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Dec 02, 2021
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APT Profile: Who is Lazarus Group?

By SOCRadar Research

[Update] December 12, 2023: See the subheading: “Lazarus Uses Log4Shell in Operation Blacksmith, Deploys New Malware: NineRAT, DLRAT, and BottomLoader.”

[Update] September 1, 2023: See the subheading: “VMConnect Campaign Unveiled: Lazarus Group is the Culprit.”

[Update] August 24, 2023: The FBI warns that the Lazarus Group plans to convert stolen cryptocurrency, potentially valued at over $40 million, into cash. Added the subheading “FBI Warns Of Lazarus Plan To Cash Out $40 Million In Stolen Cryptocurrency.”

[Update] August 8, 2023: North Korean state-backed hackers breached Russia’s leading missile manufacturer, NPO Mashinostroyeniya (NPO Mash). Added the subheading: “Lazarus and ScarCruft Breach Leading Missile Manufacturer NPO Mash.”

Nation-state threat actors are cyber threat groups operating in states’ interests. They sabotage, engage in espionage, and steal sensitive information to supply strategic and economic information to their home countries for political or national security reasons. While financial gain is among their motivations, it is not usually at the top of the list. Lazarus group, apart from the majority of other nation-state threat actors, is an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actor that prioritizes financial gain as well as political objectives.

Lazarus Group 101

The Lazarus Group is known by many names, including Hidden Cobra, Zinc, APT-C-26, Guardians of Peace, Group 77, Who Is Hacking Team, Stardust Chollima, and Nickel Academy, among other titles. The Lazarus Group is attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). In 2017, the U.S. government issued a joint technical alert (TA17-164A), based on analysis by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), that identified Hidden Cobra as a “North Korean state-sponsored malicious cyber organization.”

SOCRadar XTI Platform, Threat Actor/Malware Module
SOCRadar XTI Platform, Threat Actor/Malware Module

Lazarus group was first identified and named in the ‘Operation BlockBuster’ report (2016) published by a consortium of security firms led by Novetta to investigate the Sony Pictures Entertainment attack in 2014. During the investigation, various malware was found associated with the malware used in the Sony Pictures attack. By tracking the malware and the attackers’ modus operandi, researchers could identify the activities of the Lazarus group as far back as 2009 (possibly 2007).

Because North Korean threat actors tend to share their infrastructure, code, and resources, defining the Lazarus group’s boundaries is challenging. Uncertainties exist over the Lazarus group’s composition due to clusters like “Bluenoroff” and “Andariel,” which are classified as sub-groups, “TEMP.Hermit,” with which it shares code, and “Kimsuky,” with which its operations overlap.

Lazarus group’s activities are aligned with North Korea’s political interests. Therefore, South Korea and the U.S. are the main focus. Other countries among its targets are Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Thailand, Türkiye and the United Kingdom.

Targeted Countries by Lazarus APT Group (Source: SOCRadar)
Targeted Countries by Lazarus APT Group (Source: SOCRadar)

Lazarus group has a broader range of operations than other nation-state threat actors. Its primary objectives include information theft, money extortion, espionage, sabotage, and disruption. In addition to bank robberies, cryptocurrency theft, and ransomware attacks for financial gain, it carries out attacks against precisely selected targets in areas where it can obtain strategically important intelligence, such as energy, aviation, and defense.

  • Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities
  • Space Research and Technology
  • National Security and International Affairs
  • Finance and Insurance
  • Educational Services
  • Health Care and Social Assistance
  • Public Administration
  • Computer and Electronic Product Manufacturing
  • Commodity Contracts Intermediation (CryptoCurrency & NFT Market)
  • Publishing Industries (except Internet)
  • Utilities
  • Manufacturing

They also target journalists, human rights organizations, North Korean defectors, and any group that might criticize the DPRK.

How Does the Lazarus Group Attack

Lazarus group has evolved its strategy over time since its first attacks, which consisted of DDoS operations against various organizations in different industries. Attacks became more destructive due to an ever-evolving arsenal of malware and TTPs.

Lazarus group’s attack pattern can vary depending on the specific attacks, although they generally follow similar steps.

  • Lazarus group plans sophisticated and focused attacks against potential victims. The group determines potential targets and gathers information about their infrastructure, security posture, and employees. They observe the targets’ activities and find the best attack time.
  • They use various technics, including spear phishing, supply-chain attacks, waterhole attacks, and zero-day vulnerability exploitation. To access targeted networks, exfiltrate sensitive data, and maintain persistence, they also use a range of custom-built malware, such as remote access trojans (RATs), backdoors, and botnets.

