CF Supply Data Breach

CF Supply, a retail and e-commerce company based in the United States, has been listed as a victim on the Akira ransomware group’s dark web portal, with the listing published on August 13, 2026. This incident was identified by SOCRadar’s Dark Web Monitoring service. CF Supply operates within the distribution and supply chain sector, serving the US market. The Akira group remains highly active in 2026, consistently adding new victims, particularly those based in North America. In the 60 days preceding this listing, Akira claimed 38 other victims. The group predominantly targets the Business Services, Manufacturing, and Consumer Services sectors, with a significant concentration of victims in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada. CF Supply’s profile aligns with Akira’s typical targeting of mid-market North American businesses in commercial and supply chain verticals. Previous victims with similar operational profiles, such as Belasco Electric, Albers Mechanical Contractors, Northwood Country Club, and Kruse Construction, have also been claimed by Akira.

SOCRadar’s analysis of stealer-log telemetry found no direct records associated with the domain cfsupply.com for the queried period. However, this absence of evidence does not confirm that the organization is unaffected. Compromised credentials might exist in other data feeds not covered by this specific query, be registered under different corporate domains, or be linked to personal email accounts that are used for corporate access. Akira has a known history of leveraging compromised VPN credentials as a primary entry vector, often exploiting vulnerabilities in remote access solutions. For ransomware groups like Akira, credentials harvested by infostealers represent a well-documented method for initial access. Threat actors or initial access brokers source these credentials from underground marketplaces, validate their authenticity, and use them to gain access to VPNs, Microsoft 365, or remote-access portals before deploying ransomware. The lack of findings in this particular query does not exclude this possibility, as credentials could have appeared in other datasets, been rotated before indexing, or originated from personal email aliases. Given these factors, threat intelligence teams should continue monitoring dark web and stealer-log feeds and conduct proactive credential hygiene checks. It is important not to interpret a null query result as a confirmation of security. Recommended actions include ongoing monitoring, rigorous credential checks, password rotation, multi-factor authentication reviews, and vigilance regarding activity on alternate corporate domains, Microsoft 365, VPNs, and remote-access portals.

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.