RS Automation Co., Ltd. Data Breach

RS Automation Co., Ltd., a manufacturing company based in China, has been listed as a victim on the Barracuda ransomware group’s dark web portal, published on August 6, 2026. The listing was identified through SOCRadar’s Dark Web Monitoring service. The company manufactures industrial automation equipment, a segment where design files and production control systems both sit close to the operational core. It is one of four Barracuda entries published on this date. In the 60 days prior to this listing, Barracuda has claimed 3 other victims across its leak portal. The group has shown a targeting pattern spanning the manufacturing, technology, and healthcare sectors. Geographically, its victims are concentrated in China, South Korea, and the United States. Other recent Barracuda listings that overlap with RS Automation’s profile — manufacturing companies and East Asian entries — include Namyang Industrial Co Ltd, Micro-Comm Inc, and Ferrell / Skyline Implants & Periodontics. Barracuda’s entire visible 60-day population was published in this single batch, which means the group’s apparent East Asian manufacturing focus rests on one day of activity rather than a sustained campaign.

Initial-access correlation against SOCRadar’s stealer-log telemetry returned no records for cable-peeler.com in the queried slice. A null result is not the same as a clean bill of health: the query covers a paginated sample of one dataset, and exposure tied to alternate domains, Chinese domestic mail providers, or personal email aliases used on corporate systems would not surface here. The queried domain is a product-oriented namespace rather than an obvious corporate identity domain, and stealer-log coverage of Chinese-hosted infrastructure is generally thinner than for Western equivalents — both factors weaken the inference this null result supports. For ransomware groups such as Barracuda, infostealer-harvested credentials are a well-documented initial access vector: operators or initial access brokers source fresh logs from underground marketplaces, validate the corporate credentials, and use them to log into Microsoft 365, VPN, or remote-access portals before deploying ransomware. The absence of evidence in this query does not rule that scenario out — credentials may have surfaced in feeds outside this dataset, been used and rotated before indexing, or been harvested under personal email aliases. CTI teams should treat continued monitoring and proactive credential-hygiene checks as the appropriate response rather than reading a null query as exoneration.

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.