Evergreen Park Elementary School District 124 Data Breach
Published: Nov 17, 2026 TheGentlemen
Threat Level
High
Confidence: High
Quick Summary
- Company
- Evergreen Park Elementary School District 124 Data Breach
- Industry
- Education
- Threat Actor
- TheGentlemen
- Date of Incident
- Nov 17, 2026
Executive Summary
When TheGentlemen listed Evergreen Park Elementary School District 124 on its leak site on 2026-11-17, the Illinois K-8 public school district joined a victim batch that also included healthcare firms, manufacturers, and legal services providers across four continents. SOCRadar identified the listing through its CTI platform and correlated it with stealer-log telemetry for the district’s domain, d124[.]org. A school district’s student records and parent data appearing alongside pharmaceutical companies and law firms captures how indiscriminately the group operates, and underscores why education providers holding sensitive community data can attract ransomware and extortion activity. The listing of a public school district is not unusual for TheGentlemen. The group has consistently targeted US public sector and education entities alongside commercial organizations within the same operational windows, showing apparent indifference to the community services these organizations provide. Evergreen Park Elementary School District 124 therefore fits the group’s established targeting pattern rather than representing any departure from it.
Technical Analysis
SOCRadar’s stealer-log telemetry for d124[.]org returned 20 credential records. The concentration is striking: almost everything hits PowerSchool, the district’s student information system, covering both the administrative SIS portal and the parent portal. The freshness of the records spans November 2025 through October 2026, nearly a year of continuous credential harvesting. This pattern is consistent with stealer malware that re-harvests on each login rather than capturing a one-time snapshot, meaning that staff and parents have been feeding fresh credentials into someone’s collection for eleven months. The telemetry outlines a plausible access path without confirming one. Credentials harvested from PowerSchool accounts may circulate in the broad credential markets that SOCRadar assesses were the likely sourcing channel for TheGentlemen’s access, rather than the result of a targeted education-sector campaign. In such markets, acquired credentials can be validated and used to reach victim applications and portals. The stealer-log records confirm sustained credential exposure, but they do not, on their own, establish that this exact route was used to compromise the district, and that distinction should be maintained when evaluating the incident. The eleven-month freshness window makes this worse than a typical stealer hit because it points to repeated access rather than a stale snapshot. The district should conduct a full review of PowerSchool SIS logs covering November 2025 through October 2026, with particular attention to anomalous administrative access. Enabling multi-factor authentication on SIS administrative access is the immediate control gap to close. Given the sustained harvesting pattern, continued stealer-log and dark web monitoring for d124[.]org, together with proactive credential hygiene and rotation of exposed PowerSchool credentials, would complement the log review and authentication improvements.
Disclaimer
This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.
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