SOCRadar® Cyber Intelligence Inc. | APT Profile: Who is Lazarus Group?


Dec 02, 2021
19 Mins Read

APT Profile: Who is Lazarus Group?

By SOCRadar Research

[Update] December 12, 2023: See the subheading: “Lazarus Uses Log4Shell in Operation Blacksmith, Deploys New Malware: NineRAT, DLRAT, and BottomLoader.”

[Update] September 1, 2023: See the subheading: “VMConnect Campaign Unveiled: Lazarus Group is the Culprit.”

[Update] August 24, 2023: The FBI warns that the Lazarus Group plans to convert stolen cryptocurrency, potentially valued at over $40 million, into cash. Added the subheading “FBI Warns Of Lazarus Plan To Cash Out $40 Million In Stolen Cryptocurrency.”

[Update] August 8, 2023: North Korean state-backed hackers breached Russia’s leading missile manufacturer, NPO Mashinostroyeniya (NPO Mash). Added the subheading: “Lazarus and ScarCruft Breach Leading Missile Manufacturer NPO Mash.”

Nation-state threat actors are cyber threat groups operating in states’ interests. They sabotage, engage in espionage, and steal sensitive information to supply strategic and economic information to their home countries for political or national security reasons. While financial gain is among their motivations, it is not usually at the top of the list. Lazarus group, apart from the majority of other nation-state threat actors, is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actor that prioritizes financial gain as well as political objectives.

Lazarus Group 101

The Lazarus Group is known by many names, including Hidden Cobra, Zinc, APT-C-26, Guardians of Peace, Group 77, Who Is Hacking Team, Stardust Chollima, and Nickel Academy, among other titles. The Lazarus Group is attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In 2017, the U.S. government issued a joint technical alert (TA17-164A), based on analysis by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), that identified Hidden Cobra as a “North Korean state-sponsored malicious cyber organization.”

SOCRadar XTI Platform, Threat Actor/Malware Module
SOCRadar XTI Platform, Threat Actor/Malware Module

Lazarus group was first identified and named in the ‘Operation BlockBuster’ report (2016) published by a consortium of security firms led by Novetta to investigate the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack in 2014. During the investigation, various malware was found associated with the malware used in the Sony Pictures attack. By tracking the malware and the attackers’ modus operandi, researchers could identify the activities of the Lazarus group as far back as 2009 (possibly 2007).

Because North Korean threat actors tend to share their infrastructure, code, and resources, defining the Lazarus group’s boundaries is challenging. Uncertainties exist over the Lazarus group’s composition due to clusters like “Bluenoroff” and “Andariel,” which are classified as sub-groups, “TEMP.Hermit,” with which it shares code, and “Kimsuky,” with which its operations overlap.

Lazarus group’s activities are aligned with North Korea’s political interests. Therefore, South Korea and the U.S. are the main focus. Other countries among its targets are Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye and the United Kingdom.

Targeted Countries by Lazarus APT Group (Source: SOCRadar)
Targeted Countries by Lazarus APT Group (Source: SOCRadar)

Lazarus group has a broader range of operations than other nation-state threat actors. Its primary objectives include information theft, money extortion, espionage, sabotage, and disruption. In addition to bank robberies, cryptocurrency theft, and ransomware attacks for financial gain, it carries out attacks against precisely selected targets in areas where it can obtain strategically important intelligence, such as energy, aviation, and defense.

  • Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities
  • Space Research and Technology
  • National Security and International Affairs
  • Finance and Insurance
  • Educational Services
  • Health Care and Social Assistance
  • Public Administration
  • Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
  • Commodity Contracts Intermediation (CryptoCurrency & NFT Market)
  • Publishing Industries (except Internet)
  • Utilities
  • Manufacturing

They also target journalists, human rights organizations, North Korean defectors, and any group that might criticize the DPRK.

How Does the Lazarus Group Attack

Lazarus group has evolved its strategy over time since its first attacks, which consisted of DDoS operations against various organizations in different industries. Attacks became more destructive due to an ever-evolving arsenal of malware and TTPs.

Lazarus group’s attack pattern can vary depending on the specific attacks, although they generally follow similar steps.

