Siam Stabilizers and Chemicals Co., Ltd. Data Breach

On July 30, 2026, Siam Stabilizers and Chemicals Co., Ltd. (SSC), a manufacturing company based in Thailand, was listed on the Gunra ransomware group’s leak portal. This listing was logged by SOCRadar’s Dark Web Monitoring. While initial checks on the primary domain returned no correlated stealer-log records, this requires further context. SSC’s position as a manufacturer in Southeast Asia places it within a sector and region frequently targeted by ransomware operations, making it a potential target for such attacks. Gunra has claimed eight other victims in the preceding 60 days. The group’s targeting distribution shows a preference for the Business Services, Manufacturing, and Hospitality sectors, with a geographical concentration in Uruguay, Thailand, and Malaysia. Siam Stabilizers and Chemicals Co., Ltd. aligns with both the manufacturing sector and the group’s typical geographic focus in Southeast Asia, sharing overlap with recent victims which include Weilhotel, Dissinger and Dissinger Law Firm, and Yuditec S.A.

A query performed on sakai-ssc[.]com, the primary domain for Siam Stabilizers and Chemicals Co., Ltd., returned zero records within the sampled data. It is important to note that this query represents a bounded, paginated sample from a single dataset. Therefore, the absence of records does not conclusively confirm the absence of compromise. Data exposure could still exist under alternative corporate domains, through personal email aliases used for work services, or in logs that have not yet been indexed post-snapshot. The domain sakai-ssc[.]com was noted in a consolidated report of victims with no surfaced exposure, alongside other recently listed entities. This finding should be interpreted as “no exposure surfaced in this specific query,” rather than definitive proof of no compromise. Gunra, like many financially motivated cybercriminal groups, often utilizes credentials harvested from infostealer logs as a primary pathway for initial access. After obtaining these logs, they proceed to validate corporate credentials and leverage them to access systems such as Microsoft 365, VPNs, or other remote access portals before deploying ransomware. The confirmed methods of Gunra’s operations include acquiring infostealer logs to gain initial access. The threat actor then validates the compromised credentials and uses them to access victim systems, potentially including Microsoft 365, VPNs, and other remote access portals, paving the way for ransomware deployment. The current query’s null result does not eliminate the possibility of such an intrusion path. Continue monitoring the dark web and conduct proactive credential-hygiene checks on the domain. A null query result does not serve as an exoneration.

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.