To hide their tracks and prevent detection, they delete logs and data and infect the victim with malware or ransomware. Once detected, acting swiftly, they try to avoid forensic investigations by immediately repackaging malware and switching encryption keys and algorithms.

Lazarus APT Group Attack Chain
Lazarus APT Group Attack Chain

Which Tools and Vulnerabilities Does Lazarus Group Use

Over the years, the Lazarus group has carried out several activities, mostly involving disruption, sabotage, financial theft, and espionage. It has a reputation for employing aggressive strategies, such as disk-wiping malware, to damage its targets as much as possible.

Lazarus group is known for creating custom malware for operations and quickly modifying, upgrading, and developing existing malware. Lazarus Group has utilized a variety of tools in the attacks, some of which are:

  • Backdoors: Appleseed, HardRain, BadCall, Hidden Cobra, Destroyer, and Duuzer
  • Remote Access Trojans (RATs): Fallchill, Joanap, Brambul, and
  • Ransomware: Wannacry
Lazarus APT Group-associated tools provided by SOCRadar
Lazarus APT group-associated tools provided by SOCRadar

Lazarus group has used many zero-day vulnerabilities they purchased or discovered. They also use several known vulnerabilities in their attacks, including:

  • Adobe Flash Player vulnerabilities
  • Microsoft Office vulnerabilities
  • Vulnerabilities in local software of South Korea (Exp. Hangul Word Processor (HWP))
  • Vulnerabilities in the SWIFT (The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) software
Lazarus APT Group-associated vulnerabilities provided by SOCRadar
Lazarus APT Group-associated vulnerabilities provided by SOCRadar

Notable Attacks of the Lazarus Group 

In 2016, after being identified and named, the retrospective activities of the Lazarus group were tracked. Large-scale DDoS attacks against the U.S. and South Korea (2009), espionage attacks against U.S. and South Korean websites “Operation Troy” (2009-2013), “Ten Days of Rain,” which included DDoS attacks against South Korean media and financial institutions and U.S. military facilities (2011), “Operation 1Million/Dark Seoul” attack against a South Korean bank and broadcast organization (2013) were all attributed to the Lazarus group.

The “Operation Flame” (2007), which was eventually connected to the “Dark Seoul” attack (2013), can qualify as the group’s first attack.

The 2014 Sony Picture Entertainment attack and a series of SWIFT-targeted campaigns in 2015-2016 (especially the 2016 Bangladesh Bank heist) are among the significant attacks linked to the Lazarus group.

The ‘Wannacry’ ransomware attack in 2017—the biggest ransomware attack to date—affected 300,000 systems across 150 countries.

The “Operation AppleJeus” attack was discovered in 2018 but has been ongoing since at least 2017, targeting cryptocurrency users. Another financially motivated attack is the “FastCash” operation, founded in 2018 but has been ongoing since at least 2016. “FastCash” is a series of attacks targeting (Automated Teller Machines) ATMs of various banks in several countries.

Operation AppleJeus (Source: SOCRadar)
Operation AppleJeus (Source: SOCRadar)

Lazarus group conducted several campaigns in 2020, including attacks on pharmaceutical companies, “Operation ThreatNeddle” against the defense and security sector, “Operation In(ter)ception” against military and aerospace firms, particularly in Europe, and “Operation Dreamjob” against multiple individuals globally in the defense industry and various governmental organizations using social media.

In 2022, the Lazarus group targeted energy providers around the world. The campaign involved the exploitation of the vulnerability in VMware Horizon to gain initial access. 2022 cryptocurrency attacks also drew attention.

Recent Attacks of the Lazarus Group

As the concern of the entire world, the Covid-19 pandemic has also been on the Lazarus group’s agenda, and they targeted pharmaceutical corporations. In 2020, the group attacked pharmaceutical companies and research facilities working on Covid-19 vaccines. Lazarus group members attempted to steal crucial information about the vaccine development process by posing as medical professionals and contacting pharmaceutical business personnel with messages that contained malicious attachments.

The “Dream Job” operation from 2020 reappeared in 2022. The group specifically used social media attacks with fraudulent job offers for researchers working for chemical and information security companies.

Another recurring campaign was “Operation AppleJeus.” The U.S. government published an advisory attributing the cryptocurrency stealing campaign “AppleJeus” to the Lazarus Group (AA21-048A) in 2021. In 2022, cryptocurrency attacks continued to increase. The group targeted organizations in the finance industry with phishing emails containing malware that was used to steal cryptocurrency.