  • Lazarus group plans sophisticated and focused attacks against potential victims. The group determines potential targets and gathers information about their infrastructure, security posture, and employees. They observe the targets’ activities and find the best attack time.
  • They use various technics, including spear phishing, supply-chain attacks, waterhole attacks, and zero-day vulnerability exploitation. To access targeted networks, exfiltrate sensitive data, and maintain persistence, they also use a range of custom-built malware, such as remote access trojans (RATs), backdoors, and botnets.

To hide their tracks and prevent detection, they delete logs and data and infect the victim with malware or ransomware. Once detected, acting swiftly, they try to avoid forensic investigations by immediately repackaging malware and switching encryption keys and algorithms.

Lazarus APT Group Attack Chain
Lazarus APT Group Attack Chain

Which Tools and Vulnerabilities Does Lazarus Group Use

Over the years, the Lazarus group has carried out several activities, mostly involving disruption, sabotage, financial theft, and espionage. It has a reputation for employing aggressive strategies, such as disk-wiping malware, to damage its targets as much as possible.

Lazarus group is known for creating custom malware for operations and quickly modifying, upgrading, and developing existing malware. Lazarus Group has utilized a variety of tools in the attacks, some of which are:

  • Backdoors: Appleseed, HardRain, BadCall, Hidden Cobra, Destroyer, and Duuzer
  • Remote Access Trojans (RATs): Fallchill, Joanap, Brambul, and
  • Ransomware: Wannacry
Lazarus APT Group-associated tools provided by SOCRadar
Lazarus APT group-associated tools provided by SOCRadar

Lazarus group has used many zero-day vulnerabilities they purchased or discovered. They also use several known vulnerabilities in their attacks, including:

  • Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities
  • Microsoft Office vulnerabilities
  • Vulnerabilities in local software of South Korea (Exp. Hangul Word Processor (HWP))
  • Vulnerabilities in the SWIFT (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) software
Lazarus APT Group-associated vulnerabilities provided by SOCRadar
Lazarus APT Group-associated vulnerabilities provided by SOCRadar

Notable Attacks of the Lazarus Group 

In 2016, after being identified and named, the retrospective activities of the Lazarus group were tracked. Large-scale DDoS attacks against the U.S. and South Korea (2009), espionage attacks against U.S. and South Korean websites “Operation Troy” (2009-2013), “Ten Days of Rain,” which included DDoS attacks against South Korean media and financial institutions and U.S. military facilities (2011), “Operation 1Million/Dark Seoul” attack against a South Korean bank and broadcast organization (2013) were all attributed to the Lazarus group.

The “Operation Flame” (2007), which was eventually connected to the “Dark Seoul” attack (2013), can qualify as the group’s first attack.

The 2014 Sony Picture Entertainment attack and a series of SWIFT-targeted campaigns in 2015-2016 (especially the 2016 Bangladesh Bank heist) are among the significant attacks linked to the Lazarus group.

The ‘Wannacry’ ransomware attack in 2017—the biggest ransomware attack to date—affected 300,000 systems across 150 countries.

The “Operation AppleJeus” attack was discovered in 2018 but has been ongoing since at least 2017, targeting cryptocurrency users. Another financially motivated attack is the “FastCash” operation, founded in 2018 but has been ongoing since at least 2016. “FastCash” is a series of attacks targeting (Automated Teller Machines) ATMs of various banks in several countries.

Operation AppleJeus (Source: SOCRadar)
Operation AppleJeus (Source: SOCRadar)

Lazarus group conducted several campaigns in 2020, including attacks on pharmaceutical companies, “Operation ThreatNeddle” against the defense and security sector, “Operation In(ter)ception” against military and aerospace firms, particularly in Europe, and “Operation Dreamjob” against multiple individuals globally in the defense industry and various governmental organizations using social media.

In 2022, the Lazarus group targeted energy providers around the world. The campaign involved the exploitation of the vulnerability in VMware Horizon to gain initial access. 2022 cryptocurrency attacks also drew attention.

Recent Attacks of the Lazarus Group

As the concern of the entire world, the Covid-19 pandemic has also been on the Lazarus group’s agenda, and they targeted pharmaceutical corporations. In 2020, the group attacked pharmaceutical companies and research facilities working on Covid-19 vaccines. Lazarus group members attempted to steal crucial information about the vaccine development process by posing as medical professionals and contacting pharmaceutical business personnel with messages that contained malicious attachments.

