Circleville Police Department Data Breach

Booba Project added the Circleville Police Department to its leak site on October 29, 2026, a listing surfaced through SOCRadar’s ransomware and dark web monitoring. The department serves Pickaway County, Ohio, operates through circlevillepolice[.]com, and sits in the government sector as a municipal law enforcement agency. The claim is treated as alleged at this stage. The context is what makes the listing notable: the data a municipal police department holds — case records, informant files, inter-agency communications — gives extortion actors real leverage, and that is the dynamic the claim appears built to exploit. Booba Project has listed 32 victims over the past 60 days, with activity concentrated in the United States, Canada, and Pakistan. Government & Defense, Healthcare, and Education are the group’s primary sectors, and law enforcement is a recurring segment within that activity. Circleville PD fits the group’s current targeting profile closely: it is a United States victim in one of the group’s leading geographies, a government-sector target aligned with its most frequently claimed industries, and a law enforcement agency of the kind Booba Project has listed repeatedly.

A stealer-log query against circlevillepolice[.]com surfaced one infostealer record, dated February 2026, indicating prior credential exposure at the agency. One record is a small footprint, but credentials tied to a law enforcement endpoint carry outsized risk, since access to case management systems or inter-agency communications is qualitatively different from a compromised retailer account. The record was available in underground markets for roughly eight months before the October listing. That longevity matters: infostealer-harvested credentials circulating underground can be purchased, tested, and resold before a ransomware operation begins, so the February 2026 record represents a plausible — though unconfirmed — pre-claim access path. The telemetry itself does not establish that the credential was ever used, and it may also have been rotated since harvesting. The assessment around the listing highlights a structural imbalance: small municipal police departments do not have the security resources to match the threat they present as targets. Investigative records, informant data, and public safety communications are exactly the material ransomware operators want to threaten to release. Booba Project’s listing of Circleville PD continues a clear pattern of targeting law enforcement specifically for that leverage. Given the exposure documented in telemetry, continued dark web and stealer-log monitoring for additional records tied to circlevillepolice[.]com is a sensible baseline, together with proactive credential-hygiene checks to confirm that the February 2026 credential has been rotated or invalidated — particularly for any accounts with reach into case management or inter-agency communications platforms.