On April 12, 2022, the U.S. Treasury Department accused the Lazarus group of carrying out the “Ronin Bridge” attack, the largest cryptocurrency attack ever, and held them responsible for a $620 million Ethereum heist.

lazarus apt group ronin attack

On April 18, 2022, The FBI, CISA, and the Department of the Treasury published a joint Cybersecurity Advisory highlighting the cyber threat associated with bitcoin thefts and techniques utilized by Lazarus group as a North Korean state-sponsored advanced persistent threat (AA22-108A). In addition, the FBI, in its statement on February 6, 2023, claimed the Lazarus group was responsible for “Harmony’s Horizon Bridge Currency Theft” and $100M heist.

The chart of daily discovered Lazarus APT Group IOCs and distribution in 2022 (Source: SOCRadar)
The chart of daily discovered Lazarus APT Group IOCs and distribution in 2022 (Source: SOCRadar)

Lazarus and ScarCruft Breach Leading Missile Manufacturer NPO Mash

North Korean state-backed hackers breached Russia’s leading missile manufacturer, NPO Mashinostroyeniya (NPO Mash). The breach has been attributed to at least two distinct North Korean nation-state threat groups, including Lazarus. The attackers maintained their access for several months before discovery.

NPO Mash, renowned for its contribution to Soviet missile development, was founded during World War II. The manufacturer faced sanctions after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nowadays, Russia employs missiles produced by NPO Mash to target Ukraine.

The full impact of the breach and Pyongyang’s use of compromised information is uncertain. However, it underscores potential tensions between North Korea and its close ally.

The Possible Motive Behind the NPO Mash Cyberattack

The hack was linked to two North Korean cyberespionage groups: ScarCruft, for breaching the email server, and the notorious Lazarus, for implanting backdoors into systems. SentinelLabs researchers found that the incident began in late 2021 and lasted until May of the following year.

Researchers highlighted NPO Mash’s appeal as a target for nation-state hackers due to its possession of highly classified intellectual property associated with sensitive missile technology.

The breach is described as a “highly desirable strategic espionage mission” to support North Korea’s contentious missile program, as researchers suggest that the cyberattack could likely serve as a covert means for the country to advance its missile development goals.

OpenCarrot Backdoor and ScarCruft Compromise

In May 2022, the company found a suspicious file in its systems, later identified as a version of the OpenCarrot backdoor linked to Lazarus.

This OpenCarrot variant comes with capabilities like reconnaissance, file/process manipulation, and reconfiguration with connectivity features. Additionally, SentinelLabs found ScarCruft compromising Mash’s Linux email server.

ScarCruft is linked to North Korea’s state activities, focusing on high-value individuals. In contrast, Lazarus is known for cryptocurrency heists, allegedly amassing over $2 billion. It’s unclear if the groups collaborated, but this attack indicates possible resource sharing.

FBI Warns Of Lazarus Plan To Cash Out $40 Million In Stolen Cryptocurrency

The FBI has issued a warning indicating that individuals affiliated with the Lazarus Group are preparing to convert stolen cryptocurrency, potentially valued at over $40 million, into cash.

This announcement comes after the FBI’s tracking of around 1,580 bitcoins, taken in previous cryptocurrency heists, to six specific cryptocurrency wallets.

The agency has listed these wallet addresses and urged cryptocurrency companies to carefully analyze blockchain data and take steps to prevent transactions involving these addresses:

  • 3LU8wRu4ZnXP4UM8Yo6kkTiGHM9BubgyiG
  • 39idqitN9tYNmq3wYanwg3MitFB5TZCjWu
  • 3AAUBbKJorvNhEUFhKnep9YTwmZECxE4Nk
  • 3PjNaSeP8GzLjGeu51JR19Q2Lu8W2Te9oc
  • 3NbdrezMzAVVfXv5MTQJn4hWqKhYCTCJoB
  • 34VXKa5upLWVYMXmgid6bFM4BaQXHxSUoL

VMConnect Campaign Unveiled: Lazarus Group is the Culprit

In early August, researchers uncovered the VMConnect campaign, which featured roughly two dozen malicious Python packages on the Python Package Index (PyPI). These packages included backdoors and info-stealing capabilities, masquerading as popular open-source Python tools like vConnector, eth-tester, and databases.

