meralmanisa Data Breach

meralmanisa, an organization based in Türkiye, has been listed as a victim on the Nova ransomware group’s dark web leak portal, with the entry published on July 19, 2026. The listing was identified through SOCRadar’s Dark Web Monitoring service. The entry places meralmanisa among the most recent additions to Nova’s victim population. In the 60 days before this listing, Nova has claimed 37 other victims across its leak portal. The group has concentrated on the technology, transportation/logistics, and education sectors, with victims geographically clustered in Indonesia, Australia, and the United States. Other recent Nova listings that overlap with meralmanisa’s profile include Hosab, Jota Joias Premium, Dephub, and FMZ Tecnologia em Sistemas. meralmanisa sits within this broader, opportunistic targeting pattern rather than marking a shift in the group’s focus.

Initial-access correlation against SOCRadar’s stealer-log telemetry surfaced a severe exposure for the meralmanisa.com.tr domain. The returned sample contained 17 records tying employee credentials to organizational systems, and 8 records associated with customer, supplier, or external accounts on org-owned systems. High-value endpoints observed included the corporate mail service, server and hosting control panels, and internal admin panels on the target domain. The dominant profile is corporate intrusion risk, with sample freshness spanning June 19 to July 9, 2026. For ransomware groups such as Nova, infostealer-harvested credentials are a well-documented initial-access vector: operators or initial-access brokers source fresh logs from underground marketplaces, validate the corporate credentials, and use them to log into Microsoft 365, VPN, or remote-access portals before deploying ransomware. While the stealer-log evidence here does not confirm that these specific credentials were used by Nova, the pattern is consistent with the kill chain typically observed for this class of incident. CTI teams should prioritise credential rotation, MFA enforcement, and endpoint review for the exposed accounts, and treat the exposure as a live risk rather than a historical artifact. Continued dark web monitoring, proactive credential-hygiene checks, password rotation, multi-factor authentication review, monitoring of alternate corporate domains, and reviewing Microsoft 365, VPN, and remote-access activity are recommended.

Disclaimer

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.