The “Dream Job” operation from 2020 reappeared in 2022. The group specifically used social media attacks with fraudulent job offers for researchers working for chemical and information security companies.

Another recurring campaign was “Operation AppleJeus.” The U.S. government published an advisory attributing the cryptocurrency stealing campaign “AppleJeus” to the Lazarus Group (AA21-048A) in 2021. In 2022, cryptocurrency attacks continued to increase. The group targeted organizations in the finance industry with phishing emails containing malware that was used to steal cryptocurrency.

On April 12, 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Lazarus group of carrying out the “Ronin Bridge” attack, the largest cryptocurrency attack ever, and held them responsible for a $620 million Ethereum heist.

lazarus apt group ronin attack

On April 18, 2022, The FBI, CISA, and the Department of the Treasury published a joint Cybersecurity Advisory highlighting the cyber threat associated with bitcoin thefts and techniques utilized by Lazarus group as a North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (AA22-108A). In addition, the FBI, in its statement on February 6, 2023, claimed the Lazarus group was responsible for “Harmony’s Horizon Bridge Currency Theft” and $100M heist.

The chart of daily discovered Lazarus APT Group IOCs and distribution in 2022 (Source: SOCRadar)
The chart of daily discovered Lazarus APT Group IOCs and distribution in 2022 (Source: SOCRadar)

Lazarus and ScarCruft Breach Leading Missile Manufacturer NPO Mash

North Korean state-backed hackers breached Russia’s leading missile manufacturer, NPO Mashinostroyeniya (NPO Mash). The breach has been attributed to at least two distinct North Korean nation-state threat groups, including Lazarus. The attackers maintained their access for several months before discovery.

NPO Mash, renowned for its contribution to Soviet missile development, was founded during World War II. The manufacturer faced sanctions after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nowadays, Russia employs missiles produced by NPO Mash to target Ukraine.

The full impact of the breach and Pyongyang’s use of compromised information is uncertain. However, it underscores potential tensions between North Korea and its close ally.

The Possible Motive Behind the NPO Mash Cyberattack

The hack was linked to two North Korean cyberespionage groups: ScarCruft, for breaching the email server, and the notorious Lazarus, for implanting backdoors into systems. SentinelLabs researchers found that the incident began in late 2021 and lasted until May of the following year.

Researchers highlighted NPO Mash’s appeal as a target for nation-state hackers due to its possession of highly classified intellectual property associated with sensitive missile technology.

The breach is described as a “highly desirable strategic espionage mission” to support North Korea’s contentious missile program, as researchers suggest that the cyberattack could likely serve as a covert means for the country to advance its missile development goals.

OpenCarrot Backdoor and ScarCruft Compromise

In May 2022, the company found a suspicious file in its systems, later identified as a version of the OpenCarrot backdoor linked to Lazarus.

This OpenCarrot variant comes with capabilities like reconnaissance, file/process manipulation, and reconfiguration with connectivity features. Additionally, SentinelLabs found ScarCruft compromising Mash’s Linux email server.

ScarCruft is linked to North Korea’s state activities, focusing on high-value individuals. In contrast, Lazarus is known for cryptocurrency heists, allegedly amassing over $2 billion. It’s unclear if the groups collaborated, but this attack indicates possible resource sharing.

FBI Warns Of Lazarus Plan To Cash Out $40 Million In Stolen Cryptocurrency

The FBI has issued a warning indicating that individuals affiliated with the Lazarus Group are preparing to convert stolen cryptocurrency, potentially valued at over $40 million, into cash.

This announcement comes after the FBI’s tracking of around 1,580 bitcoins, taken in previous cryptocurrency heists, to six specific cryptocurrency wallets.

The agency has listed these wallet addresses and urged cryptocurrency companies to carefully analyze blockchain data and take steps to prevent transactions involving these addresses:

  • 3LU8wRu4ZnXP4UM8Yo6kkTiGHM9BubgyiG
  • 39idqitN9tYNmq3wYanwg3MitFB5TZCjWu
  • 3AAUBbKJorvNhEUFhKnep9YTwmZECxE4Nk
  • 3PjNaSeP8GzLjGeu51JR19Q2Lu8W2Te9oc
  • 3NbdrezMzAVVfXv5MTQJn4hWqKhYCTCJoB
  • 34VXKa5upLWVYMXmgid6bFM4BaQXHxSUoL

VMConnect Campaign Unveiled: Lazarus Group is the Culprit

In early August, researchers uncovered the VMConnect campaign, which featured roughly two dozen malicious Python packages on the Python Package Index (PyPI). These packages included backdoors and info-stealing capabilities, masquerading as popular open-source Python tools like vConnector, eth-tester, and databases.

