Mach Law APC Data Breach

Mach Law APC, a family law practice based in San Diego, United States, was listed as a victim on the leak site of the N0n ransomware group on October 25, 2026. The listing was identified through SOCRadar Dark Web Monitoring. Operating within the professional services sector, the firm handles divorce, custody, and support proceedings, maintaining extensive repositories of sensitive client financial and personal records. This concentration of confidential client information makes the firm a high-value target for extortion-based ransomware. The listing is consistent with N0n’s broader activity observed across a 60-day window. During this period, the group has concentrated on the Professional Services, Legal, Healthcare, and Manufacturing sectors, with a geographic focus on the United States and secondary attention to Canada. Its recent batch of claimed victims includes Andrews Advisory Group LLC, a financial advisory firm based in Chicago, Illinois; The Akeeli Group, a professional services company in the United States; and Finzly Corp, a United States financial services company. This activity reflects a consistent focus on small-to-mid-size U.S. professional services firms, and Mach Law APC aligns closely with that targeting pattern.

In connection with the N0n listing, SOCRadar performed a credential check, querying its stealer-log telemetry for the Mach Law APC domain. The query returned no records associated with the firm’s domain, meaning no credentials harvested by infostealers and attributed to that domain surfaced in the examined dataset. SOCRadar explicitly characterizes this outcome as no positive signal rather than a clean result. Accordingly, the absence of matching records does not confirm that Mach Law APC is unaffected, nor does it rule out credential exposure connected to the organization or its personnel. The limitations attached to this result are material. The stealer-log dataset used for the query is paginated, meaning the check covered only a limited sample of the available records rather than the full corpus. In addition, staff personal email aliases and adjacent corporate domains remain unsampled, so credentials belonging to Mach Law APC personnel could still exist in the dataset under alternate addresses that fall outside the scope of a domain-based query. Given these gaps, continued dark web and stealer-log monitoring remains important, and credential-hygiene checks that extend beyond the primary domain to personal email aliases and adjacent corporate domains will help ensure that any future exposure attributable to the firm is detected promptly.