Germany Faces Intense New Year DDoS Campaign: Weekly DDoS Threat Intelligence Analysis

Analysis Period: December 29, 2025 – January 4, 2026

Between 29 December 2025 and 4 January 2026, SOCRadar identified an intensive coordinated DDoS campaign conducted by the pro-Russian threat actor NoName057(16) and their project DDoSia. The campaign resulted in 2,637 recorded attack entries, targeting 115 unique domains and 97 unique IP addresses with an overwhelming concentration on German infrastructure.

The activity focused primarily on Germany, accounting for nearly 88% of all attacks, with additional targeting of Ukrainian and international domains. This represents a strategic shift from the previous week’s multi-country targeting approach, demonstrating a concentrated effort to pressure Europe’s largest economy and one of Ukraine’s strongest supporters during the ongoing conflict.

Executive Summary Table:

Campaign Analysis

Attack Volume and Scope

During the seven-day analysis period spanning the New Year transition, the campaign demonstrated concentrated intensity and strategic focus, with continuous updates to target lists distributed through Telegram channels. Unlike previous weeks that showed geographic diversity, this campaign exhibited deliberate concentration on German targets, suggesting coordinated strategic objectives.

• Germany accounted for 87.98% of all attack entries (2,320 attacks)
• International domains (.com, .org) comprised 8.65%(228 attacks)
• Ukraine represented 3.37% of attacks (89 attacks)

This distribution reflects a highly focused targeting strategy aimed at Germany’s government services, critical infrastructure, private sector entities, and political organizations. The overwhelming focus on German targets represents the most concentrated single-country campaign observed in recent NoName057(16) operations, demonstrating escalation in both intensity and strategic precision.

The timing during the holiday period (New Year transition) suggests deliberate exploitation of potentially reduced defensive staffing and operational capacity, a common tactic for maximizing disruption during periods when incident response may be slower.

Country-Level Impact Analysis

Geographic Distribution:

1. Germany: 2,320 attacks (87.98%)
2. International: 228 attacks (8.65%)
3. Ukraine: 89 attacks (3.37%)

Targeted Sectors

The campaign demonstrated a multi-sector targeting strategy with heavy emphasis on private sector entities, complemented by significant government and critical infrastructure targeting:

Sector Distribution Analysis

Key targeted sectors included:

• Private Sector Organizations (81.88%) – Cultural institutions, political party websites, business services, tourism platforms, municipal services, and commercial entities
• Government Services (10.43%) – Federal agencies, municipal government portals, regional authorities, and digital services platforms
• Critical Infrastructure – Transportation (5.88%) – Regional airports, transportation networks, logistics platforms
• Private Sector – Media (1.82%) – News outlets, minority-language media, information platforms

The exceptionally high concentration on private sector targets (over 80%) represents a deliberate strategy to create widespread economic and social disruption rather than focusing exclusively on hardened government and military infrastructure. This approach generates significant public visibility and media attention while potentially encountering less sophisticated defensive capabilities.

Government and critical infrastructure targets, while representing less than 20% of total attacks, include high-value strategic targets such as federal ministries, regional airports, and essential municipal services whose disruption creates cascading effects across dependent systems and services.

Attack Techniques and Methods

NoName057(16) employed a diversified multi-vector attack strategy, combining transport-layer and application-layer attacks to increase complexity and bypass single-layer defensive measures.

Most common methods observed:

Attack Methods Breakdown

• TCP SYN Flood attacks (24.69% – 651 attacks)
• HTTP POST-based attacks (21.61% – 570 attacks)
• TCP ACK Flood attacks (15.70% – 414 attacks)
• HTTP GET Flood attacks (15.55% – 410 attacks)
• UDP Flood (14.98% – 395 attacks)
• TCP PUSH Flood (7.47% – 197 attacks)

The dominant focus on TCP SYN floods (24.69%) demonstrates continued reliance on this classic attack method that exploits the TCP three-way handshake to exhaust server connection resources. The significant presence of HTTP POST attacks (21.61%) indicates sophisticated application-layer targeting designed to exhaust web server resources through resource-intensive request processing.

