CSIR Structural Engineering Research Centre Data Breach

CSIR Structural Engineering Research Centre, a public sector research institution in India, was listed on the dark web portal of the ransomware group TheGentlemen on July 7, 2026. This listing was identified by SOCRadar’s threat intelligence. TheGentlemen has shown a pattern of targeting organizations in India, as well as the business services, manufacturing, and healthcare sectors globally. TheGentlemen has claimed 116 other victims in the 60 days prior to this listing, making it a prolific ransomware operation. While the group frequently targets the business services, manufacturing, and healthcare sectors, and its victims are primarily located in the United States, Germany, and India, CSIR’s listing represents a less common sector for the group, though India aligns with its third-largest target geography.

SOCRadar’s analysis of stealer-log telemetry revealed a significant exposure related to the serc.res.in domain. This included corporate credentials for email infrastructure and various third-party services, as well as external user accounts on a target-owned portal. This indicates a potential for both endpoint compromise and direct access. A government webmail endpoint was identified among the compromised systems. The mix of corporate and external accounts suggests a blended attack scenario rather than a simple account takeover of customer credentials. The recurrence of corporate identities across multiple services further supports the interpretation of an endpoint compromise. For ransomware groups like TheGentlemen, credentials harvested by information-stealing malware are a common initial access vector. Attackers may source these credentials from underground marketplaces to gain authenticated access to systems like Microsoft 365, VPNs, or remote access portals before deploying ransomware. While the stealer-log data does not definitively prove TheGentlemen used these specific credentials, the presence of corporate email and government portal credentials is consistent with the typical kill chain of such attacks. Threat intelligence teams should treat these exposed accounts as potential access points and prioritize credential rotation, session invalidation, and monitoring of login activity for mail and portal services.

Disclaimer

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.