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Alleged

Glenmore Pharmacy & Medical Clinic Data Breach

Published: Nov 16, 2026 ShadowByt3$

Threat Level

High

Confidence: High

Quick Summary

Company
Glenmore Pharmacy & Medical Clinic Data Breach
Industry
Healthcare
Threat Actor
ShadowByt3$
Date of Incident
Nov 16, 2026

Executive Summary

Glenmore Pharmacy & Medical Clinic, a Canadian healthcare provider operating a pharmacy and medical clinic in British Columbia, was listed as a victim on the ShadowByt3$ ransomware group’s dark web leak portal on November 16, 2026. SOCRadar identified the listing through its Dark Web Monitoring service. The organization handles patient health information and prescription management for community patients, which makes it exactly the kind of target where a ransomware event carries impact well beyond IT disruption: an incident involving a community pharmacy and medical clinic could affect both patient care workflows and sensitive health data. The listing currently stands as a ransomware claim rather than an independently confirmed breach. The Glenmore listing is part of a coordinated five-victim release that ShadowByt3$ published on the same date. The other victims named in the batch are Gorcon Construction Inc. in Canada, the University of British Columbia in Canada, petstop in the United States, and Chevron Corporation in the United States. The sector mix spans Healthcare, Education, Manufacturing, Retail, and Energy, forming a broad cross-sector sweep concentrated across Canada and the United States, with three of the five victims located in Canada. A simultaneous multi-victim release from a newly observed or recently escalated actor signals that ShadowByt3$ has operational maturity behind this debut campaign wave rather than purely opportunistic access, and Glenmore’s listing fits this pattern as one of several Canadian victims in the group’s first observed wave.

Technical Analysis

For ransomware groups such as ShadowByt3$, infostealer-harvested credentials are a well-documented initial access vector. In this scenario, operators or initial access brokers source fresh logs from underground marketplaces, validate the corporate credentials they contain, and use them to log into Microsoft 365, VPN gateways, or remote-access portals before deploying ransomware. Healthcare providers are frequent targets of credential theft campaigns given the value of access to patient management and prescription systems, so this access path is relevant to consider for a pharmacy and medical clinic environment. However, no evidence in the available reporting confirms that this specific method was used against Glenmore Pharmacy & Medical Clinic; it should be treated as a plausible scenario consistent with the group’s operating model rather than an established attack path. Initial-access correlation against SOCRadar’s stealer-log telemetry returned no records for the dyckspharmacists[.]com domain in the queried slice of the dataset. This null result does not confirm that the organization is unaffected. The query covered only a limited slice of available telemetry, and credentials may have surfaced in feeds outside this dataset, been used and rotated before they were indexed, or been harvested under personal email aliases used by clinic staff rather than the corporate domain. Each of these limitations means the absence of records in this query is not evidence that no compromise occurred, and it does not rule out a credential-based intrusion scenario. CTI teams should treat continued dark web and stealer-log monitoring, together with proactive credential-hygiene checks, as the appropriate response rather than reading the null query as exoneration. Monitoring and hygiene reviews should account for the possibility that staff credentials exist under personal email aliases or appear in stealer-log feeds outside the dataset queried here. Maintaining the distinction between the observed telemetry and the possible attack scenario described above allows defenders to respond proportionately without assuming either compromise or safety.

Disclaimer

This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.