Recently, researchers identified three more malicious Python packages tied to the VMConnect campaign – tablediter, request-plus, and requestspro, attributing this malicious activity to the Lazarus Group.

About the New Malicious PyPI Packages

To conceal these malicious PyPI packages, the threat actors used typosquatting, copied the description of legitimate packages, and updated package names in the fake packages’ documentation references accordingly.


One of the Python packages researchers identified is tablediter. This package mimics “prettytable,” a Python tool for visually appealing table printing, boasting over 9 million monthly downloads. Interestingly, the malicious functionality within tablediter remains dormant during installation; it activates only when utilized in a project. Researchers found that the decrypted code’s functionality closely resembles what was extracted from a previous malicious package in the VMConnect campaign.

request-plus, requestspro:

The packages named request-plus and requestspro target the highly popular requests library on PyPI. Requests is an HTTP library that garners thousands of monthly downloads and over 2.3 million dependencies. The attackers duplicated the files from the legitimate requests package within their fake packages. Furthermore, just like with tablediter, these packages were meticulously crafted to evade detection, both pre and post-installation.

For more information about these packages, and their IoCs, refer here.

For a deeper understanding of the threat posed by malicious packages to DevOps environments, we invite you to explore our related blog post.

How Did Researchers Attribute This Campaign to Lazarus?

Researchers have uncovered py_QRcode, a package featuring a file with notably similar malicious functionality to the VMConnect package. Both manipulate file paths based on architecture, employ a base64-encoded variable for the next-level payload, and share similar code for decoding and local file writing.

JPCERT/CC previously published a blog about py_QRcode, attributing it to DangerousPassword, a Lazarus subgroup. Moreover, the py_QRcode package mirrors QRLog’s functionality, as outlined in this research. Both QRLog and py_QRcode malware samples utilize the same C2 domain. Mauro Eldritch, the researcher who discovered the malicious QRLog package, shared his findings with cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike, which confidently attributed the malware to Labyrinth Chollima, another Lazarus subgroup.

These attributions, along with shared code similarities between the VMConnect campaign and JPCERT/CC’s research, lead researchers to connect both attacks to the Lazarus Group.

Lazarus Uses Log4Shell in Operation Blacksmith, Deploys New Malware: NineRAT, DLRAT, and BottomLoader

Lazarus has been observed exploiting the Log4Shell RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in a recent campaign, deploying three new malware written in DLang: remote access trojans NineRAT and DLRAT, and a malware downloader named BottomLoader.

Cisco Talos has noted a significant change in the tactics of the Lazarus group. In the last eighteen months, Talos has revealed three distinct remote access trojans developed using ‘uncommon’ technologies such as QtFramework, PowerBasic, and most recently in this campaign, DLang.

In the campaign named “Operation Blacksmith,” Lazarus targets manufacturing, agricultural, and physical security companies. According to the researchers, the campaign includes ongoing opportunistic targeting of global enterprises that publicly host and expose vulnerable infrastructure to n-day vulnerability exploitation, like the Log4j vulnerability.


NineRAT utilizes the Telegram API for C2 communication, facilitating the transfer of files and evasion of detection. This RAT also employs a dropper, aiding threat actors in establishing persistence and executing additional binaries. The commands associated with NineRAT are as follows:

/info Gather preliminary information about the infected system.
/setmtoken Set a token value.
/setbtoken Set a new Bot token.
/setinterval Set time interval between malware polls to the Telegram channel.
/setsleep Set a time period for which the malware should sleep/lie dormant.
/upgrade Upgrade to a new version of the implant.
/exit Exit execution of the malware.
/uninstall Uninstall self from the endpoint.
/sendfile Send a file to the C2 server from the infected endpoint.


DLRAT is a downloader RAT that Lazarus can utilize to deploy additional malware and retrieve commands from the C2. Upon infiltrating a device, DLRAT executes hard-coded commands for reconnaissance, collecting system information, and exfiltrates it to the C2 server.