Recently, researchers identified three more malicious Python packages tied to the VMConnect campaign – tablediter, request-plus, and requestspro, attributing this malicious activity to the Lazarus Group.

About the New Malicious PyPI Packages

To conceal these malicious PyPI packages, the threat actors used typosquatting, copied the description of legitimate packages, and updated package names in the fake packages’ documentation references accordingly.

tablediter:

One of the Python packages researchers identified is tablediter. This package mimics “prettytable,” a Python tool for visually appealing table printing, boasting over 9 million monthly downloads. Interestingly, the malicious functionality within tablediter remains dormant during installation; it activates only when utilized in a project. Researchers found that the decrypted code’s functionality closely resembles what was extracted from a previous malicious package in the VMConnect campaign.

request-plus, requestspro:

The packages named request-plus and requestspro target the highly popular requests library on PyPI. Requests is an HTTP library that garners thousands of monthly downloads and over 2.3 million dependencies. The attackers duplicated the files from the legitimate requests package within their fake packages. Furthermore, just like with tablediter, these packages were meticulously crafted to evade detection, both pre and post-installation.

For more information about these packages, and their IoCs, refer here.

For a deeper understanding of the threat posed by malicious packages to DevOps environments, we invite you to explore our related blog post.

How Did Researchers Attribute This Campaign to Lazarus?

Researchers have uncovered py_QRcode, a package featuring a builder.py file with notably similar malicious functionality to the VMConnect package. Both manipulate file paths based on architecture, employ a base64-encoded variable for the next-level payload, and share similar code for decoding and local file writing.

JPCERT/CC previously published a blog about py_QRcode, attributing it to DangerousPassword, a Lazarus subgroup. Moreover, the py_QRcode package mirrors QRLog’s functionality, as outlined in this research. Both QRLog and py_QRcode malware samples utilize the same C2 domain. Mauro Eldritch, the researcher who discovered the malicious QRLog package, shared his findings with cybersecurity firm Crowdstrike, which confidently attributed the malware to Labyrinth Chollima, another Lazarus subgroup.

These attributions, along with shared code similarities between the VMConnect campaign and JPCERT/CC’s research, lead researchers to connect both attacks to the Lazarus Group.

Lazarus Uses Log4Shell in Operation Blacksmith, Deploys New Malware: NineRAT, DLRAT, and BottomLoader

Lazarus has been observed exploiting the Log4Shell RCE vulnerability (CVE-2021-44228) in a recent campaign, deploying three new malware written in DLang: remote access trojans NineRAT and DLRAT, and a malware downloader named BottomLoader.

Cisco Talos has noted a significant change in the tactics of the Lazarus group. In the last eighteen months, Talos has revealed three distinct remote access trojans developed using ‘uncommon’ technologies such as QtFramework, PowerBasic, and most recently in this campaign, DLang.

In the campaign named “Operation Blacksmith,” Lazarus targets manufacturing, agricultural, and physical security companies. According to the researchers, the campaign includes ongoing opportunistic targeting of global enterprises that publicly host and expose vulnerable infrastructure to n-day vulnerability exploitation, like the Log4j vulnerability.

NineRAT: 

NineRAT utilizes the Telegram API for C2 communication, facilitating the transfer of files and evasion of detection. This RAT also employs a dropper, aiding threat actors in establishing persistence and executing additional binaries. The commands associated with NineRAT are as follows:

/infoGather preliminary information about the infected system.
/setmtokenSet a token value.
/setbtokenSet a new Bot token.
/setintervalSet time interval between malware polls to the Telegram channel.
/setsleepSet a time period for which the malware should sleep/lie dormant.
/upgradeUpgrade to a new version of the implant.
/exitExit execution of the malware.
/uninstallUninstall self from the endpoint.
/sendfileSend a file to the C2 server from the infected endpoint.

DLRAT: 

DLRAT is a downloader RAT that Lazarus can utilize to deploy additional malware and retrieve commands from the C2. Upon infiltrating a device, DLRAT executes hard-coded commands for reconnaissance, collecting system information, and exfiltrates it to the C2 server.

Researchers discovered that the session information ID used by DLRAT in its communication with the C2 server is “23wfow02rofw391ng23,” same as a value identified in a previous research into MagicRAT.

The C2 reply includes the external IP address of the implant. The malware recognizes specific command codes/names sent by the C2 to execute actions on the infected system.

deletemeDelete itself from the system using a BAT file.
downloadDownload files from a specified remote location.
renameRename files on the system.
iamsleepInstructs the implant to go to sleep for a specified amount of time.
uploadUpload files to C2.
showurlsEmpty command (Not implemented yet).

