HIT dd Data Breach

Akira ransomware has listed HIT dd, a Slovenian company operating in the hospitality, gaming, and leisure sectors, on its dark web portal. This listing was identified through SOCRadar’s Dark Web Monitoring service on September 23, 2026. While HIT dd is based in Slovenia, which may seem outside Akira’s typical operational focus on US, UK, and German entities, the ransomware group’s reach is demonstrably global. This incident highlights the broad targeting capabilities and expanding geographic scope of the Akira threat actor. In the 60 days preceding this listing, Akira claimed 64 other victims. The ransomware group’s most frequently targeted industries are Manufacturing and Professional Services, with the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom being its leading victim countries. HIT dd’s inclusion follows recent European listings by Akira, such as TDMI, George Cameron Nash, Worrell, and Flex1, indicating a continued pattern of targeting organizations within Europe.

SOCRadar’s analysis of the domain hit[.]si revealed a significant credential exposure. The query returned 25 records, with 10 classified as INTERNAL_AUTH_EMPLOYEE (Category A). These records contained corporate usernames paired with identity and mail infrastructure endpoints specific to hit[.]si. An additional three records indicated corporate hit[.]si usernames being used on third-party services, suggesting potential concurrent workstation-level compromises. A critical detail is the recency of this data. The logs were dated September 13, 2026, and inserted on September 15, 2026. This means the credentials were harvested less than two weeks before the Akira listing and were likely still circulating in the active supply chain at that time. Such fresh logs increase the probability that the credentials remain valid and can be leveraged for further malicious activities. Assessment: The presence of ten Category-A credentials, specifically tied to internal identity infrastructure and harvested within the preceding two weeks, forms a precursor profile consistently observed before Akira ransomware deployments. Given this evidence, immediate mandatory credential rotation, a thorough audit of multi-factor authentication (MFA) status, and an active review of all sessions on hit[.]si systems are strongly recommended. These actions should be undertaken without delay, rather than waiting for further verification, to mitigate the risk of a full-scale ransomware attack.

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.