Researchers discovered that the session information ID used by DLRAT in its communication with the C2 server is “23wfow02rofw391ng23,” same as a value identified in a previous research into MagicRAT.

The C2 reply includes the external IP address of the implant. The malware recognizes specific command codes/names sent by the C2 to execute actions on the infected system.

deleteme Delete itself from the system using a BAT file.
download Download files from a specified remote location.
rename Rename files on the system.
iamsleep Instructs the implant to go to sleep for a specified amount of time.
upload Upload files to C2.
showurls Empty command (Not implemented yet).


BottomLoader is a malware downloader that retrieves and executes next-stage payloads from a remote host, like HazyLoad. Researchers note that it can download the payload from a hardcoded remote URL and upload files to the C2 using PowerShell commands. Additionally, BottomLoader can establish persistence for newer versions or new payloads by modifying the Startup directory.

Lazarus’ Attack Scheme in ‘Operation Blacksmith’ Campaign

In ‘Operation Blacksmith,’ Lazarus initiates access by exploiting the Log4j vulnerability discovered in 2021. Although fixed, the vulnerability continues to pose a threat, with Lazarus sub-groups extensively exploiting it for malicious activities. The threat actor targets VMWare Horizon servers exposed to the public, utilizing a vulnerable Log4j logging library version.

After exploiting the vulnerability, Lazarus establishes persistent access using the HazyLoad proxy tool, runs reconnaissance commands, creates admin-privileged user accounts, and deploys credential-stealing tools such as ProcDump and MimiKatz. Microsoft previously identified HazyLoad in Lazarus attacks exploiting a critical security vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity (CVE-2023-42793). HazyLoad is downloaded and executed by the loader malware known as BottomLoader.

NineRAT is launched in the second phase, initially observed in use by Lazarus as early as March 2023. Upon activation, NineRAT receives commands via its Telegram-based C2 channel, enabling the fingerprinting of infected systems. Researchers suggest that re-fingerprinting indicates that data collected by Lazarus through NineRAT may be shared with other APT groups, residing in a different repository from the initial fingerprint data collected during Lazarus’ initial access.

Operation Blacksmith’s infection Chain (Cisco Talos)

Operation Blacksmith’s infection Chain (Cisco Talos)

Additionally, Talos notes overlap between Lazarus’ ‘Operation Blacksmith’ and the North Korean state-sponsored group Onyx Sleet (PLUTIONIUM), also known as the Andariel APT group. Onyx Sleet is widely considered an APT sub-group under the Lazarus umbrella, exhibiting consistent TTPs.

More information about the Operation Blacksmith campaign and the IOCs for NineRAT, DLRAT, BottomLoader, HazyLoad, and network-related indicators are accessible here.

How Can SOCRadar Help?

Lazarus group has been active for over a decade and has launched attacks in various industries. In their attacks, they have shown high proficiency and flexibility, utilizing custom-built and publicly accessible tools and exploiting various vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. Due to its capabilities and operations, the group is currently one of the most powerful North Korean threat actors.

Reviewing the cases reveals that the group typically uses phishing attacks to gain initial access. In particular, spear phishing attacks against the defense and aerospace sector and ‘dreamjob’ attacks against security researchers, which include fake job offers, make it necessary for companies in these sectors to be sensitive about the cybersecurity awareness of their employees.

SOC Tools on SOCRadar XTI Labs provide a free analysis of suspicious emails.

SOC Tools provided by SOCRadar Labs
SOC Tools provided by SOCRadar Labs

Lazarus group effectively exploits some well-known system vulnerabilities in their numerous attacks. SOCRadar Extended Threat Intelligence provides an Attack Surface Management (ASM) solution for continuous discovery, inventory, classification, and prioritization with real-time monitoring to help gain comprehensive visibility into external-facing digital assets. Security teams can keep track of the vulnerabilities in the network using the SOCRadar XTI ASM solution. Understanding which vulnerabilities exist in the company can help to minimize the attack surface that nation-state threat actors may exploit.

SOCRadar XTI Attack Surface Management

Lazarus group frequently uses supply-chain attacks. SOCRadar XTI provides organizations 360-degree visibility across the entire digital ecosystem by including third-party/supply chain partners in their digital footprint.

