Dink Co Ltd Data Breach

Dink Co Ltd, an organization based in Japan, has been identified as a victim of the ransomware group The Gentlemen. This listing was published on July 16, 2026, and detected by SOCRadar’s Dark Web Monitoring service. While the specific industry of Dink Co Ltd is not detailed beyond its location in Japan, its inclusion on the leak site places it within the context of The Gentlemen’s recent activities targeting various sectors and regions. The company’s profile, while operating in Japan, aligns with a pattern of broader extortionate activities by the ransomware group. In the 60 days preceding this listing, The Gentlemen was responsible for claiming 132 other victims. The group has demonstrated a consistent preference for targeting the Business Services, Manufacturing, and Healthcare industries, with a geographical focus on the United States, Germany, and France. Notable recent victims similar in profile to Dink Co Ltd include Kaneko, Danzo Group, Terry P Moosmann CPA PC, and Byggelit Sverige. Although Dink Co Ltd might not represent the group’s most typical targets, this incident provides valuable insight into the expanding victimology of The Gentlemen.

SOCRadar’s analysis of stealer-log telemetry related to the dink.co.jp domain revealed limited exposure. The query returned two records, both containing corporate usernames associated with a third-party service. This finding is consistent with an indicator of workstation compromise, but no credentials specifically for dink.co.jp-owned systems were observed within the sampled data. The primary risk indicated by this telemetry is a potential workstation compromise scenario. The appearance of corporate accounts in external logs is recognized as an early warning sign, even in the absence of direct credential compromise on internal systems within the queried dataset. For ransomware operations like those conducted by The Gentlemen, credentials harvested by infostealers serve as a significant initial access vector. Threat actors frequently acquire these logs from underground marketplaces, validate the authenticity of the corporate credentials, and subsequently use them to gain unauthorized access to systems. This access is often achieved through various means, including Microsoft 365 accounts, VPNs, or remote access portals, which then pave the way for ransomware deployment. While the observed stealer-log data does not definitively confirm that these specific credentials were utilized by The Gentlemen for an intrusion, the pattern aligns with the typical kill chain documented for such incidents. This highlights the exposed accounts and endpoints as critical areas requiring immediate attention for credential rotation and thorough review.

Disclaimer

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.