The overwhelming concentration on port 443 (HTTPS) (65.91% of all attacks – 1,738 attacks) indicates deliberate targeting of encrypted web services, including government portals, business websites, cultural institution platforms, and critical infrastructure management systems where disruption has immediate public impact. Additional targeting of port 80 (HTTP) (25.37% – 669 attacks) suggests attacks against both modern HTTPS services and legacy HTTP infrastructure.

Attack Types Distribution:

Attack Types Distribution

• TCP-layer attacks: 1,632 attacks (61.89%)
• HTTP/2 attacks: 614 attacks (23.29%)
• UDP attacks: 386 attacks (14.64%)
• HTTP/1.1 attacks: 5 attacks (0.19%)

This distribution demonstrates a layered attack methodology, combining volumetric network-layer floods (TCP: 61.89%) with sophisticated application-layer attacks (HTTP/2: 23.29%) designed to bypass rate-limiting defenses and exhaust server resources efficiently. The significant HTTP/2 component demonstrates the DDoSia botnet‘s capability to execute modern protocol-specific attacks exploiting HTTP/2’s multiplexing and server push features.

Most Targeted Organizations

The campaign targeted a strategically selected mix of cultural institutions, political entities, regional infrastructure, government services, and business platforms across Germany and other targets. The diversity of sectors demonstrates intelligence-driven targeting rather than opportunistic selection.

Top 10 Hosts by Attack Volume (across all countries)

Germany

Top 10 Most Targeted German Hosts:

1. www.naumburger-dom.de (66 attacks) – Naumburg Cathedral, UNESCO World Heritage site (Cultural Heritage)
2. spd-lsa.de (54 attacks) – SPD Saxony-Anhalt, political party regional chapter (Political)
3. www.baden-airpark.de (52 attacks) – Baden-Airpark, regional airport near French border (Critical Infrastructure – Transportation)
4. www.fred-huck.de (48 attacks) – Fred Huck, political figure website (Political)
5. reiner-haseloff.de (48 attacks) – Reiner Haseloff, Minister-President of Saxony-Anhalt (Political)
6. www.nowycasnik.de (48 attacks) – Nowy Casnik, Sorbian minority newspaper (Media)
7. www.tender24.de (40 attacks) – Tender24, procurement/tendering platform (Business Services)
8. stiftung-moritzburg.de (40 attacks) – Moritzburg Foundation, cultural institution (Cultural Heritage)
9. www.rostock.de (estimated 35+ attacks) – City of Rostock municipal portal (Government – Municipal)
10. www.lvermgeo.rlp.de (estimated 30+ attacks) – Rhineland-Palatinate Surveying Office (Government – Regional)

International and Ukrainian Targets

Notable International Targets:

1. www.baden-baden.com (48 attacks) – Baden-Baden tourism and services platform
2. www.nemetschek.com (39 attacks) – Nemetschek Group, major European software company
3. Various .com domains serving European markets

Ukrainian Infrastructure:

• 193.19.152.74 (89 attacks) – Ukrainian government/infrastructure IP address
• Multiple Ukrainian domains continuing to face persistent targeting

Target Analysis

The selection of targets reflects multiple strategic objectives:

Cultural and Symbolic Targeting: Attacks on UNESCO World Heritage sites (Naumburg Cathedral), cultural foundations (Moritzburg), and minority media (Sorbian newspaper) demonstrate symbolic warfare aimed at European cultural identity and diversity.

Political Disruption: Concentrated attacks on political party infrastructure (SPD Saxony-Anhalt) and politician personal websites (Reiner Haseloff, Fred Huck) represent direct attempts to disrupt political communications and undermine confidence in political digital infrastructure.

Regional Infrastructure: Targeting of Baden-Airpark (regional airport) and Port of Oulu demonstrates focus on regional transportation hubs that, while smaller than major international airports, serve critical regional economic functions and are potentially less defended than national-level infrastructure.

Government Services: Municipal government portals (Rostock), regional surveying offices, and administrative platforms represent attacks on citizen-facing services that directly impact public access to government information and services.

Economic Targeting: Business platforms (Tender24 for procurement), software companies (Nemetschek), and commercial services demonstrate economic warfare objectives aimed at disrupting business operations and confidence.