BottomLoader: 

BottomLoader is a malware downloader that retrieves and executes next-stage payloads from a remote host, like HazyLoad. Researchers note that it can download the payload from a hardcoded remote URL and upload files to the C2 using PowerShell commands. Additionally, BottomLoader can establish persistence for newer versions or new payloads by modifying the Startup directory.

Lazarus’ Attack Scheme in ‘Operation Blacksmith’ Campaign

In ‘Operation Blacksmith,’ Lazarus initiates access by exploiting the Log4j vulnerability discovered in 2021. Although fixed, the vulnerability continues to pose a threat, with Lazarus sub-groups extensively exploiting it for malicious activities. The threat actor targets VMWare Horizon servers exposed to the public, utilizing a vulnerable Log4j logging library version.

After exploiting the vulnerability, Lazarus establishes persistent access using the HazyLoad proxy tool, runs reconnaissance commands, creates admin-privileged user accounts, and deploys credential-stealing tools such as ProcDump and MimiKatz. Microsoft previously identified HazyLoad in Lazarus attacks exploiting a critical security vulnerability in JetBrains TeamCity (CVE-2023-42793). HazyLoad is downloaded and executed by the loader malware known as BottomLoader.

NineRAT is launched in the second phase, initially observed in use by Lazarus as early as March 2023. Upon activation, NineRAT receives commands via its Telegram-based C2 channel, enabling the fingerprinting of infected systems. Researchers suggest that re-fingerprinting indicates that data collected by Lazarus through NineRAT may be shared with other APT groups, residing in a different repository from the initial fingerprint data collected during Lazarus’ initial access.

Operation Blacksmith’s infection Chain (Cisco Talos)

Operation Blacksmith’s infection Chain (Cisco Talos)

Additionally, Talos notes overlap between Lazarus’ ‘Operation Blacksmith’ and the North Korean state-sponsored group Onyx Sleet (PLUTIONIUM), also known as the Andariel APT group. Onyx Sleet is widely considered an APT sub-group under the Lazarus umbrella, exhibiting consistent TTPs.

More information about the Operation Blacksmith campaign and the IOCs for NineRAT, DLRAT, BottomLoader, HazyLoad, and network-related indicators are accessible here.

How Can SOCRadar Help?

Lazarus group has been active for over a decade and has launched attacks in various industries. In their attacks, they have shown high proficiency and flexibility, utilizing custom-built and publicly accessible tools and exploiting various vulnerabilities to achieve their goals. Due to its capabilities and operations, the group is currently one of the most powerful North Korean threat actors.

Reviewing the cases reveals that the group typically uses phishing attacks to gain initial access. In particular, spear phishing attacks against the defense and aerospace sector and ‘dreamjob’ attacks against security researchers, which include fake job offers, make it necessary for companies in these sectors to be sensitive about the cybersecurity awareness of their employees.

SOC Tools on SOCRadar XTI Labs provide a free analysis of suspicious emails.

SOC Tools provided by SOCRadar Labs
SOC Tools provided by SOCRadar Labs

Lazarus group effectively exploits some well-known system vulnerabilities in their numerous attacks. SOCRadar Extended Threat Intelligence provides an Attack Surface Management (ASM) solution for continuous discovery, inventory, classification, and prioritization with real-time monitoring to help gain comprehensive visibility into external-facing digital assets. Security teams can keep track of the vulnerabilities in the network using the SOCRadar XTI ASM solution. Understanding which vulnerabilities exist in the company can help to minimize the attack surface that nation-state threat actors may exploit.

SOCRadar XTI Attack Surface Management

Lazarus group frequently uses supply-chain attacks. SOCRadar XTI provides organizations 360-degree visibility across the entire digital ecosystem by including third-party/supply chain partners in their digital footprint.

SOCRadar XTI Supply Chain Intelligence Module
SOCRadar XTI Supply Chain Intelligence Module

Appendixes

Appendix 1.

MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

TechniquesName
T1134.002Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token
T1087.002Account Discovery: Domain Account
T1098Account Manipulation
T1583.001Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
T1583.004Acquire Infrastructure: Server
T1583.006Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services
T1557.001Adversary-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay
T1071.001Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
T1010Application Window Discovery
T1560Archive Collected Data
T1560.002Archive via Library
T1560.003Archive via Custom Method
T1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Shortcut Modification
T1110Brute Force
T1110.003Password Spraying
T1059.001Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
T1059.003Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell
T1059.005Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic
T1584.001Compromise Infrastructure: Domains
T1584.004Compromise Infrastructure: Server
T1543.003Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
T1485Data Destruction
T1132.001Data Encoding: Standard Encoding
T1005Data from Local System
T1001.003Data Obfuscation: Protocol Impersonation
T1074.001Data Staged: Local Data Staging
T1491.001Defacement: Internal Defacement
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1587.001Develop Capabilities: Malware
T1561.001Disk Wipe: Disk Content Wipe
T1561.002Disk Wipe: Disk Structure Wipe
T1189Drive-by Compromise
T1573.001Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
T1585.001Establish Accounts: Social Media Accounts
T1585.002Establish Accounts: Email Accounts
T1048.003Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol: Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1567.002Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
T1203Exploitation for Client Execution
T1008Fallback Channels
T1083File and Directory Discovery
T1589.002Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses
T1591Gather Victim Org Information
T1591.004Identify Roles
T1564.001Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
T1574.002Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
T1574.013Hijack Execution Flow: KernelCallbackTable
T1562.001Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
T1562.004Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall
T1070Indicator Removal
T1070.003Clear Command History
T1070.004File Deletion
T1070.006Timestomp
T1202Indirect Command Execution
T1105Ingress Tool Transfer
T1056.001Input Capture: Keylogging
T1534Internal Spearphishing
T1036Masquerading
T1036.003Rename System Utilities
T1036.004Masquerade Task or Service
T1036.005Match Legitimate Name or Location
T1104Multi-Stage Channels
T1106Native API
T1046Network Service Discovery
T1571Non-Standard Port
T1027Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.002Software Packing
T1027.007Dynamic API Resolution
T1588.002Obtain Capabilities: Tool
T1588.003Obtain Capabilities: Code Signing Certificates
T1588.004Obtain Capabilities: Digital Certificates
T1566.001Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002Phishing: Spearphishing Link
T1566.003Phishing: Spearphishing via Service
T1542.003Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
T1057Process Discovery
T1055.001Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
T1090.001Proxy: Internal Proxy
T1090.002Proxy: External Proxy
T1012Query Registry
T1620Reflective Code Loading
T1021.001Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.004Remote Services: SSH
T1053.005Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
T1593.001Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media
T1489Service Stop
T1608.001Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware
T1608.002Stage Capabilities: Upload Tool
T1553.002Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing
T1218System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005Mshta
T1218.01Regsvr32
T1218.011Rundll32
T1082System Information Discovery
T1614.001System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
T1016System Network Configuration Discovery
T1049System Network Connections Discovery
T1033System Owner/User Discovery
T1529System Shutdown/Reboot
T1124System Time Discovery
T1221Template Injection
T1204.001User Execution: Malicious Link
T1204.002User Execution: Malicious File
T1078Valid Accounts
T1497.001Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks
T1102.002Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
T1047Windows Management Instrumentation
T1220XSL Script Processing
T0865Spearphishing Attachment

Appendix 2.

Lazarus Group crypto Ethereum address:

0x098B716B8Aaf21512996dC57EB0615e2383E2f96

0xa0e1c89Ef1a489c9C7dE96311eD5Ce5D32c20E4B

0x3Cffd56B47B7b41c56258D9C7731ABaDc360E073

0x53b6936513e738f44FB50d2b9476730C0Ab3Bfc1

Appendix 3.

IoCs of Wannacry

IP Addresses and Domains

IPv4 197(.)231.221.211

IPv4 128(.)31.0.39

IPv4 149(.)202.160.69

IPv4 46(.)101.166.19

IPv4 91(.)121.65.179

URL hxxp://www(.)btcfrog(.)com/qr/bitcoinpng(.)php?address

URL hxxp://www(.)rentasyventas(.)com/incluir/rk/imagenes(.)html

URL hxxp://www(.)rentasyventas(.)com/incluir/rk/imagenes(.)html?retencion=081525418

