confidence that Earth Longzhi is related to or is a subgroup of APT41 based on the following reasons:
Earth Baku Report.pdf This research paper covers the technical details of a new cyberespionage campaign that we believe can be traced back to the notorious advanced persistent threat (APT) group Earth Baku
APT Name Aliases Target Countries Source Countries Total IOCs
timeline History Timeline

  • Wed, 28 Aug 2024 16:23:05 GMT
    New IOC's Added

    Total 55 IOC's added.

  • Wed, 28 Aug 2024 14:09:42 GMT
    New Report Added

    An Analysis of Multiple Campaigns by APT41’s Subgroup, Earth Longzhi report added.

  • Wed, 28 Aug 2024 14:07:03 GMT
    New Report Added

    Earth Baku Report report added.

  • Wed, 28 Aug 2024 13:13:19 GMT
    Created!

    New Campaign created.

  • Fri, 09 Aug 2024 00:00:00 GMT
    Earth Baku’s Latest Campaign
    The group has updated its tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) in more recent campaigns, making use of public-facing applications such as IIS servers as entry points for attacks, after which they deploy sophisticated malware toolsets on the victim’s environment, including the loaders StealthVector and StealthReacher, and the modular backdoor SneakCross.

  • Thu, 01 Dec 2022 00:00:00 GMT
    Geographical Expansion
    Earth Baku expanded its operations beyond the Indo-Pacific to Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, targeting countries such as Italy, Germany, UAE, and Qatar.

  • Sat, 01 Oct 2022 00:00:00 GMT
    Infrastructure Observations
    Connections to Earth Baku's infrastructure were traced back to Georgia and Romania, suggesting these countries were also targeted.

  • Tue, 01 Mar 2022 00:00:00 GMT
    Global Reach
    Earth Baku's activities were detected in countries like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, targeting enterprises and government entities.

  • Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 GMT
    Attack Expansion
    Earth Baku expanded its target regions to include more countries in the Indo-Pacific region, exploiting public-facing applications and distributing malware via SQL injection and email attachments.

  • Mon, 01 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT
    ProxyLogon Exploitation
    Earth Baku exploited the ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) in Microsoft Exchange Servers to deploy China Chopper web shells and subsequently StealthVector.

  • Thu, 01 Oct 2020 00:00:00 GMT
    Toolset Update
    The group started deploying the StealthVector shellcode loader, which uses various evasion techniques and is actively developed.

  • Wed, 01 Jul 2020 00:00:00 GMT
    New Campaign Initiation
    Earth Baku launched a new campaign, introducing the ScrambleCross backdoor along with the use of Cobalt Strike and a new shellcode loader, StealthMutant.

  • Thu, 01 Nov 2018 00:00:00 GMT
    Initial Observations
    Earth Baku began using tools like Cobalt Strike, Crosswalk, and Metasploit in their cyber espionage campaigns.

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