SOCRadar XTI Supply Chain Intelligence Module
SOCRadar XTI Supply Chain Intelligence Module


Appendix 1.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Techniques Name
T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token
T1087.002 Account Discovery: Domain Account
T1098 Account Manipulation
T1583.001 Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
T1583.004 Acquire Infrastructure: Server
T1583.006 Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
T1557.001 Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
T1071.001 Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
T1010 Application Window Discovery
T1560 Archive Collected Data
T1560.002 Archive via Library
T1560.003 Archive via Custom Method
T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification
T1110 Brute Force
T1110.003 Password Spraying
T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
T1584.001 Compromise Infrastructure: Domains
T1584.004 Compromise Infrastructure: Server
T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
T1485 Data Destruction
T1132.001 Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
T1005 Data from Local System
T1001.003 Data Obfuscation: Protocol Impersonation
T1074.001 Data Staged: Local Data Staging
T1491.001 Defacement: Internal Defacement
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1587.001 Develop Capabilities: Malware
T1561.001 Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe
T1561.002 Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe
T1189 Drive-by Compromise
T1573.001 Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
T1585.001 Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts
T1585.002 Establish Accounts: Email Accounts
T1048.003 Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1567.002 Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution
T1008 Fallback Channels
T1083 File and Directory Discovery
T1589.002 Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses
T1591 Gather Victim Org Information
T1591.004 Identify Roles
T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
T1574.013 Hijack Execution Flow: KernelCallbackTable
T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.004 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall
T1070 Indicator Removal
T1070.003 Clear Command History
T1070.004 File Deletion
T1070.006 Timestomp
T1202 Indirect Command Execution
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
T1056.001 Input Capture: Keylogging
T1534 Internal Spearphishing
T1036 Masquerading
T1036.003 Rename System Utilities
T1036.004 Masquerade Task or Service
T1036.005 Match Legitimate Name or Location
T1104 Multi-Stage Channels
T1106 Native API
T1046 Network Service Discovery
T1571 Non-Standard Port
T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.002 Software Packing
T1027.007 Dynamic API Resolution
T1588.002 Obtain Capabilities: Tool
T1588.003 Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates
T1588.004 Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Link
T1566.003 Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
T1542.003 Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
T1057 Process Discovery
T1055.001 Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
T1090.001 Proxy: Internal Proxy
T1090.002 Proxy: External Proxy
T1012 Query Registry
T1620 Reflective Code Loading
T1021.001 Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002 Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.004 Remote Services: SSH
T1053.005 Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
T1593.001 Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media
T1489 Service Stop
T1608.001 Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
T1608.002 Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool
T1553.002 Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005 Mshta
T1218.01 Regsvr32
T1218.011 Rundll32
T1082 System Information Discovery
T1614.001 System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery
T1049 System Network Connections Discovery
T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
T1529 System Shutdown/Reboot
T1124 System Time Discovery
T1221 Template Injection
T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
T1078 Valid Accounts
T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
T1102.002 Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
T1220 XSL Script Processing
T0865 Spearphishing Attachment

Appendix 2.

Lazarus Group crypto Ethereum address:





Appendix 3.

IoCs of Wannacry

IP Addresses and Domains

IPv4 197(.)231.221.211

IPv4 128(.)31.0.39

IPv4 149(.)202.160.69

IPv4 46(.)101.166.19

IPv4 91(.)121.65.179

URL hxxp://www(.)btcfrog(.)com/qr/bitcoinpng(.)php?address

URL hxxp://www(.)rentasyventas(.)com/incluir/rk/imagenes(.)html

URL hxxp://www(.)rentasyventas(.)com/incluir/rk/imagenes(.)html?retencion=081525418