URL hxxp://gx7ekbenv2riucmf(.)onion

URL hxxp://57g7spgrzlojinas(.)onion

URL hxxp://xxlvbrloxvriy2c5(.)onion

URL hxxp://76jdd2ir2embyv47(.)onion

URL hxxp://cwwnhwhlz52maqm7(.)onion

URL hxxp://197.231.221(.)211 Port:9001

URL hxxp://128.31.0(.)39 Port:9191

URL hxxp://149.202.160(.)69 Port:9001

URL hxxp://46.101.166(.)19 Port:9090

URL hxxp://91.121.65(.)179 Port:9001

Hashes

https://gist.github.com/Blevene/42bed05ecb51c1ca0edf846c0153974a

Hash-MD55a89aac6c8259abbba2fa2ad3fcefc6e
Hash-MD505da32043b1e3a147de634c550f1954d
Hash-MD58e97637474ab77441ae5add3f3325753
Hash-MD5c9ede1054fef33720f9fa97f5e8abe49
Hash-MD5f9cee5e75b7f1298aece9145ea80a1d2
Hash-MD5638f9235d038a0a001d5ea7f5c5dc4ae
Hash-MD580a2af99fd990567869e9cf4039edf73
Hash-MD5c39ed6f52aaa31ae0301c591802da24b
Hash-MD5db349b97c37d22f5ea1d1841e3c89eb4
Hash-MD5f9992dfb56a9c6c20eb727e6a26b0172
Hash-MD546d140a0eb13582852b5f778bb20cf0e
Hash-MD55bef35496fcbdbe841c82f4d1ab8b7c2
Hash-MD53c6375f586a49fc12a4de9328174f0c1
Hash-MD5246c2781b88f58bc6b0da24ec71dd028
Hash-MD5b7f7ad4970506e8547e0f493c80ba441
Hash-MD52b4e8612d9f8cdcf520a8b2e42779ffa
Hash-MD5c61256583c6569ac13a136bfd440ca09
Hash-MD531dab68b11824153b4c975399df0354f
Hash-MD554a116ff80df6e6031059fc3036464df
Hash-MD5d6114ba5f10ad67a4131ab72531f02da
Hash-MD505a00c320754934782ec5dec1d5c0476
Hash-MD5f107a717f76f4f910ae9cb4dc5290594
Hash-MD57f7ccaa16fb15eb1c7399d422f8363e8
Hash-MD584c82835a5d21bbcf75a61706d8ab549
Hash-MD5bec0b7aff4b107edd5b9276721137651
Hash-MD586721e64ffbd69aa6944b9672bcabb6d
Hash-MD5509c41ec97bb81b0567b059aa2f50fe8
Hash-MD58db349b97c37d22f5ea1d1841e3c89eb
Hash-SHA16fbb0aabe992b3bda8a9b1ecd68ea13b668f232e
Hash-SHA2560a73291ab5607aef7db23863cf8e72f55bcb3c273bb47f00edf011515aeb5894
Hash-SHA25621ed253b796f63b9e95b4e426a82303dfac5bf8062bfe669995bde2208b360fd
Hash-SHA256228780c8cff9044b2e48f0e92163bd78cc6df37839fe70a54ed631d3b6d826d5
Hash-SHA2562372862afaa8e8720bc46f93cb27a9b12646a7cbc952cc732b8f5df7aebb2450
Hash-SHA2562ca2d550e603d74dedda03156023135b38da3630cb014e3d00b1263358c5f00d
Hash-SHA2563ecc7b1ee872b45b534c9132c72d3523d2a1576ffd5763fd3c23afa79cf1f5f9
Hash-SHA25643d1ef55c9d33472a5532de5bbe814fefa5205297653201c30fdc91b8f21a0ed
Hash-SHA25649fa2e0131340da29c564d25779c0cafb550da549fae65880a6b22d45ea2067f
Hash-SHA2564a468603fdcb7a2eb5770705898cf9ef37aade532a7964642ecd705a74794b79
Hash-SHA256616e60f031b6e7c4f99c216d120e8b38763b3fafd9ac4387ed0533b15df23420
Hash-SHA25666334f10cb494b2d58219fa6d1c683f2dbcfc1fb0af9d1e75d49a67e5d057fc5
Hash-SHA2568b52f88f50a6a254280a0023cf4dc289bd82c441e648613c0c2bb9a618223604
Hash-SHA2568c3a91694ae0fc87074db6b3e684c586e801f4faed459587dcc6274e006422a4
Hash-SHA256aae9536875784fe6e55357900519f97fee0a56d6780860779a36f06765243d56
Hash-SHA256b9c5d4339809e0ad9a00d4d3dd26fdf44a32819a54abf846bb9b560d81391c25
Hash-SHA256ed01ebfbc9eb5bbea545af4d01bf5f1071661840480439c6e5babe8e080e41aa
Hash-SHA256f7c7b5e4b051ea5bd0017803f40af13bed224c4b0fd60b890b6784df5bd63494
Hash-SHA25609a46b3e1be080745a6d8d88d6b5bd351b1c7586ae0dc94d0c238ee36421cafa
Hash-SHA256149601e15002f78866ab73033eb8577f11bd489a4cea87b10c52a70fdf78d9ff
Hash-SHA256190d9c3e071a38cb26211bfffeb6c4bb88bd74c6bf99db9bb1f084c6a7e1df4e
Hash-SHA25624d004a104d4d54034dbcffc2a4b19a11f39008a575aa614ea04703480b1022c
Hash-SHA2562584e1521065e45ec3c17767c065429038fc6291c091097ea8b22c8a502c41dd
Hash-SHA2564186675cb6706f9d51167fb0f14cd3f8fcfb0065093f62b10a15f7d9a6c8d982
Hash-SHA256593bbcc8f34047da9960b8456094c0eaf69caaf16f1626b813484207df8bd8af
Hash-SHA2565ad4efd90dcde01d26cc6f32f7ce3ce0b4d4951d4b94a19aa097341aff2acaec
Hash-SHA2567c465ea7bcccf4f94147add808f24629644be11c0ba4823f16e8c19e0090f0ff
Hash-SHA2569b60c622546dc45cca64df935b71c26dcf4886d6fa811944dbc4e23db9335640
Hash-SHA2569fb39f162c1e1eb55fbf38e670d5e329d84542d3dfcdc341a99f5d07c4b50977
Hash-SHA256b47e281bfbeeb0758f8c625bed5c5a0d27ee8e0065ceeadd76b0010d226206f0
Hash-SHA256b66db13d17ae8bcaf586180e3dcd1e2e0a084b6bc987ac829bbff18c3be7f8b4
Hash-SHA256c365ddaa345cfcaff3d629505572a484cff5221933d68e4a52130b8bb7badaf9
Hash-SHA256d8a9879a99ac7b12e63e6bcae7f965fbf1b63d892a8649ab1d6b08ce711f7127
Hash-SHA256f8812f1deb8001f3b7672b6fc85640ecb123bc2304b563728e6235ccbe782d85
Hash-SHA25611d0f63c06263f50b972287b4bbd1abe0089bc993f73d75768b6b41e3d6f6d49
Hash-SHA25616493ecc4c4bc5746acbe96bd8af001f733114070d694db76ea7b5a0de7ad0ab
Hash-SHA2566bf1839a7e72a92a2bb18fbedf1873e4892b00ea4b122e48ae80fac5048db1a7
Hash-SHA256b3c39aeb14425f137b5bd0fd7654f1d6a45c0e8518ef7e209ad63d8dc6d0bac7
Hash-SHA256e14f1a655d54254d06d51cd23a2fa57b6ffdf371cf6b828ee483b1b1d6d21079
Hash-SHA256e8450dd6f908b23c9cbd6011fe3d940b24c0420a208d6924e2d920f92c894a96