Threat Actor Overview: NoName057(16)

NoName057(16) is a pro-Russian hacktivist collective that emerged in March 2022 following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The group has established itself as one of the most persistent and organized hacktivist actors conducting sustained DDoS campaigns against NATO member states, European Union countries, and nations supporting Ukraine.

Threat actor card of NoName057(16)

The group operates through a crowdsourced, volunteer-driven model using the custom DDoSia botnet framework distributed via Telegram channels. This operational model provides several advantages: distributed attack infrastructure difficult to attribute and disrupt, plausible deniability for state involvement, and ability to mobilize thousands of volunteer participants incentivized through gamification and cryptocurrency rewards.

NoName057(16) operations consistently align with Russian geopolitical objectives, with targeting prioritizing:

• NATO member states, particularly recent additions like Finland
• European Union institutions and member states
• Countries providing military, financial, or political support to Ukraine
• Ukrainian government services and critical infrastructure
• Private sector entities in targeted countries to create economic pressure

The group has demonstrated persistent operational tempo with regular target list updates multiple times per day, sustained campaigns over weeks and months, and strategic coordination timed to geopolitical events and diplomatic developments.

Key Characteristics:

• Operational Model: Volunteer-driven crowdsourced attacks via DDoSia botnet tool
• Coordination: Telegram channels for target distribution and participant recruitment
• Motivation: Pro-Russian hacktivist aligned with state geopolitical objectives
• Technical Capability: Multi-vector attacks combining volumetric (TCP/UDP floods) and application-layer techniques (HTTP/HTTP2 floods, nginx_loris)
• Target Selection: Intelligence-driven, strategically prioritized targeting
• Persistence: Continuous operations with sustained pressure over extended periods
• Sophistication: Medium-to-high technical capability with evolving tactics

Mitigation and Recommendations

Immediate Actions:

• Deploy cloud-based DDoS protection services (Cloudflare, Akamai, AWS Shield, Azure DDoS Protection)
• Implement Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules targeting HTTP/HTTP2 flood patterns
• Configure rate limiting at web application, reverse proxy, and network layers
• Enable SYN cookies and TCP connection limits at firewall and server levels
• Establish traffic baseline monitoring with automated alerting for anomalies
• Verify geographic redundancy and failover capabilities for critical services

Infrastructure and Response:

• Implement Content Delivery Networks (CDN) to distribute and absorb volumetric attacks
• Deploy auto-scaling capabilities to handle sudden traffic spikes
• Use DDoS-protected DNS providers with geographic distribution
• Separate critical authentication services from public-facing websites
• Document and test DDoS-specific incident response procedures
• Maintain pre-established relationships with DDoS mitigation service providers for rapid activation
• Prepare alternative communication channels (social media, phone lines) for service disruptions

Strategic Measures:

• Conduct DDoS risk assessments identifying critical services and vulnerabilities
• Develop business continuity plans accounting for extended service disruptions
• Budget appropriately for DDoS protection services and infrastructure redundancy
• Train staff on recognizing DDoS attacks and response procedures
• Engage with national CERT/CSIRT programs and sector-specific ISACs for threat intelligence
• Monitor threat intelligence feeds tracking NoName057(16) activity
• Evaluate cyber insurance policies covering DDoS-related losses

Conclusion

The NoName057(16) campaign observed between 29 December 2025 and 4 January 2026 demonstrates a strategically concentrated, persistent, and technically sophisticated DDoS operation overwhelmingly focused on German infrastructure during the New Year holiday period. With 2,637 attack entries distributed across 115 unique domains, this campaign represents one of the most concentrated single-country targeting operations observed in recent NoName057(16) activity.

The technical sophistication demonstrated through multi-vector attacks combining TCP floods (61.89%), HTTP/2 attacks (23.29%), and UDP floods (14.64%) indicates continued evolution of DDoSia botnet capabilities. The heavy concentration on HTTPS services (port 443: 65.91%) demonstrates understanding of modern infrastructure and strategic focus on high-value encrypted services that cannot be easily disabled as a mitigation measure.

SOCRadar will continue monitoring NoName057(16) activity and provide updated intelligence as new campaigns emerge. Organizations requiring detailed threat intelligence, sector-specific analysis, or assistance with DDoS mitigation strategies can contact our threat intelligence team.

If you would like a more detailed breakdown for your organization or sector, you can reach out to us at [email protected].