Metro Design Cente Data Breach

Metro Design Cente, a consumer services company based in Mexico, has been listed as a victim on the DragonForce ransomware group’s dark web portal, with the listing dated July 16, 2026. This information was identified through SOCRadar’s Dark Web Monitoring service. The company operates within the Consumer Services sector, and the listing places it within DragonForce’s recent pattern of activity across various regions and industries. In the 60 days preceding this listing, DragonForce claimed 84 other victims. The group’s typical targets include the Business Services, Manufacturing, and Consumer Services sectors, with a significant concentration of victims in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Recent DragonForce victims with profiles similar to Metro Design Cente include Southport Outdoor Living, refreshmentsystems.co.uk, ksmart.ca, and saver.nl. Metro Design Cente aligns with this trend as a Consumer Services organization located in Mexico.

Initial access correlation against SOCRadar’s stealer-log telemetry returned no records for metrodesigncenter.com in the queried sample. It is important to note that a null result does not confirm the absence of a compromise. The query covers only a partial, paginated sample of data, and credentials could be exposed under alternate corporate domains, use personal email aliases, or exist in logs that were harvested and rotated before indexing. The queried domain yielded no credentials in this specific analysis. For ransomware operators like DragonForce, credentials obtained from infostealers represent a well-documented initial access vector. Threat actors, or initial access brokers, often acquire fresh logs from underground marketplaces, validate the corporate credentials within them, and then utilize these credentials to access systems such as Microsoft 365, VPNs, or remote-access portals before deploying ransomware. The lack of evidence in this particular query does not preclude such a scenario, as credentials might have appeared in data feeds not covered by this dataset, been rotated prior to indexing, or been harvested using personal email aliases. Consequently, CTI teams should prioritize continuous monitoring and proactive credential hygiene checks. The absence of detected evidence in a query should not be interpreted as definitive proof of no compromise. Recommended actions include continued dark web monitoring, credential hygiene checks, password rotation, multi-factor authentication review, monitoring of alternate corporate domains, and reviewing activity logs for Microsoft 365, VPNs, and remote-access portals.

Disclaimer

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.