Appendix 4.

IoCs of BADCALL

IndicatorDescription
d1f3b9372a6be9c02430b6e4526202974179a674ce94fe22028d7212ae6be9e7Proxy server (32-bit EXE)
4257bb11570ed15b8a15aa3fc051a580eab5d09c2f9d79e4b264b752c8e584fcProxy server (32-bit DLL)
93e13ffd2a2f1a13fb9a09de1d98324f75b3f0f8e0c822857ed5ca3b73ee3672Implant loader (32-bit EXE)
da353b2845a354e1a3f671e4a12198e2c6f57a377d02dfaf90477869041a044fDecrypted implant (Zip Archive)
91650e7b0833a34abc9e51bff53cc05ef333513c6be038df29929a0a55310d9cProxy server (32-bit DLL)
edd2aff8fad0c76021adc74fe3cb3cb1a02913a839ad0f2cf31fdea8b5aa8195Remote access tool (Android APK)

Appendix 5.

IoCs of FastCash

IndicatorDescription
D465637518024262C063F4A82D799A4E40FF3381014972F24EA18BC23C3B27EETrojan.Fastcash Injector
CA9AB48D293CC84092E8DB8F0CA99CB155B30C61D32A1DA7CD3687DE454FE86CTrojan.Fastcash DLL
10AC312C8DD02E417DD24D53C99525C29D74DCBC84730351AD7A4E0A4B1A0EBATrojan.Fastcash DLL
3A5BA44F140821849DE2D82D5A137C3BB5A736130DDDB86B296D94E6B421594CTrojan.Fastcash DLL