URL hxxp://gx7ekbenv2riucmf(.)onion

URL hxxp://57g7spgrzlojinas(.)onion

URL hxxp://xxlvbrloxvriy2c5(.)onion

URL hxxp://76jdd2ir2embyv47(.)onion

URL hxxp://cwwnhwhlz52maqm7(.)onion

URL hxxp://197.231.221(.)211 Port:9001

URL hxxp://128.31.0(.)39 Port:9191

URL hxxp://149.202.160(.)69 Port:9001

URL hxxp://46.101.166(.)19 Port:9090

URL hxxp://91.121.65(.)179 Port:9001


Hash-MD5 5a89aac6c8259abbba2fa2ad3fcefc6e
Hash-MD5 05da32043b1e3a147de634c550f1954d
Hash-MD5 8e97637474ab77441ae5add3f3325753
Hash-MD5 c9ede1054fef33720f9fa97f5e8abe49
Hash-MD5 f9cee5e75b7f1298aece9145ea80a1d2
Hash-MD5 638f9235d038a0a001d5ea7f5c5dc4ae
Hash-MD5 80a2af99fd990567869e9cf4039edf73
Hash-MD5 c39ed6f52aaa31ae0301c591802da24b
Hash-MD5 db349b97c37d22f5ea1d1841e3c89eb4
Hash-MD5 f9992dfb56a9c6c20eb727e6a26b0172
Hash-MD5 46d140a0eb13582852b5f778bb20cf0e
Hash-MD5 5bef35496fcbdbe841c82f4d1ab8b7c2
Hash-MD5 3c6375f586a49fc12a4de9328174f0c1
Hash-MD5 246c2781b88f58bc6b0da24ec71dd028
Hash-MD5 b7f7ad4970506e8547e0f493c80ba441
Hash-MD5 2b4e8612d9f8cdcf520a8b2e42779ffa
Hash-MD5 c61256583c6569ac13a136bfd440ca09
Hash-MD5 31dab68b11824153b4c975399df0354f
Hash-MD5 54a116ff80df6e6031059fc3036464df
Hash-MD5 d6114ba5f10ad67a4131ab72531f02da
Hash-MD5 05a00c320754934782ec5dec1d5c0476
Hash-MD5 f107a717f76f4f910ae9cb4dc5290594
Hash-MD5 7f7ccaa16fb15eb1c7399d422f8363e8
Hash-MD5 84c82835a5d21bbcf75a61706d8ab549
Hash-MD5 bec0b7aff4b107edd5b9276721137651
Hash-MD5 86721e64ffbd69aa6944b9672bcabb6d
Hash-MD5 509c41ec97bb81b0567b059aa2f50fe8
Hash-MD5 8db349b97c37d22f5ea1d1841e3c89eb
Hash-SHA1 6fbb0aabe992b3bda8a9b1ecd68ea13b668f232e
Hash-SHA256 0a73291ab5607aef7db23863cf8e72f55bcb3c273bb47f00edf011515aeb5894
Hash-SHA256 21ed253b796f63b9e95b4e426a82303dfac5bf8062bfe669995bde2208b360fd
Hash-SHA256 228780c8cff9044b2e48f0e92163bd78cc6df37839fe70a54ed631d3b6d826d5
Hash-SHA256 2372862afaa8e8720bc46f93cb27a9b12646a7cbc952cc732b8f5df7aebb2450
Hash-SHA256 2ca2d550e603d74dedda03156023135b38da3630cb014e3d00b1263358c5f00d
Hash-SHA256 3ecc7b1ee872b45b534c9132c72d3523d2a1576ffd5763fd3c23afa79cf1f5f9
Hash-SHA256 43d1ef55c9d33472a5532de5bbe814fefa5205297653201c30fdc91b8f21a0ed
Hash-SHA256 49fa2e0131340da29c564d25779c0cafb550da549fae65880a6b22d45ea2067f
Hash-SHA256 4a468603fdcb7a2eb5770705898cf9ef37aade532a7964642ecd705a74794b79
Hash-SHA256 616e60f031b6e7c4f99c216d120e8b38763b3fafd9ac4387ed0533b15df23420
Hash-SHA256 66334f10cb494b2d58219fa6d1c683f2dbcfc1fb0af9d1e75d49a67e5d057fc5
Hash-SHA256 8b52f88f50a6a254280a0023cf4dc289bd82c441e648613c0c2bb9a618223604
Hash-SHA256 8c3a91694ae0fc87074db6b3e684c586e801f4faed459587dcc6274e006422a4
Hash-SHA256 aae9536875784fe6e55357900519f97fee0a56d6780860779a36f06765243d56
Hash-SHA256 b9c5d4339809e0ad9a00d4d3dd26fdf44a32819a54abf846bb9b560d81391c25
Hash-SHA256 ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa
Hash-SHA256 f7c7b5e4b051ea5bd0017803f40af13bed224c4b0fd60b890b6784df5bd63494
Hash-SHA256 09a46b3e1be080745a6d8d88d6b5bd351b1c7586ae0dc94d0c238ee36421cafa
Hash-SHA256 149601e15002f78866ab73033eb8577f11bd489a4cea87b10c52a70fdf78d9ff
Hash-SHA256 190d9c3e071a38cb26211bfffeb6c4bb88bd74c6bf99db9bb1f084c6a7e1df4e
Hash-SHA256 24d004a104d4d54034dbcffc2a4b19a11f39008a575aa614ea04703480b1022c
Hash-SHA256 2584e1521065e45ec3c17767c065429038fc6291c091097ea8b22c8a502c41dd
Hash-SHA256 4186675cb6706f9d51167fb0f14cd3f8fcfb0065093f62b10a15f7d9a6c8d982
Hash-SHA256 593bbcc8f34047da9960b8456094c0eaf69caaf16f1626b813484207df8bd8af
Hash-SHA256 5ad4efd90dcde01d26cc6f32f7ce3ce0b4d4951d4b94a19aa097341aff2acaec
Hash-SHA256 7c465ea7bcccf4f94147add808f24629644be11c0ba4823f16e8c19e0090f0ff
Hash-SHA256 9b60c622546dc45cca64df935b71c26dcf4886d6fa811944dbc4e23db9335640
Hash-SHA256 9fb39f162c1e1eb55fbf38e670d5e329d84542d3dfcdc341a99f5d07c4b50977
Hash-SHA256 b47e281bfbeeb0758f8c625bed5c5a0d27ee8e0065ceeadd76b0010d226206f0
Hash-SHA256 b66db13d17ae8bcaf586180e3dcd1e2e0a084b6bc987ac829bbff18c3be7f8b4
Hash-SHA256 c365ddaa345cfcaff3d629505572a484cff5221933d68e4a52130b8bb7badaf9
Hash-SHA256 d8a9879a99ac7b12e63e6bcae7f965fbf1b63d892a8649ab1d6b08ce711f7127
Hash-SHA256 f8812f1deb8001f3b7672b6fc85640ecb123bc2304b563728e6235ccbe782d85
Hash-SHA256 11d0f63c06263f50b972287b4bbd1abe0089bc993f73d75768b6b41e3d6f6d49
Hash-SHA256 16493ecc4c4bc5746acbe96bd8af001f733114070d694db76ea7b5a0de7ad0ab
Hash-SHA256 6bf1839a7e72a92a2bb18fbedf1873e4892b00ea4b122e48ae80fac5048db1a7
Hash-SHA256 b3c39aeb14425f137b5bd0fd7654f1d6a45c0e8518ef7e209ad63d8dc6d0bac7
Hash-SHA256 e14f1a655d54254d06d51cd23a2fa57b6ffdf371cf6b828ee483b1b1d6d21079
Hash-SHA256 e8450dd6f908b23c9cbd6011fe3d940b24c0420a208d6924e2d920f92c894a96

