Powers & Sons Data Breach
Published: Nov 18, 2026 Settra
Threat Level
High
Confidence: High
Quick Summary
- Company
- Powers & Sons Data Breach
- Industry
- Manufacturing
- Threat Actor
- Settra
- Date of Incident
- Nov 18, 2026
Executive Summary
Powers & Sons, a U.S. Midwest construction and manufacturing firm, has been listed on the leak site of the settra ransomware group on November 18, 2026. The organization is associated with the domain powersandsons[.]com, and the listing was observed by SOCRadar as part of its dark web monitoring of ransomware leak sites. The claim positions Powers & Sons as the group’s latest target in an ongoing extortion campaign, and the listing has not been independently confirmed as evidence of a successful breach or ransomware deployment. The listing aligns with a period of high activity by settra. Over the past 60 days, the group has claimed 46 victims, clustering across Professional Services, Manufacturing, and Other sectors, with a geographic concentration in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. According to SOCRadar’s analysis, settra does not discriminate by company size, and U.S. manufacturing firms are a core part of its target set. Powers & Sons therefore fits squarely within the group’s typical targeting pattern, both in industry and geography, underscoring why the organization’s sector and U.S. footprint may continue to attract ransomware and extortion activity from this actor.
Technical Analysis
SOCRadar’s stealer-log query for powersandsons[.]com returned no results in monitored underground channels. This means that no leaked credentials tied to the corporate domain were found in the stealer-log datasets that SOCRadar monitors. However, the query is bounded and may not capture all exposed credentials. The absence of a positive signal is the best-case finding, but it does not confirm that the organization is unaffected; credentials could exist in feeds outside the queried dataset, under alternate corporate domains or personal email aliases, or may not yet have been indexed. Based on the available telemetry, initial access was likely achieved through phishing or exploitation of a public-facing application rather than leaked credentials tied to the corporate domain. This is consistent with how infostealer-harvested credentials, when they do appear in underground markets, can be sold or validated by initial access brokers and subsequently support ransomware operations such as corporate account access or remote portal compromise; no such evidence was observed in this case, and this access method has not been confirmed for Powers & Sons. The immediate priorities for defenders are containment and scoping the actual impact of settra’s claim. Network segmentation, verified offline backups, and endpoint detection and response (EDR) are the baseline controls that limit blast radius. Organizations should engage an incident response firm to independently validate settra’s claim and assess whether data exfiltration preceded encryption, while continuing dark web and stealer-log monitoring for any subsequent exposure of the powersandsons[.]com domain.
Disclaimer
This report is intended for threat intelligence and security awareness purposes. SOCRadar does not host, redistribute or buy stolen data. All breach information reported here is collected from publicly accessible threat actor and ransomware portals. This content is intended to equip CTI teams with context around recent attacks. While we strive for accuracy, listings on ransomware leak and extortion sites cannot always be independently verified and may not reflect confirmed breaches. If you believe any data in this report is incorrect, please contact us.
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