Appendix 4.


Indicator Description
d1f3b9372a6be9c02430b6e4526202974179a674ce94fe22028d7212ae6be9e7 Proxy server (32-bit EXE)
4257bb11570ed15b8a15aa3fc051a580eab5d09c2f9d79e4b264b752c8e584fc Proxy server (32-bit DLL)
93e13ffd2a2f1a13fb9a09de1d98324f75b3f0f8e0c822857ed5ca3b73ee3672 Implant loader (32-bit EXE)
da353b2845a354e1a3f671e4a12198e2c6f57a377d02dfaf90477869041a044f Decrypted implant (Zip Archive)
91650e7b0833a34abc9e51bff53cc05ef333513c6be038df29929a0a55310d9c Proxy server (32-bit DLL)
edd2aff8fad0c76021adc74fe3cb3cb1a02913a839ad0f2cf31fdea8b5aa8195 Remote access tool (Android APK)

Appendix 5.

IoCs of FastCash

Indicator Description
D465637518024262C063F4A82D799A4E40FF3381014972F24EA18BC23C3B27EE Trojan.Fastcash Injector
CA9AB48D293CC84092E8DB8F0CA99CB155B30C61D32A1DA7CD3687DE454FE86C Trojan.Fastcash DLL
10AC312C8DD02E417DD24D53C99525C29D74DCBC84730351AD7A4E0A4B1A0EBA Trojan.Fastcash DLL
3A5BA44F140821849DE2D82D5A137C3BB5A736130DDDB86B296D94E6B421594C Trojan.Fastcash DLL